Norway hasn’t been overly quick to kick off their own zweitenwende – to the extent that just eighteen months ago the discussion was whether they could afford new tanks or not (a topic on which I had some opinions). But things can change quickly when there’s a will, and last Friday Norway launched one of the most ambitious rearmament plans seen in the post-2022 world. It’s good to have allies like these (assuming the government proposal passes the parliament, which it seems set to do).
A sense of urgency has clearly gripped the Norwegian government, and several of the planned procurements are on rather ambitious timelines. Tailormade solutions are nice, but we are too small for them to make sense and they take too long was the message delivered.
Growth
Both the budget and the defence forces will increase. Not only will Norway reach the 2% of GDP threshold already this year if the government gets the additional funds they want this spring (Sweden, take notice!), but the plan calls for defence spending to reach 3% by 2036. And there are a lot of issues you can fix by throwing an extra 57 billion Euro at them. This includes things that can be addressed (or at least ordered…) in short order, such as more munitions, spares, and larger fuel storages. We will also see significant investment in infrastructure and host nation support (HNS)-related capabilities to ensure the ability to receive aid from allies.
A key issue is personnel, as getting qualified personnel is not something that is done in an instant. The government does say all the right things – they will increase the number of conscripts significantly, as these constitute an important basis for recruitment to all positions within the force, and they will start training more officers. The NCO academy (Forsvarets Befalsskole) will also relocate to Kjevik in search of better facilities – which is quite the turnaround for the garrison in Southern Norway which was supposed shut down. To ensure retention, they are looking at wages and benefits, and doing so while discussing the question with the unions involved. Living quarters and living conditions in general are also looked at and are to be improved. The proof is in the pudding, but recognising this will be a significant aspect of whether the plan succeeds or fails is at least a good first step. And while the increase in conscripts and contracted personnel by 4,600 more in each category is significant, their numbers are overshadowed by the plan to add 13,700 reservists.
For Finland and Sweden, it might be worth starting to ask questions about the Norwegian ambitions for their operational headquarters, the Forsvarets operative hovedkvarter, which they happily describe as “the only joint operational headquarters in the Nordics that is fully compatible with NATO”, and the future of which will be adjusted according to NATO plans and Nordic cooperation. Did we read JFC Norfolk’s Land Component Command between the lines?
Ground Forces
The Army which until recently has struggled to put a single brigade together will grow to three. Okay, there’s a bit of fluff in those number, but the increase is significant. Brigade Nord will continue to be the premier fighting unit, with four mechanised battalions and supporting elements. Supporting it in the High North will be the new Finnmarksbrigaden situated closest to the Russian border. A single light infantry battalion will be added to the two battalions already found in the North-East – the border guards’ Jegerbataljon (GSV) and the light mechanised Porsanger bataljon – and the unit will receive an artillery battalion, organic air defences, a recce-company, and an engineering company. The brigade will also operate in close cooperation with the Home Guard in the region. The third brigade is Brigade Sør, which will be made up of reservists and set up in the south of the country. The main task will be to secure the capital region, but also to act as a mobile strategic response force. In addition, the Home Guard will grow to 45,000 soldiers, and receive better training and equipment.
I wrote about the possibility of having a three brigade-strong multinational division in the High North a while ago, but with Sweden now planning for a Swedish division (with two brigades) for operations as part of a NATO corps-level headquarters in the region, and Norway bringing two brigades of their own, we might have to scrap those ideas. Instead it starts to look like we indeed will have a full allied army corps defending the region – a most welcome development in what traditionally has been a very sparsely defended area!
The Norwegian thinking around the value of long-range precision fires is well-known by now, and to the surprise of absolutely no-one a rocket-artillery battalion will also be set up. Ground-based air defences will also see significant increases, including more NASAMS-batteries, a long-range air defence unit able to counter short-range ballistic missiles, and more light systems.
Air
The Norwegian Air Force with a sizeable number of F-35A multirole fighters and five P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft have been the branch with the least issues for quite some time, and unsurprisingly there weren’t as many flashy headlines here. However, a number of significant improvements are heading their way, including an additional fifth C-130J Hercules as well as improvements to a number of air force bases. The value of these for the Finnish and Swedish Air Forces as well is obvious, and it is a welcome development from a force that at one point seemed to be putting too many eggs in the same basket.
The major change when it comes to platforms will be the venerable Bell 412 retiring, with a new transport helicopter being acquired for tactical transport and special forces duty. The schedule is rather tight, with deliveries of the new system being finished by the end of 2032.
Naval
The largest piece of the cake when measured in funds goes to the Navy (including the Coast Guard). I wrote a piece over at Naval News, but to recap the motley collection of patrol vessels, mine countermeasure vessels, and auxiliaries will be replaced by two standardised designs – 10 vessels of a large class for offshore work and 18 of a medium one for coastal work – with modular sensors and weapons. The order for Type 212CD submarines will be raised from four to five with options for a sixth, and there will be investments in air- and space-based sensors for monitoring the maritime domain – including additional resources and a brand new simulator for the P-8 Poseidon-fleet at Evenes (Harstad/Narvik) as well as long-endurance drones with a particular eye towards maritime surveillance in the High North.
The standardised designs will share as much commonality as possible to create synergies when it comes to acquisitions and maintenance, but also when it comes to training and aiding with transferring personnel from one class to another. They will be based on civilian standards adjusted for military needs, and the roles include patrol, offensive and defensive mine warfare, and limited ASW-capability. An interesting detail is that – in line with general comments on the press conference – the vessels will be built with an eye to changing propulsion at some point during their career away from fossil fuels, as the defence forces can’t be left running on fossils in 2060 if the rest of society has moved on. The specifications sounds somewhat like Norwegian defence powerhouse Kongsberg’s Vanguard-concept, which might or might not be what the MoD has in mind. What is clear however is that throughout the fleet plan, involving the Norwegian maritime industry is a stated aim, and the order for 28 modern vessels seems like a prime candidate to provide work for Norwegian shipyards.
The Type 212CD submarines is a joint German-Norwegian program for a submarine significantly larger than either the German 212A-class or the Norwegian (German-built) Ula-class. So far Germany has two boats on order and Norway has had four on order – building of the first having started last fall. This will now be raised by one additional order, with an option for a sixth one (my understanding is that Norway as part of the original contract has had an option for boats five and six, so it remains to be seen whether this refers to a lengthening of the option for boat number six, or how the paperwork will look). Notable is that Norway has six Ula-class in service (with plans to retire two and soldier on with four), so while an argument can be made that the 212CD will be able to spend longer times on patrol and generally have better availability thanks to being newer, a five-boat fleet would still cut the number of hulls by one. Delivery of boat number one for Norway is slated for 2029, and the German and Norwegian vessels are referred to as “identical“. Keep those two data points in mind.
For the maritime patrol drones, the goal is to have them as part of the activities at Andøya, which contrary to earlier decisions won’t be closed, but instead will be developed into a centre for space and surveillance capabilities. The drones will also be acquired as part of an international users group, as the number of Norwegian platforms is expected to be very limited, leading to the need to split certification, training, and maintenance costs with other users. This is all part of the goal – with its own subheading in the report – of making Norway the alliance member with the best situational picture in the High North.
The single largest item in the whole plan is the acquisition of five new frigates – with options for a sixth – to replace the four remaining frigates of the Fridtjof Nansen-class. This has the possibility of being one of the more interesting naval programs, because the Norwegians plan on acquiring them fast. Very fast.
The vessels will be multipurpose frigates with the ability to fight enemies in the air, on the surface, and underwater, but an emphasis is placed on ASW. For this purposes, they will also be equipped with ASW-helicopters, something which the Norwegians currently lack after they packed up their NH 90 and shipped them back to the factory. The NH 90 was ordered for both Coast Guard and ASW-duties, and while the urgent needs for the Coast Guard is being handled by an extremely quick buy of MH-60R Seahawks – the ordered was placed only last year, with first delivery in 2026 thanks to US Navy handing over slots in the production queue – there has been no order for ASW-helicopters as of yet. While the MH-60R is certainly more than capable of fulfilling the ASW-role as well, it was not named as the chosen platform for the frigates.
However, it is hard not to see the Seahawk-buy as having inspired the government when it comes to what can be achieved if one really wants it. The experience with having the tailored Nansen-design and having to pay for the maintenance, training pipelines, and upgrades alone has also apparently been a less than happy one, and there will now be a full U-turn. The new frigates will be ordered according to what is operated by a “close ally” (a wording that is significantly stricter than just the general “allies” found in the alliance), and when asked about it on the press conference the Minister of Defence Bjørn Arild Gram went as far as using the word “identical” and drawing comparisons to the 212CD-program. Ordering them to an identical standard is probably also the only option if Norway really plans on getting the first vessel delivered by 2029.
Yes, they plan on getting a frigate they haven’t even ordered yet delivered within five years.
It’s not completely out of the realm of possibility – FREMM-class frigates which in complexity roughly corresponds to what Norway is looking for regularly have seen a building time from being laid down to being commissioned of four to five years – but it almost certainly will require an order placed within the next few months, and of a – as Gram said – identical design to one that is already in production. It might even require not just a hot production line, but one where the host nation is ready to give up a production slot or two.
So, who could this “close ally” be, who is able to build an ASW-centred multirole frigate for delivery by 2029, and preferably one which uses the Norwegian Naval Strike Missile (NSM) as its main anti-ship missile (the latter requirement is just my guess, the Proposition doesn’t explicitly mention the crown jewel of Norwegian arms export)?
The materiel cooperation with the United Kingdom also show good development after the United Kingdom has, among other things, acquired NSM. The United Kingdom is the most important country in Europe for early reinforcement of Norway in crisis and war. Continued prioritization of cooperation with the United Kingdom will become even more important for our security in the years to come. The collaboration has developed to also include the most modern weapon systems, so-called fifth-generation platforms. The cooperation is particularly important within the maritime domain, in areas such as anti-submarine operations, intelligence cooperation, maritime surveillance and presence.
Prop. 87 S
(2023 –2024)
Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til stortingsvedtak)
Forsvarsløftet – for Norges trygghet
Langtidsplan for forsvarssektoren
2025–2036
There are some frigate designs that might fit the bill. The Constellation-class is built by the “close ally” the USA, but it isn’t looking too hot right now. Germany’s F126 frigate is literally the size of French super-dreadnoughts and might be too much of a jump in size. The original FREMM-class or the Spanish F110 might be an opportunity, but Norway usually doesn’t talk about France, Italy, or Spain when it mentions “close allies”. The Dutch-Belgian ASWF potentially, but the schedule is cutting it close. The obvious answer is the UK, which has not only one but two frigates that looks suitable. Of these, the Type 31/Arrowhead 140 reportedly won’t be offered, to increase the chances of the Type 26. The Type 26 has already scored two export orders, with Canada choosing it for their Canadian Surface Combatant program and Australia as their Hunter-class. Both of these configurations will however be delivered only in the early 2030’s (again highlighting what is the usual timespan for projects of this calibre), leaving the UK City-class. The program has seen delays, but delivery of the lead ship HMS Glasgow is still set for 2026 with an initial operational capability by 2028. The build time for the vessels has been slow, but that is in no small part down to budgetary concerns and trying to even out the workload for the yard – which also means that they really would like to receive an export order to build a few more frigates at home. While the Royal Navy is already battling with a frigate force literally being worked until they are falling apart and struggling to keep up with demands of the current operational tempo, the political and financial benefits means I wouldn’t be surprised if HMS Belfast suddenly became Sleipner. And while there are some talk about Norway really wanting an AEGIS-ship, the impression I get from the official documents and the press conference is that focus is elsewhere. Speed of delivery. ASW-capable. Operated by a close ally.
…and of course, one shouldn’t forget that it was HMS Glasgow that back in 1940 whisked not only the king and crown prince, but also the government and part of the gold reserve, away from advancing German forces. Something the British embassy wasn’t slow to remind the Norwegians of.
An interesting question to ponder: does “identical” mean that the new ASW-helicopter will be the AW159 Wildcat, or even the mighty Merlin HM2? Norway is after all a former Lynx-operator, and the AW101 is already in Norwegian Air Force service as the SAR Queen.
Corporal Frisk 
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