Guest Post: A Picture in Moscow

The following post was originally posted by Swedish blogger Jägarchefen on his excellent blog. As the topic is highly relevant for but rarely discussed here in Finland, I asked for and got permission to translate it. The below translation is not a word for word one, but instead I have included some explanatory comments on issues which are assumed to be known to Swedish readers but which might not be immediately obvious to foreigners, as well as diving deeper into how this all affects Finland.

Valery Gerasimov, the Russian Chief of the General Staff, held a speech at the annual security conference in Moscow 26 to 27 April. The speech included how the actions and preparations of NATO aimed at providing the basis for a rapid surge of reinforcements to NATO’s eastern flank would affect Russian security. In one of the pictures he showed both Swedish and Finnish territory were marked as part of NATO’s preparatory actions. This indicates that Russia sees Finnish and Swedish territory as an extension of NATO territory, though whether they are seen as an integrated part is better left unsaid. What is clear is that in the Russian strategic military doctrine from 2014 and in the national security strategy from 2015 NATO is described as a threat to Russian security.

Regarding Sweden this isn’t news. Based on a number of books published during the last two decades it is clear that the Soviet Union during the better part of the Cold War regarded Sweden as an unofficial NATO member, making the current Russian view of Sweden as a part of NATO less than surprising. In addition to the historical case, this is also based on Sweden being one of five states with the possibility of deeper cooperation (the famous ‘Gold Card’) and the recently signed Host Nation Support Agreement.

More surprising is the view that Finland would constitute an extension of NATO. Granted, Finland, like Sweden, has signed the HNS agreement and received the ‘Gold Card’, but Finland and Russia still make occasional statement about the special relationship that prevail between the countries. From that point of view, the statement by the Russian Chief of Staff is somewhat out of sync, as it indirectly labels Finland as a threat. It is also interesting to see the raging debate about the nature of Finnish support in case of a conflict in the region in context with Gerasimov’s picture.

What then did the picture show? It showed four geographical areas, as well as a possible continuous  support or staging area. On Swedish territory, it appeared to show Varberg or Halmstad port as a possible staging ground for naval assets. On the Swedish east coast it appeared to show the port of Gävle as a staging ground for naval assets. It also seemed to indicate Sundsvall as a supporting area for air operations (in other words Midlanda airport). Finally, on Finnish territory it seemed to show Vasa as a supporting area for naval assets and Kauhava as a supporting area for air operations. The continuous supporting/staging area seemingly consisting of Gävle – Sundsvall – Vasa – Kauhava.

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Map courtesy of Jägarchefen

To some extent this is strategic signalling. The Russian leadership is showing their unhappiness with the current Swedish and Finnish defence cooperation with NATO, and this could be a way of trying to pressure Finland and Sweden diminish or even stop the cooperation. Another alternative is that Russia is trying to send a message: “We know what you are preparing and we want you to know that”. The aim then would be to make preparations and/or cooperation more difficult.

Starting with the Swedish west coast, it is clear that it is vital for Sweden in peace as well as in war. This comes both from its role in the influx of crucial goods, as well as from its use as the gateway for any reinforcements brought in from the west. The main focus has been on the port of Gothenburg, which in peacetime handles almost 30% of Swedish imports, is ice-free year-round, and has a significant rail network enabling efficient distribution of goods to other parts of Sweden. One possibility is obviously that the location of the marker is wrong, and that the real intention was to highlight Gothenburg and not Varberg or Halmstad. However, the other possibility is that the military units would stay out of the crowded port, and instead choose a less busy civilian port for bringing in reinforcements and basing naval vessels.

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Sundsvall/Midlanda airport. Source: Wikimedia Commons/Felix Wikström

Even more interesting is Gävle and the Sundsvall – Vasa – Kauhava area. The reasoning behind Gävle might be its use as the port of departure for the forward-deployed US Marine Corps Brigade that is currently found in the caves of Trøndelag, in central Norway. From Gävle, the unit could then be shipped out to the Baltic states in case of a grave security crises. Gävle could also be used as a base for naval units from Finland and/or NATO countries for operations in the northern Baltic Sea. The use of Midlanda (Sundsvall) airport likely refers to its use as a base for fighter and strike aircraft. In case of transport of personnel the US forces would likely directly use the airports in Trøndelag instead. Another possibility is that the base would be used to provide strategic depth for Finnish fighters.

The most curious aspect is Vasa as a naval base or staging area, as well as Kauhava as a base for airborne assets. It is possible that Vasa would be part of a protected staging area for naval vessels operating in the northern parts of the Baltic Sea as well as in the Gulf of Finland. Notably however, no airports in southern or central parts of Sweden, nor the naval base in Karlskrona, are included in the picture. In the by now rather well-known RAND study of how a Russian attack on the Baltics could look, the use of air bases in central Sweden is highlighted as being of crucial importance to NATO.

It could be that Russia feels it has the ability to interfere with operations in southern and central Sweden to the extent that the area is not seen as a threat in case NATO would base forces there. In this case Gerasimov’s picture would indicate that the marked areas would not be as affected by the Russian actions, and as such would be more of a threat.

This makes the transfer of two Buyan-M class corvettes from the Black Sea Fleet to the Baltic Fleet during the autumn of 2016 especially interesting, as it provides the opportunity for Russia to target the Swedish west coast with Kalibr long-range cruise missiles without these overflying the territory of other nations, which would have been the case if the missiles would have been fired from the North Fleet.

 

Added to this the Swedish broadcasting corporation’s radio earlier this year reported that some unknown entity seems to try and map out people working for the regional council in Jämtland, including those that play a role in upholding comprehensive security in the region. There are no information on the situation in Västernorrland county, but it can be assumed to be similar, as these two constitute a continuous geographical area of operations due to the forward-deployed storages in Trøndelag.

These two counties, together making up the region of Mellersta Norrland (literally ‘Middle Norrland’), seems to be an area of great military strategic interest for Russia, indirectly making them an area of strategic military interest for Sweden as well. This is in addition to the five areas identified earlier, which include:

  • Southern Scania, which controls the waterways between the Baltic Sea and the North Sea
  • Gotland, which could be employed as a basing area for long-range weapon systems
  • Gothenburg/the west coast, discussed above
  • Stockholm, the national capital
  • Northern Norrland, as a transit area for flanking operations during any battle between Norwegian and Russian forces

With a sixth area added to these, it is clear that the Swedish Defence Forces lacks the quantity needed to defend all of these at the same time.

It should be noted that the highlighting of Mellersta Norrland is in line with earlier posts on Jägarchefen’s blog, where during the last two year several indications have been reported which point to Mellersta Norrland being strategically more important that generally assumed. This can now be seen as confirmed by the Russian general staff.

Own comments:

For Finland, the situation is somewhat similar. Traditionally, the main strategic areas have been identified as the southern parts of the country, where the capital of Helsinki and the major cities of Turku and Tampere are found, as well as the northern parts of the country which would be important in case of a major conflict where Finnish territory could be used for flanking maneuvers in the battles for Murmansk and northern Norway. A third possible axis of attack would be the Kajaani – Oulu axis, which was attempted in the Winter War as a way of cutting Finland in half.

Southern Ostrobothnia has traditionally not been seen as a primary target. Kauhava has a long history as an air force base, and would likely be used for dispersed basing in case of war. From a NATO point of view, its value is more limited, as bases in northern Sweden would likely be a better choice for basing fighters due to the strategic depth they offer, while for air transport several other civilian airports hold similar facilities and at least equal road and rail connections (and in some cases local ports can be used as a complement).

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Swedish corvette HSwMS Sundsvall (K24) entering the civilian port of Kokkola during a joint exercise in 2010. Source: Own picture

 

One possibility is that the designation of Vasa as a port of interest does portray a more general concept of using civilian ports as naval bases. Finland has a notoriously high number of ports along the coast, and the Ostrobothnian shore is no exception. While no ‘true’ naval bases are found in the area, there are a number of differently sized ports which could be used for refuelling and replenishment, in effect a dispersed basing concept for naval vessels. From the relative protection of the Gulf of Bothnia the vessels could then sortie out to strike against enemy movements in the northern Baltic Sea, before again withdrawing back to safety.

The conclusions drawn by Jägarchefen are the following:

  1. As Russia sees NATO as a threat to their national security, and as they see Finnish and Swedish territory as being potential areas supporting NATO operations, Russia does see Finland and Sweden as well as threats to their security. This has (or rather, should have) a significant impact on the discussions on Finland’s role in case of war in the Baltics.
  2. This has now been clearly communicated at the highest military level, making it also a political signal as well to Finland and Sweden.
  3. Mellersta Norrland must be seen as an area of strategic military importance. In Finland, this goes for Southern Ostrobothnia as well.
  4. This must lead to a discussion at the political level about the importance of this area. Currently, the area feature more or less the same security vacuum Gotland enjoyed before the island became home for permanently stationed troops again. While Finland stresses that peacetime garrisons should not be seen as indicative of where any given unit would fight, it is very much open (as it should be) if current defence planning recognises the importance of this area, and how e.g. the Local Voluntary Units (Maakuntajoukot) tasked with defending the area has been briefed and equipped to meet this increased threat level.

Have a good one! // Jägarchefen

Under Scottish Skies – The Path Forward

‘Seek and Destroy’. That’s the motto of the RAF’s 41(R) test and evaluation squadron currently residing at RAF Coningsby. Operating six Typhoons (as well as a few Tornados set for retirement next year), the squadron is responsible for testing updates to RAF’s Typhoons and looking into the best ways of employing new capabilities in the field, before these are rolled-out to the frontline squadrons of the service. This summer, the squadron will start testing a new and highly destructive tool, as the first operational Typhoons will receive the P2E-upgrade (Phase 2 Enhancements). The most obvious change to RAF Typhoon operations this brings is the introduction of the Meteor very-long range air-to-air missile, though internally the there will also be major improvements to the data link and sensor fusion.

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“Meteor [on Typhoon] will feature a two-way datalink, which is quite different to Rafale”Paul Smith, BAE Systems Test Pilot

Meteor is something both RAF and BAE Systems like to talk about. RAF Lossiemouth station commander group captain Paul Godfrey notes that the real life roll-out has been preceded by a significant amount of test in simulators, focused on looking into the tactics the new weapon will allow for. “I am hugely looking forward to it”, he says. BAE test pilot Paul Smith shows a slide highlighting the different velocity pattern of the ramjet-driven missile compared to traditional rocket-powered ones. Rocket engines accelerate faster out of the gate, but once the rocket has burned out the missile will coast towards the target, meaning that long-range shots will have relatively little energy left for maneuvering close to the target. The Meteor’s ramjet engine is able to cruise at an economical setting and then throttle up when it closes in on the target, giving it a huge boost to the no-escape zone compared to rocket-powered missiles. It is no surprise that the Meteor is set to complement or in some cases replace the AIM-120 AMRAAM and MICA medium- and long-range missiles on all HX-contenders with the exception of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, though there are differences to exactly how it is being implemented. Both the Eurofigher and the Gripen will feature a two-way datalink, which allows the missile to send data back to the aircraft, further increasing accuracy as well as situational awareness.

Godfrey talking

“We already know how we’ll operate the Meteor”GROUP CAPTAIN PAUL GODFREY OBE, STATION COMMANDER AT RAF LOSSIREMOUTH

But P2E is only part of what RAF calls the the Centurion staircase, a series of phased enhancements aimed at making sure no capabilities will disappear with the retirement of the Tornado in 2019. The P3E(a) is in the works for RAF, which will bring the Brimstone to the Typhoon. Officially described as a low-collateral high precision air-to-surface weapon, the anti-tank/anti-vehicle missile is probably best described as an AGM-65 Maverick for the 21st century. It has been used with great success in all combat operation RAF has taken part in during recent years. Godfrey highlighted its performance in Libya, where RAF Tornados used it to take out a pro-Gaddafi T-72 which was shooting at a crowd in an urban environment. The Brimstone penetrated the tank, and the explosion was violent enough to cause the turret to bounce from its mount, while the people standing besides it were unhurt. The Brimstone has also quite a lot of potential against lighter naval vessels, and being carried on triple-racks a nice number of missiles can be carried by the Typhoon.

Yes, that is the kind of stuff that gives landing craft skippers nightmares.

The other weapon being integrated with P3E(a) is the Storm Shadow stealthy cruise missile, called SCALP in French service. In the event of the Eurofighter (or Rafale) actually winning the HX-program, this would likely be acquired to replace the AGM-158 JASSM in Finnish service (the 15 year shelf-life of the missiles nicely matches the retirement date of the F/A-18C Hornet). In parallel the P3E(b) is being developed for the Kuwait Air Force, and includes the Enhanced GBU-16 (GBU-48) 1,000 pound laser/GPS-guided bomb, as well as the CAPTOR E AESA radar and the Sniper advanced targeting pod in place of RAF’s Litening III pods.

There has been much talk about the fact that the Eurofighter still relies on the CAPTOR M mechanically scanned radar, which, despite being more or less as good as it gets when it comes to mechanical scanning, is still not an electronically scanned array. Godfrey admits that while the current radar is very good, he would like to get the CAPTOR E.  “Would I like to have an AESA? Sure. Why? Because of versatility.” While his wish will be granted, in the case of RAF, the CAPTOR E is still some time out in the future.

Before HX deliveries the plan is that yet another major upgrade will have taken place. The P4E is currently in the negotiation phase, and as such its exact scope is yet undecided. The plan is that the upgrade will include full operational capability for the CAPTOR E, upgrades to the PIRATE infrared search and track sensor, as well as the integration of SPEAR long-range anti-tank/anti-vehicle weapon (and/or the Small Diameter Bomb in some version). The SPEAR will, together with a planned major improvement to the DASS and sensor integration, be at the core of allowing the Typhoon to take up the SEAD/DEAD mission. This is a most welcome addition for RAF, as they lack a dedicated SAM-hunting capability after the retirement of the ALARM anti-radiation missile in 2013. In addition, a number of anti-ship missiles are currently being evaluated. These include the Marte ER, of which there is currently a feasibility study ongoing for integrating it onto the Typhoon, as well as the JSM and Harpoon (of which the JSM is further along). A contract for the P4E is expected within the next 12 months.

Pair of Tiffies

“The Centurion staircase is what’s driving the UK Typhoon program”JOHN BROMEHEAD, GENERAL MANAGER BAE SYSTEMS

What won’t see a direct replacement is the RAPTOR reconnaissance pod, the British version of the Goodrich DB-110. Instead, advanced targeting pods will take over the role of dedicated reconnaissance pods for the Typhoon.

The P4E would likely form the basis of the Eurofighter Typhoon’s HX-bid. Still, it is important to remember that just because an aircraft is certified for a certain weapon, it does not mean that Finland would get these (case in point the current F/A-18C Hornet is able to carry the better part of the US Navy’s arsenal, while in Finnish service the weapons used goes on the fingers of one hand). In the case of the Eurofighter, while the weapons integration is part of the core package, ‘unlocking’ a certain weapon or capability means buying it from the nation(s) that have originally paid for it’s integration. In this way, costs for popular weapons are brought down through sharing, but you only pay for the ones you plan on buying. Realistically, this means that Finland e.g. would buy either IRIS-T (likely) or the ASRAAM short-ranged air-to-air missiles to complement the longer-ranged Meteor, and not both. In the same way, exactly which ground attack weapons would be bought is open. To replace the capabilities of the current F/A-18C Hornet the Storm Shadow would likely replace the JASSM, with SPEAR and some suitable GPS/LGB being other likely candidates. Brimstone and an anti-ship missile would add significant punch to the Air Force, but while the Air Force Command has confirmed they are looking into the anti-shipping mission for HX, it is unlikely that the funds will be found for these (at least not in the initial buy).

What will then follow after P4E? The Typhoon is set to stay RAF’s primary air superiority fighter for the foreseeable time, and the current plan is that it will stay in RAF service beyond 2050. Integration with unmanned platforms operating is a hot topic. A large area display for the cockpit has also been proposed to customers, but currently the interest from the users has instead focused on the Striker II helmet mounted sight, which will provide a full-colour, fully digital night/day sight. While the exact development path is still open, it is clear that the development will continue. As BAE Systems Mark Parkinson notes: “There is simply nothing else on the horizon.”

Guest Post: Additional thoughts regarding the strategic depth issue

Professor Forss has for several decades been one of the leading authorities on Finnish defence and national security policy. For me personally his writings in Finnish daily Hufvudstadsbladet were one of very few sources on Finnish security and defence policy available in the pre-#turpo age. It is a great honour for me to be able to publish the post below where he examines the idea of the Finnish Air Force using foreign bases in greater detail.

Corporal Frisk addresses the Finnish – Swedish issue about strategic depth, which started from the by now well-known Jane’s article.

The picture that Jane’s paints, isn’t, however, very new. The idea of using a common strategic depth as an item to be introduced in Finnish-Swedish air force cooperation is actually more than twenty years old. The first to float it was – as far as former colleagues and friends now recall – the eminent Swedish air warfare analyst Bengt Andersson at the Swedish Defence Research Establishment FOA, now known as FOI.

His thinking started from the premise that the Swedish Jas 39 Gripen and the Finnish F-18 Hornet shared enough common features, that Hornets operating from Swedish air bases was a realistic idea worth developing. The Gripen’s engine, Volvo RM 12 was developed from the General Electric F404-400 engine. The Hornet’s GE F404-GE-402 engine was similar enough to use the same fuel as Gripen at least temporarily and both aircraft also carried the same AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles.

As for the Nordic defense co-operation project NORDEFCO, Col. Pekka Holopainen and myself described it in detail in our monograph Breaking the Nordic Defense Deadlock which U.S. Army War College Press published in February 2015.

At that time, the air forces of Finland, Sweden and Norway had already conducted mutual Cross Border Training together for some time in the air space of the three countries. The air forces continue to exercise in this mode on a weekly basis and are already able to operate fairly seamlessly.

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The Nordic ministers of defence visiting Swedish Kallax AFB during an exercise back in 2015. In the background a Finnish F/A-18C Hornet stands next to a Swedish JAS 39C Gripen. Source: Jimmy Croona/Försvarsmakten

The particular issue of strategic depth is indeed not new. There is a major practical problem, however, from a Finnish viewpoint. In the late 1990s Sweden had a marvelous dispersed air base system all over Sweden. It was called Air Base 90 and it consisted of 88 individual prepared road bases with full infrastructure, shelters, electricity, fuel and weapons storage facilities. The whole system was built upon the premise that the air force should be able to operate in a nuclear and CW environment.

Then eternal peace broke out in Europe and this magnificent system was dismantled, except for two bases at Jokkmokk in Lapland and Hagshult in Småland in the south. Restoring Base 90 is impossible, but the Swedes are now trying to bring back something. With the Base 90 intact, strategic depth would have carried a lot more substance, seen from our Finnish perspective.

A foreign friend also offered the following thoughts. In his opinion, it seems, there was no particular reason for euphoria regarding the strategic depth issue: “There is a bit of negative that should be added. Why would Finland send aircraft to Sweden when it still would be in the threat ring of bad stuff and would be looking for support from bases with un-like aircraft?

Why wouldn’t Finland want to deploy to NATO bases outside the immediate threat ring where there would be more like-systems and more munitions to carry on the fight? Levels of conventional munitions stocks are classified, but I am guessing that the US has more pre-positioned in Europe than Sweden.”

Be it as it may, it’s no exaggeration to say that the air forces of Finland, Sweden and Norway have

come very far in their efforts to be able to integrate fully should a political decision to do that be adopted.

Norway is in the process of introducing the first Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning-II combat aircraft of the 52 ordered. Sweden is committed to 60-70 domestically produced Saab Jas 39 E/F Gripen aircraft. Ideas of keeping ‘surplus’ Jas 39 C/D Gripens operative have been floated. One leading Swedish security policy analyst Dr. Robert Dalsjö pleaded in August that 97 almost new C/D Gripens should be retained. Another senior Swedish defense analyst, Krister Andrén describes the Swedish needs for the 2030s as eight air combat divisions with 200 aircraft.

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Finnish F/A-18C Hornet in MLU 2 configuration. Source: FiAF

The Finnish Air Force has now concluded its second midlife update of its fleet of 62 Boeing F/A-18 C/D Hornet aircraft and is at present regarded as perhaps the strongest Nordic air force. Two Finnish Hornets plus pilots and support personnel are in the U.S. training to use the advanced JASSM long-range stand-off missile, which will be operationally introduced in the FiAF next year.

At the same time the acquisition process to replace the Hornets has begun. Offers from five manufacturers of the next combat aircraft have been requested, and the planes considered include F-35A Lightning-II, F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, Jas 39 E/F Gripen, Eurofighter Typhoon and Rafale. Final decision is to be made in 2021 and operational introduction of the new air craft beginning in about 2025.

We are now four years from that decision. A whole lot of familiarization with both F-35 and the new Gripen will have been acquired by then in the routine Cross Border Training. Depending on how the integration process between the air forces proceeds, it may impact the final Finnish decision. Given that Sweden and Norway have decided on the aircraft for their fleets, the Finnish choice is the only open parameter left and it will of course play a role for the other partners too.

The optimum Finnish choice isn’t necessarily the same if you look at things only from a Finnish national perspective or from the perspective of a combined Nordic air force. The planes that will fly in our common airspace the next 3 4 decades have their individual strengths but also weaknesses. For example, air-to-surface firepower is not one of the strengths of the small Gripen or the F-35 flying in stealth mode with weapons carried only internally.

So, what plane will Finland eventually buy? It is of course impossible to tell. The purchase of the Hornet in the early 1990s proved to be a tremendous success and the Finnish Air Force enjoys respect wherever you go.

Even more important has the security political dimension proved to be. Security political relations between Finland and USA then took a quantum leap. That is something Finland will not easily abandon, although there still are political factions in Finland which try to sabotage our relations with the U.S. the best they can.

Stefan Forss

Professor

Adjunct Professor, Finnish National Defence University

Views presented are solely those of the author.

Strategic depth and Alliances

“American newspaper – the concept of strategic depth: Finland could withdraw to Sweden if attacked”

That is the headline chosen by Finnish news source Verkkouutiset when retelling Jane’s Defence Weekly’s recent story that the Swedish Air Force has been working on a concept of enabling Finnish fighters to operate from Swedish bases in times of crises. The idea is both extremely radical, and blatantly obvious, a combination uncomfortably common in Finnish national security.

In short, the interviewed officer was colonel Magnus Liljegren, responsible for the production of Swedish air units and equipment at the Swedish Defence Forces’ general staff (designated C PROD FLYG in the Swedish Defence Forces). The colonel stated that “Finland is absolutely our top priority partner right now […] they are looking to us in order to increase their operational depth. If they need to withdraw they can move into our country and use our bases.” (full article over at JDW).

Three different fighters from three different countries of the NORDEFCO (Nordic defense cooperation) overflying Turku airport. Source: Own picture

From a strictly military perspective, this is an obvious solution. With the increased range of modern air defence and surveillance systems the Finnish air space is more or less contested throughout from the start of a conflict. There are significant benefits coming from operating from Kallax compared to Oulunsalo, not to mention Kuopio-Rissala.

Side note: if Finnish fighters were planning to use Swedish bases, there’s really only one contender that makes sense for HX. The  benefits of deploying to a base that already has everything you need to operate your aircraft in combat compared to having to bring your logistics train with you is huge. I haven’t seen any indication this would have been a marketing stunt (and I don’t believe it is), but we really should sort this out before 2021 if there’s a chance we would like to run along with the concept.

At the same time, it would be an unprecedented political step. I highly doubt there is a Finnish politician ready to sign the paper saying we would join in the fray if Russian troops suddenly appeared on Gotland. Likewise, if we are supposed to use Swedish bases when attacked, that would mean that Sweden would join in a conflict they might not (yet) be part of.

While that might be a hard sell to the voters, it would in fact make sense. If Finland would react to a Crimea-like coup aimed towards Gotland by mobilising the reserve and dispatching air and sea units to throw out the attackers by force and protect shipping around the island, there is in my opinion a higher likelihood that the conflict would stay local and limited in time. The reasoning behind this is the markedly higher deterrence value of the Finnish Defence Forces once mobilised and dispersed compared to their peacetime stance, as well as the increased striking power of the combined Finnish-Swedish forces. For Sweden, the situation is similar. In effect, Finland shields the northern part of Sweden from direct aggression, allowing the numerically small Swedish Army to concentrate their two brigades in the southern parts of the country, something that would also provide Finland with a measure of flanking support. The strength of the defence forces operating together is also larger than the sum of them individually, as the relatively small sizes of both countries means that some capabilities are found only in one of them, and that their combined size can reach quantitative thresholds (‘critical mass’) in areas where this would not be possible individually, both geographic and capability wise.

What is interesting is that the whole issue has been completely overshadowed by the rather similar quarrel over Finland’s response if Estonia was to be attacked. The whole thing started when Finnish tabloid Iltalehti published a long report stating that a major split had developed between the president (and government) and the parliament. President Sauli Niinistö (yes, we have three different Niinistös in Finnish politics, all representing different parties) of the centre-right National Coalition Party (fi. Kokoomus sv. Samlingspartiet) represents the more “allowing” line, found in the recent Government Defence Report published in February:

“Finland will actively and extensively strengthen its international defence cooperation and other networking as well as develop the abilities to provide and receive international assistance.

[…]

Finland, as a Member State of the European Union, could not remain an outsider should threats to security emerge in its vicinity or elsewhere in Europe. […] Finland will not allow the use of its territory for hostile purposes against other states. On the basis of the Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy this does not limit Finland’s prospects to provide and receive international assistance or to intensify defence cooperation.”

This is not an uncontroversial view in Finnish politics. Former foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja has apparently been able to gather enough support to get a majority of the parliament behind a strongly worded statement arguing for a reduction in Finnish participation in NATO-exercises and a ban on any Finnish military aid to Estonia in case the country would be attacked. Tuomioja represents the left flank of the Finnish Social Democrat Party, and the veteran politician has not only been able to enlist the support of his party (currently the largest opposition party), but also of the Left Alliance (fi. Vasemmistoliitto sv. Vänsterförbundet) and part of the MP’s from the ruling Centre Party (fi. Keskusta sv. Centerpartiet). The rebellion has deep roots in Finnish post-war history, when the Centre Party was the ideological home of Finlandisation, and the party has still a significant amount of people longing for the ‘good old days’ when we enjoyed a special relationship with the Soviet Union (i.e. not being able to have an independent foreign policy despite not being occupied or a Soviet satellite). While the situation during the Cold War might have called for some careful maneuvering, it surpasses my understanding why Finland in today’s world would strive to stand on the edge between western democracies and a Russian autocracy. This is especially strange considering that both Russia and our European allies consider us an integral part of the ‘West’, NATO-membership or not.

The report in Iltalehti caused considerable buzz. Niinistö and Tuomioja sternly denied there being any open issues between the two, while Yle in turn reported that the argument wasn’t as much between the president and the parliament, as it was between the government and the parliament. Anyhow, Finland has once again managed to make a complete mess of what our current policy vis-a-vis helping Estonia would be, and our southern brothers only made the embarrassment worse when Estonian MoD Margus Tsahkna went to the press (and Twitter) to assure us that we need not worry, Estonia will come to Finland’s aid in case we need help…

The youth organisation of the Finns Party (fi. Perussuomalaiset, sv. Sannfinländarna) in turn took the opportunity to suggest a joint Finnish-Estonian volunteer corps, ready to come to the aid of whichever country would be attacked (original presser in Finnish, blog post on the issue in English). While wordings such as “Failure to provide assistance would be a cold statement to our brothers and sisters. Finnish-Ugrian culture is best defended by the Finno-Ugric peoples themselves” are not necessarily ones I personally would use, the contrast to the careful language found amongst the more pro-Russian politicians is stark. While there to a certain extent do exist a left-right fault line in Finnish politics when it comes to Russia, there are also significant inner-party fault lines, as well as a difference between different generations.

The presser also highlights the difference between the staunchly anti-Kremlin line of the Finns Party, and the pro-Kremlin narrative of many of Europe’s populist parties. This was painstakingly obvious when one of the leading national security voices of the Swedish Democrat’s party started advocating for Sweden to declare their intention not to give assistance to the Baltic countries, using an imaginary Finnish “decision not to help” as justification.

Daniel Vikström: So when Russia threatens and invades its neighbors to secure its geostrategic interests, we should be humble about this?
Mikael Jansson: Finland has declared that it cannot assist the Baltic countries if they are attacked, Sweden should do the same. That is NATO’s task #defencepolicy

Added to this all, Finland ratified the Treaty of Lisbon nine years ago. The Treaty famously include clause 42.7, the so called solidarity clause.

If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

That an “obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power” would include direct military contribution would seem a no-brainer, not to mention the current talking point of whether NATO fighters could use Finnish airspace to defend Estonia in case the country was attacked.

The range of a number of modern Russian weapons systems if based in Tallinn. Courtesy of Petri Mäkelä

To sum it up, even if we skip any moral responsibility to help our neighbours, Finland has a number of self-serving reasons to intervene, or at least allow other countries to intervene (we don’t really want invading smaller countries to be an accepted part of international politics, and Russian weapons stationed on Gotland or in Estonia would be really bad for us). In addition, we have actually signed an international agreement promising to do so. That the prime minister apparently has seen a covert rebellion in his party over this is deeply worrying.

Under Scottish Skies – Air Superiority

While the Typhoon so far has seen combat solely in the air-to-ground role, there is no mistaking in that the primary role of RAF Lossiemouth lies elsewhere. The base is the northern of RAF’s two quick-reaction alert bases, abbreviated as QRA(N). As such, a pair of armed Typhoons stand guard around the clock, year round. These are airborne within ten minutes of the scramble, often with time to spare. While the usual ‘bogey’ for QRA(S) down at RAF Coningsby is an airliner gone silent (usually due to having the wrong radio frequency), RAF Lossiemouth handles the classic North Sea intercept of any Russian bombers coming down round Norway. This includes “Bears in different versions”, presumably meaning that both the Tu-95 bomber version and the Tu-142 maritime patrol versions has been sighted, as well as the Tu-160 Blackjack. The latter is something of a newcomer in the area, starting to make appearances only post-Crimea. By the time any bomber approaches the British isles, they are always escorted by Norwegian F-16s, which hand over the mission to the Typhoons. Notably, the Typhoons has been on station and escorted the Tu-160 during the strikes in Syria which have been flown along the western route, circumnavigating the UK.

Scottish mountains

“Deliver QRA(I)N and prepare for global operations”
RAF Lossiemouth mission statement

All QRA flights are armed with a mix of four ASRAAM short-range IR-missiles and four AMRAAM medium-range missiles, of which two ASRAAM would be traded for another two AMRAAM in case of a ‘wartime load’. In addition, the aircraft are sporting two supersonic drop tanks and a full load of 27 mm ammunition for the internal Mauser gun. While RAF’s QRA flights haven’t had to open fire upon intercepted aircrafts in modern times, the risk is always there. And nowhere is this more evident than in the Baltics, where the Typhoon face the most modern fighters that Russia has to offer.

Wing Commander Billy Cooper is the officer commanding 6 Squadron, and an experienced fighter pilot who has logged over 1,300 hours on the Typhoon after transitioning to it from the Tornado F.3, RAF’s earlier QRA jet. Before joining the Lossiemouth based squadron, he took part in a Baltic Air Policing tour with the Coningsby based 3(F) Squadron, being deployed to Šiauliai in Lithuania. The detachment brought some interesting challenges to the RAF, as the facilities of the old Soviet base were overcrowded. A number of portable cabins were shipped out for the personnel to live in, while the Typhoons were allocated unheated soft-skin hangars throughout the stay. While these did offer a measure of protection from the wind and precipitation, this still meant that all maintenance work on the planes were performed in whatever the outside temperature happened to be. While the detachment had “relatively small issues with the climate”, as Cooper put it, a more unexpected issue appeared. Soon after arrival, the British airmen spotted a “large, elk-like creature” towards the far end of the base. Large mammals was not something that RAF was used to operating around, but with the proper procedures in place, air operations could continue.

If the QRA(N) gets scrambled once every few months, BAP is another issue completely. The latest tour by 2(AC) Squadron to Ämari air base in Estonia resulted in 42 intercepted aircraft during their 4 month long stay. In addition to the normal weaponry a targeting pod was often carried, being particularly useful in the identification of ships. Some targets are trickier than others, with Cooper mentioning one of his personal highlights being the intercept of a Kamov Ka-27 helicopter launched from a Russian frigate. After he had intercepted the helicopter, the Finnish Air Force also appeared and closed in to take a look on it.

Cooper

“We were briefed quite closely to not interact with them too much”
WING COMMANDER BILLY COOPER, OFFICER COMMANDING 6 SQUADRON

The behavior of the Russian pilots varied widely, and while the British pilots where briefed to maintain their cool, Cooper was under the impression that their Russian colleagues were more free to engage their adversaries as they saw fit. This included aggressively turning against any intercepting fighters trying to take pictures of them, and while no-one tries to cause a mid-air collision, the short distances between the aircrafts (Typhoons often closing to within 65 meters of their targets) meant that the risk certainly was there. This kind of behavior was more common if the Russian fighters were flying escort for transport or attack/bomber aircraft, and apparently also depended on the personal style of the pilots. “Sometimes you closed in and thought for yourself ‘isn’t that the one from last week’, and sure enough he starts doing the same kind of things this time around as well,” Cooper explained. When asked whether he had experienced the kind of aggressive flare dumping described by the Swedish Air Force, he commented that he hadn’t personally seen it, “but it wouldn’t surprise me”. Both sides carry flares on a regular basis, and in addition to being defensive countermeasures, their purpose does include (stern) signalling. Some Russian pilots did use other means of less-than-friendly communication, while RAF’s pilots stuck to smiles and occasional waves.

Cooperation with the Finnish Air Force is not uncommon for the BAP, with Finnish Air Force and BAP sharing a common recognised air picture and sharing data over Link 16. During intercepts over the Gulf of Finland, it was not uncommon to have a pair of BAP fighters shadowing a Russian target from the south, with a pair of Finnish F/A-18C Hornets doing the same from the north. Operating together in this manner is no problem, as both the RAF and Finnish Air Force share the same doctrine and has the ability to use the same data link. “It is the same as operating with a NATO-country”, Cooper sums up. In addition to chance encounters on intercepts, the two air forces regularly do schedule joint training missions.

Cooper and media

“You need something that can fight long-range and dominate short-range”
WING COMMANDER BILLY COOPER, OFFICER COMMANDING 6 SQUADRON

The nature of aerial combat also was also something which came up. With the advent of a new generation of long-range missiles and sensors, many have concluded that the classic within-visual-range dogfight is (finally) dead. Cooper wasn’t as sure, noting that he could see quite a few scenarios where a fighter would find itself uncomfortably close to its target before being able to open fire. The main question was to what extent the rules of engagement would allow for firing at targets beyond visual range, or if a visual confirmation will be required first. In any case, RAF has taken their Typhoons on exercises against both Indian Sukhoi Su-30MKI and Malaysian Su-30MKM, and contrary to some Indian reports, the “Typhoon did extremely well” against the Su-30MKI at close range, while long range engagements were a matter of “clubbing seals” (an expression BAE was quick to explain is fighter pilot jargon for easy air-to-air kills, in case someone would have misunderstood its use…). In the end, “the Indians weren’t happy”, despite their pilots spending much of their time practicing within visual range combat according to Cooper.

It is no secret that while the Finnish Air Force is looking for a fighter able to handle a range of missions in a full-scale conventional war, the main mission during peacetime is QRA and air policing in the crowded airspace over the Baltic Sea. This is also a point which BAE likes to push, and certainly one of the better selling points of the Typhoon. That isn’t to say that BAE is trying to sell the fighter with its peacetime mission as the argument (arguably not a great idea…), as they are clear with that they think the Typhoon is a great multirole fighter all around. It just happens to be very good at what the Finnish Air Force does in their everyday line of work. At least according to the sales pitch.

The speed is well-known, with the Eurofighter being able to supercruise (though the exact prestanda in supercruise mode is somewhat controversial, with anything between Mach 1.1 to 1.5 being quoted depending on the source and load conditions), but Cooper was also keen to point out the range of the aircraft. Operating alongside the Polish MiG-29’s in BAP, the importance of endurance quickly became evident. While Cooper noted that the Polish Air Force pilots were professional and eager to do a good job, at the same time they did suffer problems due to the notorious short range of their aircraft. At the time these were early production MiG-29 9.12 from ex-DDR stocks, while the Polish detachment which took up the BAP-mission this week is flying F-16’s instead of MiG-29’s. The Typhoon, usually operating with twin supersonic drop tanks, were able to stay on target, despite what appeared to be efforts to shake them off. “Sometimes when the Russian flight came to Kaliningrad, instead of landing they just turned around and headed back north, probably thinking we would have to break off,” Cooper remembered. “We didn’t.”

Under Scottish Skies – Red Flag and the Middle East

The Eurofighter Typhoon is probably the most misunderstood aircraft of the HX program. The public perception of it, especially outside of Finland, is surprisingly negative. Much of this is based on the early teething troubles experienced by the program. “There were absolutely issues to starts with”, group captain Paul Godfrey, OBE, concedes. The former Harrier pilot is the station commander of RAF Lossiemouth, the larger of Britain’s two Typhoon-bases, and one of the original pilots to transition to the multirole fighter when it first entered service with the RAF a decade ago, something he was chosen for partly because he had multirole experience from flying the F-16CJ ‘Wild Weasel’-variant during an exchange tour with the USAF. Of his current mount, he has (almost) nothing but praise. “It’s like an F-16 on steroids”, he compares the two, talking about the similar philosophy of the aircrafts, with both focusing on performance and multirole capability. Fully coming to grip with the multirole tasking has required some new thinking for the RAF, who up until recently operated a large variety of single-role aircraft. This was one of the reasons pilots with exchange experience were common in the first Typhoon units. Today, there’s naturally a considerable number of ex-single role pilots, especially as the Tornado is approaching the end of it’s service life in the RAF.

Godfrey

“When I first flew Typhoon, I knew it was gonna be a game changer.”
Group Captain Paul Godfrey OBE, Station Commander at RAF Lossiremouth

But while the early Typhoons were plagued by a number of different issues and a decided lack of interest on the part of British politicians when it came to funding the necessary development programs needed to unlock the fighters full potential, today it is in many ways a mature system. This was something Godfrey got to experience first hand. Only in the second week of his new job as station commander, he was faced with the order to dispatch six Typhoons from 1(F) Squadron down to RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, from where they were to conduct strikes over Iraq and Syria. Within twenty-four hours of receiving the mission, the Typhoons touched down at their new operating base, and within a further twenty-four hours the first combat-loaded aircrafts were already flying operational missions over the battlefield. After 1(F) Squadron was ready with their tour, fellow Lossiemouth squadron 6 Squadron took over. In total, Lossiemouth based Typhoons alone have dropped closed to 700 Paveway IV laser/GPS-guided bombs during Operation Shader, as the British anti-ISIL air operation is known.

The missions flown in Syria and Iraq include air interdiction, close air support (CAS), and strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR). Cue lasting debate over value of fast jets as opposed to classic single-role aircraft such as the A-10 Warthog or Su-25 flying the CAS mission. For wing Commander Billy Cooper, the squadron commander of 6 Squadron, the answer is clear. The old way of doing CAS was created out of necessity, as the only way of acquiring a target accurately was by looking out of the window, which meant you had to be close to the target and flying slow. With today’s advanced sensors and precision guided munitions, that need is gone, and using faster and more advanced aircraft will provide significant benefits, including e.g. survivability and transit time from loitering area to the battlefield. Originally a Tornado F.3 pilot, Cooper is also a Qualified Weapons Instructor with over 3,000 flying hours on fighters. The RAF QWI course roughly corresponds to the US Navy’s TOPGUN program, but strives to give a broader understanding of the aircraft, it’s weapons and capabilities. Earlier this year, he lead the squadron in exercise Red Flag 17-1 in Nevada, an exercise which created quite some buzz for being the first time the F-35A participated in a Red Flag exercise.

Cooper under plane

“We were working quite closely with the F-35.”
Wing Commander Billy Cooper, Officer Commanding 6 Squadron

While it was heavily reported that the F-35A had achieved a 20:1 kill ratio, the details of the exercise has naturally been kept under wraps. As such, it was very interesting to hear Cooper describe his first-hand experience of operating Typhoons together with the F-35’s. As could be expected, he described the F-35 regularly operating within the engagement zones of the REDFOR air defences. Compared to other non-stealthy fighters, the Typhoon was in turn able to achieve greater stand-off range for its weapons, thanks to its ability to operate higher and faster. This allowed it to lay further back, often remaining outside of the threat range. What all seemed to agree on, was that the the F-35 transmitting sensor data on Link 16 provided a huge boost in situational awareness for the rest of the fleet.

When asked about the RAF acquiring both aircraft, none of the pilots were prepared to pick one over the other. “You need stealth to be able to go forward,” Cooper argued. His personal opinion was that the future lies in the mix of capabilities provided by different platforms, echoing the sentiment expressed by his commander at an earlier briefing. “Both airplanes are fantastic airplanes,” Godfrey had said. “A mix would always be better [than operating only F-35’s or Typhoons].” When pressed further for which one he would choose if he could only get one, Godfrey had smiled and just said “Both”.

While a puzzled group of Finnish media representatives started to wonder if the fighter pilots were arguing for the stealthy F-35 as the right choice for HX, further discussion revealed the complexity of the issue. The big thing in the mind of the pilots was not so much stealth in and by itself, but the superior situational awareness the F-35 got by combining the ability to get in close while carrying a good sensor suite, and which it then shared with the rest of the team. By teaming up with the Typhoons and their heavy load of long-ranged weapons, the F-35 in turn got around it’s main weakness in Red Flag, namely its very limited load of internal weapons. Some participants in the exercise jokingly referred to the stealth fighter as the ‘cheerleader’, always present providing data and cheering the other ones on, but often unable to take the shots themselves having already expended all their missiles.

It also seemed that for an air force used to operating a wide variety of tactical single-role jets the Finnish problem of only being able to afford a single type while not being able to count on the support of allies was hard to relate to. BAE test pilot Paul Smith, a former squadron mate of Cooper, agreed with the operational pilots that he saw a future need for a stealthy platform providing increased situational awareness, but rather than going for a stealth fighter he talked about replicating the successful hunter/killer-teams of Red Flag with an unmanned stealthy wingman getting in close and the Typhoon bringing its firepower to bear from stand-off range (yes, a picture of Taranis had managed to sneak its way into one of the briefings).

But while going into heavily defended airspace with a non-stealthy platform might not be optimal, Red Flag did also see the Typhoon do just that and come out on the other side to live to tell the tale. While the exact details aren’t open information, we were briefed that the fighters took out targets being covered by layered defences of “double and triple digit SAM’s”, indicating systems entering service in the early 80’s and later, likely including at least the S-300. What made this possible was two things. To begin with, the Typhoon’s self-defence DASS suite received nothing but praise. The system not only automatically scans for threats and autonomously uses jamming and countermeasures to defeat them, it also provide visual cues for the pilot on how to best outmanoeuvre any threats encountered. The other factor that increased the survivability of the Typhoon was again its performance. The combination of a manoeuvrable aircraft with an impressive thrust-to-weight ratio gave the pilots the ability to defeat the missiles encountered. It might not be as nice as having stealth, but BAE puts enough trust in the concept to plan for the upcoming P4E enhancement to include a SEAD/DEAD-ability (more on the upgrade path in an upcoming post).

In the end, no-one was willing to tell us which aircraft we were supposed to buy, though for the RAF, the operational concept is clear. Typhoon is set to stay the force’s air superiority platform past 2050, while “F-35 is a Tornado [GR.4] replacement,” as BAE’s John Bromehead explained. None of the pilots seemed interested in trading their Typhoons for F-35’s, but they just might be willing to swap out the Typhoons of the squadron next door.

Typhoon 320

“I’ll never gonna give up speed”
Gp Capt Godfrey

Under Scottish Skies – Selling the Typhoon

As part of a Finnish media tour I had the opportunity to spend a day at RAF Lossiemouth, where BAE Systems and RAF briefed us on why they think the Eurofighter Typhoon would be the right choice for Finland. No discussion on the Typhoon is complete without mentioning the cost, so lets start with a look at the business side of things.

The large twin-engined fighter has so far struggled to secure export orders outside of the wealthy Gulf states, something which is often attributed to the price tab. BAE Systems regional manager Mark Parkinson doesn’t deny that the fighter is expensive. “It’s a large aircraft, which means it has more parts than some of the competitors,” he notes. “That’s certainly visible in the unit cost.” But beyond the outright acquisition cost, the Eurofighter is remarkably competitive, with the current ten-year support agreement signed between BAE and RAF stipulating a support cost per flying hour that is on level with that of the F-16.

Mark Parkinson

“None of these aircrafts are cheap”
Mark Parkinson, Regional Manager BAE Systems

At the heart of this agreement from last summer is the Typhoon Total Availability eNterprise, or TyTAN for short, a support package aiming at closer co-operation between BAE Systems and RAF, who both share the common aim of making sure the operating costs are kept low and availability high for the Typhoon fleet. In essence, BAE tries to react proactively to any upcoming issues and provide for an increased level of training amongst the front-line mechanics of the air force, while RAF in turn strives to clearly communicate their needs and expectations back to BAE. In the words of John Bromehead, “The beauty of TyTAN is us sitting on the same side of table”, and contrasted this to the more traditional customer-supplier relationship which in the past has caused unnecessary friction over contractual issues. As a whole, the role of BAE as the prime contractor for British Typhoon support is not unlike how the Finnish Defence Forces and Millog are handling their strategic partnership in some areas.

Bromehead is the general manager of BAE Systems at Lossiemouth, meaning he oversees a team of some sixty persons that are responsible for not only the maintenance of the aircrafts and the supply chain associated with it, but also for the Typhoon Training Facility (North), an on-site simulator facility where six senior instructors lead the training of the operational fighter pilots. Of his team, only about half are actually BAE employees, with RAF providing a third of the work force, and Leonardo (ex-Selex), Thales, and other subcontractors making up the rest. In the same way as RAF is making resources available to BAE, Bromehead has a single BAE engineer posted to each of the squadrons operating at the base. “These are my ears and eyes,” he explains. The role of the engineers is to get a clear picture of how the operational squadrons perceive the aircraft, what kinds of demands and expectations they place upon it, and then communicate these back to the BAE. As noted, BAE is contractually bound to the ambitious goal of 40% reduction in support costs, and while this still is some way out in the future, a number of relatively simple improvements such as ensuring proper diagnostics not leading to unnecessary swapping out of healthy aircraft parts has meant that already in its first nine months TyTAN has seen reductions in flight hour costs.

John Bromehead

“Typhoon is a step-change in technology for the RAF”
John Bromehead, General Manager BAE Systems

For HX, Parkinson noted that the exact package is still open, and that BAE is in a dialogue with relevant Finnish authorities to get a better picture of what the Air Force and the MoD wants. This includes questions such as whether the contract will be in Euros or Pounds, and what kind of a support package is to be included. “The aircraft does come as a kit of parts,” Parkinson explained, meaning that a final assembly line could be set up in Finland with relative ease. In addition to the question of final assembly, he also revealed that the RFI included questions on whether it is possible to provide test rigs and/or an instrumented aircraft. The answer to both questions is yes, and in the end proper test rigs (and potentially a fully instrumented flight test aircraft) could be of more interest to the Finnish Air Force than a production line. Already under current orders and production rate, a potential Finnish order would fit in well with the large production schedule, and BAE has their scope set on a number of “promising” prospective orders, both new and returning customers. The general message was that while nothing is decided when it comes to the exact scope of the industrial cooperation, more or less anything requested by the Finnish Ministry of Defence can be provided. It is just a question of, you guessed it, cost.

I was invited for a Finnish media event to RAF Lossiemouth. The one-day event included briefings by both RAF and BAE Systems personnel (with the travelling taking places on the days before and after), and BAE kindly offered to cover the travel and stay in Scotland. Neither BAE nor RAF has put any restrictions or requests regarding what I do with the information given, nor have they reviewed (or asked for permission to review) any of my texts before publication. Instead, all involved were very forthcoming with providing us with information and answering questions we had regarding the Eurofighter Typhoon fighter program and how it is operated by the RAF. As RAF Lossiemouth is an active air force base, photography was naturally restricted to certain locations and angles.