On 9 May, Iranian forces in Syria launched several rockets against Israel. The Israeli response was swift and included one of the largest air campaigns the region has seen.
The IDF has struck dozens of Iranian military targets in Syria in response to the Iranian rocket attack against Israel. Quds force is behind attack and has played the initial price. IDF remains ready for various scenarios but does not seek to escalate the situation. pic.twitter.com/4rC8gHK2LG
However, attention soon turned to one single strike in particular, as the Israeli forces released a video clip shot by a missile taking out a Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 GREYHOUND). While it has earlier been reported that Pantsirs have been destroyed in Syria (a misidentified Mercedes truck a year ago comes to mind), this is the first confirmed instance I have seen.
The IDF struck an SA22 aerial interception system as part of a wide-scale attack against Iranian military sites in Syria pic.twitter.com/dFGXIwMT45
The Pantsir is the short-range companion to Russia’s more famous long-range S-300/S-400 air defence missiles, and its role is to swat down any aircraft or air-launched weapons which manage to penetrate to close range where the longer-ranged systems are less capable. In line with the Russian marketing of the longer-ranged systems, the Pantsir is described as “near 100 % efficiency” and some western journalists have described it as showing how Russia’s “air defenses outpace America’s”. Needless to say, there are preciously little evidence to support Russia’s claims, and as the Israeli video is one of the rare documented encounters between the system and an airborne enemy it quickly generated considerable discussions.
On one hand, some questioned whether the system was a decoy, others whether it was operational, and some declared the whole Pantsir-family as being nothing but expensive trash. All in all, the short clip deserves further scrutiny.
It is clear that the radar is elevated and pointing backwards, as the U-shaped radar support is visible (blue). The weapons are pointing towards the rear, which is the transport position (though if the whole vehicle was rigged for transport, the radar would be lying flat facing upwards). The front of the truck corresponds with the Kamaz 6560 which is used by the most numerous Russian version (red).
Could it be a decoy? Parking out in the open on the tarmac and not making any attempt at covering the system certain seems to be begging to be destroyed. However, a crucial detail is visible in the video. A group of people are standing next to the vehicle, and seconds before the missile impact it one of them runs towards it.
Whether he was trying to save it or fire at the attacker is unsure, but in any case you would not run towards a decoy being fired upon. A brave act, but far too late.
Interestingly enough, images of the destroyed vehicle also appeared afterwards.
The picture matches the video as far as it is possible to tell. The truck is hit just aft of the cabin, the weapons are facing rearwards, and the radar is raised. The versions floating around on pro-Assad accounts often refer to the IAI Harop, a loitering UAV, while other sources often mention the Delilah loitering cruise missile (others still refer to the Spike NLOS, a very long range anti-tank missile). All three carry relatively small warheads consistent with the kind of damage visible in the picture. However, the only evidence in either direction I’ve seen is that the sight picture does seem to match the Delilah better than it does for the other two.
Left: footage from Military Channel's (now American Heroes Channel) "Ultimate Weapons" special on Israel featuring the #Delilah ALCM. Right: footage from last night's #IAF strike against a Syrian SA-22 system.
In any case, the exact weapon doesn’t really matter, as this was not a case of an Israeli wonder-weapon being able to crack the defences of the Pantsir. Instead, it is clear that poor training on the part of the Syrian air defences, coupled with the lack of a clear situational picture, spelt the end for the Pantsir. The latter comes as no surprise, considering the numerous Israeli strikes targeting the integrated air defence network operated by Syria, but as shown by Serbia during Operation Allied Force, it is possible to stay alive and at least constitute a force-in-being even if the individual units have to fight their own war. This however require basic skills and training which the Syrians clearly lacked in this case. The Pantsir had no job standing out in the open if it lacked missiles, and it never had any job being parked in such an open spot without camouflage (as a matter of fact, it can fire on the move, so parking out in the open even if camouflaged might not be the best option).
For the Russians getting the Pantsir knocked out was something of an embarrassment, and they have been quick to point out that it must have either been out of ammo or otherwise non-operational. While that seems to indeed have been the case, it should be noted that days after the strike, the Russian government made a U-turn with regards to supplying the advanced long-range S-300PMU-2 free-of-charge to Syria. The idea was floated after the Western cruise missile strikes, but is now apparently completely scrapped. Many sources attribute this to Israeli prime minister Netanyahu’s successful lobbying during his recent visit to Moscow, but one has to wonder if not the incompetency shown by the Syrians operating the Pantsir caused concerns about the international embarrassment a successful strike against the S-300 would cause for the Russian arms manufacturers. As such, taking out the Pantsir might indeed have had significant regional consequences, but it does not in any way prove the system itself either good or bad.
1.2 billion Euros. That’s the quoted cost for Finland’s four new Pohjanmaa-class corvettes being built under the Squadron 2020-project. An estimate thrown around is that roughly half of that sum is the ship itself, and the other half is the naval specific items. While Rauma Marine Construction, RMC, has more or less secured the shipbuilding contract, the fight is still on for the “battle system”. This consists of the weapons, sensors, combat management system, and their integration into the vessel, and with a contract likely coming in at over half a billion Euros, it has certainly grabbed the attention of the shortlisted companies.
One of these is Saab (the other two being Atlas Elektronik GmbH and Lockheed Martin Canada Inc), and this means that I find myself together with a small group of Finnish journalists and their photographers in a nondescript conference room at Saab’s facilities in Järfälla just outside of Stockholm. The large site include a number of different production as well as R&D facilities, and everything is designated a protected site by the Swedish authorities, meaning that we have to pay close attention to what we are allowed to take pictures of. The reason is simple.
Things happen quite often, more than you know.
What exactly happens is left open to imagination, but it is clear that it includes both cyber security as well as people physically moving around in the vicinity of the site.
But if Saab isn’t too keen on discussing the details of attempts at intelligence gathering directed against them, they are very keen on discussing Finland. “It’s almost a home market for us”, senior director for Naval Combat Systems Mickael Hansson explains. “We are very proud of that as well” he says and points to the currently installed product base in the Finnish Navy. This covers everything from the Trackfire remote weapon system which the Navy has developed something of a love affair with (it has been bought for all three classes being built or undergoing MLU’s during the last years), via radars, remotely operated vehicles, communication systems, missiles, and on to the 9LV combat management system.
The 9LV is found in the Rauma-class, and soon in the Hamina as well as the system was chosen for the MLU. When asked what he believes were the deciding factors, Jonas Widerström, Saab’s Naval Sales Director Finland, mentions price, harmonisation with the Rauma-class, and above all the robustness of the system. Widerström should know, being a retired naval anti-aircraft officer having served aboard Swedish corvettes he has ample experience of the 9LV. Interestingly enough, the Hamina-class currently sports Atlas Elektronik’s ANCS 2000 but instead of upgrading this the Finnish Defence Forces chose to tear it out and replace it with Saab’s offering. While the Hamina MLU technically isn’t related to the Squadron 2020 CMS contract, it is clear that the MLU-contract means that Saab is the favourite for the larger deal as well. And Saab doesn’t beat around the bush when it comes to this.
We want to win this.
How is Saab then planning on doing this? The talking points comes as no surprise. They include a “comprehensive industrial participation package” and the value of having a harmonised C3I system with not only the Hamina-class but with the Swedish ships of the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG) as well. The 9LV is also sporting “pretty advanced” capabilities when it comes to converting between national and international data links and “very good sensor fusion software” with a rapid response time. Saab also points out that they have worked with the ESSM before on the Halifax-class (ironically as part of a team led by Lockheed Martin Canada), a system which “can be, maybe be on the SQ2020”.
To top off the offer Saab is bringing their own sensor suite. This is centered around the Saab Lightweight Integrated Mast (completely unironically abbreviated SLIM) which will be manufactured by Saab and delivered as a complete subassembly to the yard for installation aboard the ship. As a parenthesis, Saab explained that the renders showed this particular SLIM-setup “on another ship” and not on the Pohjanmaa-class. Hmm, I wonder what ship that could be…?
The mast sports a number of sensors and communication antennas, the most important of which are the vessels main active sensors: the Sea Giraffe 4A FF (Fixed Face) and a single rotating Sea Giraffe 1X found inside. Keen readers of the blog will remember that Saab originally planned for a setup with a single rotating 4A accompanying the rotating 1X, and while the head of marketing and sales for Surface Radar Solutions Pontus Djerf (another retired commander) maintain that it is an solution that’s “often good enough”, the fixed face version is more future proof and provides additional benefits. As the project has proceeded, this has led Saab to swap out the rotating 4A to the FF. The fixed 1 x 2 meter AESA-arrays cut response times, but it does not replace the need for the 1X. Instead the two complementing radars operate in S- and X-band respectively (in addition any CEROS FCS-systems would bring a Ku-band radar to the ship) which brings a certain amount of redundancy and jamming resistance while also providing radars optimised for slightly different roles. In short, the 4A looks at the larger picture, while the 1X has shorter range but better resolution. Notably both radars sport features borrowed from Saab’s work with artillery location radars and small targets (such as UAV’s), or C-RAM and ELSS respectively.
These are all interesting features for the Finnish Defence Forces, because as opposed to blue water fleets, the Finnish Navy is very much a force present on the right flank of the battlefield in any potential conflict. As such, the corvettes will play an important role in the grander picture (‘joint’ is a keyword for both the Squadron 2020 and the HX-programs) when it comes to establishing situational awareness and providing medium-ranged anti-aircraft support around the most populous areas of Finland. To be able to fill the needs of higher command, a serious sensor array of both active and passive systems coupled with an effective combat management system and the datalinks to share this information. Saab seems confident that they have the solution, and that they do so at a balanced cost/performance-ratio. We will have to wait for a few months and see if the Finnish Navy agrees.
On the evening of 18 November 1942, three Finnish motor torpedo boats entered the Soviet port at Moschny Island (Fi. Lavansaari) and fired four torpedoes which sank the Soviet 1,700 ton gun boat Krasnoye Znamya at its moorings, after which they sped away unscathed. The daring raid is the high point in the history of Finnish torpedoes, and five years later torpedoes were effectively banned from Finnish use with the Paris Peace Treaty.
Like the case with guided missiles, the ban would in the end give way to Soviet weapon exports. In this case torpedoes reappeared on the (official) Finnish TOE with the acquisition of two Project 50 ‘Gornostay’ (NATO-designation ‘Riga’-class) frigates in the mid-1960’s, both of which sported heavy torpedoes (533 mm). The local renaissance of the torpedo was however cut short by the fact that the ships themselves weren’t overly successful, and importantly they were too manpower intensive for the small Finnish Navy. In the end, they were retired in 1979 and 1985 respectively.
Now, while the heavy torpedo slowly gave way to the anti-ship missile as the premier weapon in ship-to-ship combat, the lightweight torpedo became the anti-submarine weapon of choice for most navies in the world. In Finland things were a bit different, mainly because of the shallow and constrained waters which dominate the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland. However, things slowly started to change with the introduction of ever more capable diesel-electric submarines and different kinds of midget submarines in the Russian Baltic Fleet. While running towards the enemy at speed and throwing depth charges might have worked against a Project 641 ‘Foxtrot’-class, it was very doubtful whether it would against more modern designs such as the current Project 877/636 ‘Kilo’ or the upcoming Project 677 ‘Lada’.
With these developments under the surface in combination with the Finnish Navy shifting more and more priority from defence against enemy amphibious landings/naval movements to protection of merchant shipping, it was clear that the ASW-capability needed a boost. There simply needed to be more ships capable of performing ASW, and they needed a longer reach to avoid being sunk outside of the range of their own ASW-weapons. Enter the second reintroduction of torpedoes into Finnish service, with the decision that the Hamina-class and the upcoming Pohjanmaa-class (Squadron 2020) would both get light torpedoes.
The choice of torpedoes was revealed early January this year, with the announcement that Saab’s new lightweight torpedo (NLWT) had been chosen. As a matter of fact, the torpedo is so new that it hasn’t got a company name yet. “There is a name in the works”, Saab’s sales director for underwater systems Håkan Ekström discloses. In the meantime, the Swedish Defence Forces has already named the new weapon Torped 47 (sans-o, as that’s how the word is written in Swedish).
That Finland would opt for the NLWT was rather unsurprising, considering that it is highly optimised for the kind of littoral environment that any Finnish submarine hunt would take place in. Compared to ‘blue waters’ (open seas), looking for submarines is vastly different in the Baltic Sea. Detection ranges, and combat ranges for that matter, can easily be much greater than the depth, leaving the combat taking place in what the product manager for torpedoes, Thomas Petersson, described as a “Thin slice of water”. This causes issues for active sonars, as in the oceans anything spotted by them is usually either a submarine or some kind of sealife. In the Baltic Sea, most echoes are simply coming from the seabed, leading to a more difficult discrimination problem. The water also has some interesting behaviors, part of which comes from the many rivers flowing into the sea. These bring fresh water of various temperatures and significant amounts of sediments into the sea, leading to sound waves in some cases experiencing refraction in two directions (see this short and nice primer on how different temperatures messes up submarine hunting). In short together with the cluttered seabed detection becomes difficult, leading to relatively short engagement ranges.
Saab’s answer is the NLWT, which sports a number of niche features which combine to address the problems of subhunting in littoral waters. To begin with the torpedo is wire-guided, meaning that the operator aboard the ship can easily control the torpedo throughout its course. This also allows it to be used like a forward-deployed sensor, in that the operator can use its active sonar to look for targets, at different depths, as the torpedo is happily moving towards the suspected submarine location. The torpedo also has a very low slowest possible speed, allowing it to run very silently, further increasing the effectiveness of its sonars (the torpedo can be fired in both active and passive modes). One crucial difference is that the active sonar is operating at a somewhat higher frequency than usual for light torpedoes, giving it better resolution on the sonar picture as a tradeoff for somewhat shorter viewing range. The torpedo also has a quick launch sequence and rapidly goes into stable running, to ensure that it doesn’t touch the bottom and can handle the earlier mentioned short engagement ranges efficiently.
For the technical specifications, NLWT is made out of aluminium, and sports a pump jet with a single rotating impeller and a stator in place of the earlier Torped 45’s two unshrouded coaxial counter-rotating screws. The battery has also been upgraded, with lithium iron phosphate (LiFePO4) batteries replacing the earlier silver-oxide. This allows the torpedo to stay launch-ready for longer times in the launch tube, which also functions as the plug-and-play storage tube. The launch tube also include pressurised air to eject the torpedo and a spool of the same wire as is found inside the torpedo. If the torpedo moves, the torpedo spools out wire, and if the vessel moves the launch tube spools out wire. This ensures that the wire stays stationary in the water after the first few meters of the torpedo run, making sure that it doesn’t tangle or break. In the case of a wire break the torpedo will either abort or continue in fire-and-forget mode, depending on the mode chosen before launch. After a torpedo has been launched, the whole empty launch tube is switched out to a new tube with a launch ready torpedo inside it. This switch takes around 15-30 minutes for a trained crew and doesn’t require any specific equipment other than a suitable crane to handle the load. As such, it could conceivably be handled at sea (sea state allowing). The used launch tube is then sent back to a naval base to be reloaded. The direct drive DC-motor together with the new batteries provide a range measured in “tens of kilometers”, the exact number being both classified and highly dependent upon the speed of the torpedo.
The active sensor provides a detailed enough picture that it can measure the length of the target, and any major features such as the conning tower can be made out. During the run the torpedo maps all return echoes, run validity checks, and reports on valid targets. If allowed it will then intercept the closest valid target inside the search box, and in case of a miss it will re-acquire for another attack. The seeker has been used successfully during live-fire exercises against targets the size of midget submarines, and Saab is confident that it can handle these kinds of targets as well as regular submarines. An interesting feature is the anti-ship capability, and though the small warhead (Saab declines to give the size, but notes that most light torpedoes carry a warhead weighing “about 50 kilograms”) won’t sink any major surface units, it does punch above its weight in that it has a dedicated ASuW-attack mode going beneath the vessel and using an upwards-looking proximity fuse to detonate under the keel. The combined effect of the gas-bubble which removes the water that carries that part of the vessel combined with the impact of water rushing back to fill the hole is enough to literally break ships in two when employed by larger torpedoes, and while the NLWT won’t repeat that, it will most likely send any corvette limping back to base with the hull distorted and propulsion shafts out of alignment.
Part of this performance comes from the Swedish requirement to be able to use the torpedo from both surface ships, submarines, coastal launchers, and aircrafts/helicopters. For the submarines, the light torpedo plays an important role as a self-defence weapon, as well as for hunting other submarines. For the Hamina-class, they will sport a single fixed twin launcher on the rear deck, allowing enough space for the RIB-launch to remain in its current position. Looking at the future, the contract with Saab also include an option for the four Pohjanmaa-class corvettes, and everything points towards this option being exercised within the next year or so when the acquisition of weapons for the corvette program starts to take place.
The current Finnish contract for the torpedoes include the systems for the Hamina-class and an undisclosed number of torpedoes, as well as training at the torpedo research and development center in Motala. This is also where we are shown the first prototype of the weapon, which is just about to finish its part of the development program. The production of the units themselves, and prototype number two which is currently in production, takes place in Linköping. Deliveries to both Finland and Sweden will start in 2023, and FNS Tornio, the first of the Hamina-class to undergo MLU, will be ready to go to sea with the launchers fitted already next year. Notable is that the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, FMV, is closely involved in the project and is the launch customer that has contracted Saab to develop a new torpedo. However, the Finnish contract with Saab does not include any research and developments, but is purely for production and supply (including torpedoes, hardware needed for their operation, documentation, and training). However, at the same time the Finnish Defence Forces Logistics Command, PVLOGL, has signed an agreement with the FMV regarding cooperation and loans of Torped 45 to cover the period 2019 to 2023 when the Finnish Navy will have torpedo capable ships but no torpedoes.
‘Borrowing’ something that is literally worth millions of Euros sounded a bit suspicious to me, so I decided to contact FMV to confirm that it wasn’t just a case of Saab spelling ‘leasing’ wrong. However, FMV confirmed that it is indeed the case that the Finnish Defence Forces gets to borrow a non-disclosed number of torpedoes for free, as long as they are used and maintained according to official documentation. The aim of this agreement is that Finland will be able to operate with the Torped 45 aboard FNS Tornio already next autumn. Part of why this generosity is bestowed upon the Finnish Navy is no doubt that torpedoes occupy a rather unique role amongst modern munitions in that after launch they can be retrieved (the training warhead sports a flotation device in the form a inflatable ‘balloon’), and after the wire has been respooled and the battery recharged they are good to go again. As such, this is quite different compared to e.g. borrowing artillery rounds.
However, another angle is without doubt the value for Sweden of having Finland as an operator of the same system. Not only will this offer benefits when jointly performing ASW missions as part of the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group (the SFNTG), but a second cooperation deal signed at the same time between FMV and PVLOGL concern the future of the NLWT. Under this the two nations will cooperate around the acquisition and continued development of the torpedo system. By creating these kinds of synergies the costs for operating and keeping the system up to date will hopefully be lower for both users, and the agreement also open up the doors for increased cooperation around the ASW-mission as a whole.
The first draft of the text and pictures, with the exception of those parts based on information given by FMV, has been provided to Saab for screening to ensure that no classified, export controlled, or company confidential information is included.
“Psychedelic” is the word I hear someone standing next to me use to describe the room. I agree. We are standing inside what is roughly a 13 m long cube, with all the surfaces being covered with soft blue spikes of different sizes. The room is completely void of echoes, and they say that if you stand here alone, you will eventually hear your heart beating. Loudly. The only objects standing out is a large frame mounted halfway up one wall, and a pattern of blank discs mounted opposite the frame, these being the flight motion simulator and the antenna wall respectively. We are in the anechoic chamber at ELSI, and I almost expect GLaDOS to start talking to us.
ELSI, or the Electrical Warfare Simulator, is at the hearth of Saab’s anti-ship missile program. The seeker-head of the RBS15 missile is mounted on the flight motion simulator, which moves the seeker in 3-axises as it ‘flies’. On the other end of the room the antennas sends out signals corresponding to what the seeker would see at any given moment during its course. This includes not only target signatures, environmental effects, and countermeasures in the form of false targets and active jammers. All this, coupled with the seekers simulated position and real-world direction, are then used to create the model, which is fed to the antenna wall’s signal generator which creates artificial radar returns for the seeker head. As noted, it is very much a case of the actual hardware being in the loop during testing.
The story of ELSI goes back to the early 90’s, when the board decided upon the investment, partly to ensure that Saab would be able to expand their share of the export market in an age of shrinking defence budgets. 1994 the site was running its first tests, and four years later it was operating at the desired level, a host of teething problems having been fixed.
Finland is no stranger to the RBS15, having operated the first generation of the missile from ship and shorebased batteries under the local designation MTO-85 since the late eighties. As such, a Finnish delegation visited ELSI early on in 1999, with the latest Finnish threat pictures. The purpose was to run a comprehensive round of tests with the MTO-85 seeker, which then provided the basis for an upgrade program launched at Saab. The upgraded seeker was then run through the same set of tests the following year. The tests can’t have gone too bad, as two years later the upgraded RBS15 SFIII, a customised RBS15 MkII, was introduced in Finnish service as the MTO 85M.
Now the RBS15 is a hot topic again for Finland. The anti-ship missile is one of the candidates for the PTO2020-program, the current acquisition to replace the MTO 85M on the Hamina-class following their ongoing MLU and in the truckmounted batteries, as well as becoming the main surface-to-surface weapon for the new Pohjanmaa-class corvettes (Squadron 2020). And Saab is confident that the RBS15 will be a prime candidate this time as well.
Saab has two distinct versions on the table. Noting that the baseline version was nearing the end of its life, Saab embarked on an ambitious upgrade program. While the step from MkI to MkII was an upgrade, the Mk3 was a radical redesign resulting in what was basically a completely new missile. Following a four-year test program it was adopted by the German Navy, and shortly after that by the Poles. The Swedish Navy is still soldiering on with the MkII, and would have been happy to adopt the Mk3. However, the Swedish Air Force had other thoughts, and had a requirement for the weapon to be lighter to allow four missiles to be carried simultaneously by the upcoming 39E Gripen. The result was the RBS15 ‘Next Generation’ (still lacking an official designation, though Mk4 wouldn’t come as a surprise), which is an upgraded Mk3 with a lighter launch weight, longer range, and generally improved performance. The weapon is contracted for introduction into Swedish service for both the Navy and the Air Force during the next decade, and Saab doesn’t mince words: “It is the most capable and advanced anti-ship missile on the market”, as was explained to us during a briefing.
The new launchers are a chapter for themselves, with the original box-like launcher having been replaced by octagonal tubes. The reason behind this is cost-savings, as the original box held the missile tilted 45° to one side, meaning that the railings holding the missile inside the box have very demanding tolerances. The newer launch tube instead holds the missile level, which is somewhat more forgiving on the structures. But it in turn leads to new questions. “The Visby-class will fit the NG, but we have already cut square holes in the side for the MkII, so in that case we will use the old launcher,” a technical sales support engineer explained. “The missile itself doesn’t really care, it can handle both positions.”
What then is so special about the RBS15? From a Finnish standpoint, the Baltic Sea as the design environment of choice is interesting. The often poor weather combined with a cluttered archipelago and lots of civilian traffic makes for a challenging battlefield, and Saab is one of very few companies designing their anti-ship missiles from the outset for littoral waters as opposed to the open sea. This is also where ELSI comes into play. allowing for advanced simulations of the performance of the seeker, something which plays a key role in evaluating parameters such as ECCM and target discrimination. The weapon is also capable of performing the land-attack role against ‘soft’ targets, though it is not optimised for the role in the same way as ‘true’ land-attack cruise missiles.
The ships we are firing against are not that keen on being hit.
The flight path of the missile is guided through a number of pre-set 3D waypoints, and the missile then navigates using both GPS and inertial navigation to make sure it hits all waypoints on time. Timing is key for features such as simultaneous time-on-target, a default feature for the RBS15, and as such the missile will throttle up and down in flight as needed to hit all waypoints on the exact time given. The exact height of the sea-skimming part of the trajectory also varies according to sea state, with larger waves naturally forcing the missile to fly at higher altitude. And in case the missile misses its target, it will swing around and do a reattack. If no target is found at all, it will eventually head off to a pre-set destruction point, which can be altered by the operator to make sure the missile doesn’t fly off and self-destruct over the nearest town.
For PTO2020, Saab hasn’t offered a specific variant, but instead opened the shop and described the Mk3 available today and the NG available tomorrow. The systems will also be interoperable, with NG launchers able to fire Mk3 and Mk3 launchers able (after a software update) to launch NG missiles. Customisation, as has been the case with the earlier Finnish versions, is also an option, but Saab notes that less and less countries are willing to pay the premium of having a customised missile. From a Finnish perspective, the supply chain is interesting. Diehl in Germany handles final assembly, with Saab building many major subassemblies and handling much of the development work and testing in Linköping. However, a new location on the map is Saab’s brand new technology centre, the STC, in Tampere, which is heavily involved in the electronic warfare side of the technology for the RBS15 NG.
The first draft of the text and pictures has been provided to Saab for screening to ensure that no classified, export controlled, or company confidential information is included.
From the perspective of the Kremlin, Syria has been a great success. Following the surprisingly successful organisation of a transatlantic response to the Russian invasions of Crimea and the Donbas, the Russian intervention in Syria not only managed to prop up the Assad regime and reverse the course of the civil war, it also made sure that the Russian Navy would get a naval base in the Mediterranean. And most importantly: it forced the West to again talk directly with the Kremlin.
This was not only a case of Russia playing a rather mediocre hand very well, but also of several events outside of Putin’s control lining up favourably. These include both Iran and Hezbollah intervening, as well as the Turkish turn-around following the failed coup of 2016. The introduction of Russian long-range air-defence system, including the S-400, into Syria caused further alarm amongst western observers, with some going as far as stating that no assets in theatre beyond the F-22 Raptor “has any ability to operate and survive” inside the 400 km range of the system’s 40N6 missile.
I have earlier on the blog cautioned against drawing rings on maps and stating that they are any kind of steel domes inside which anything and everything will be shot down, and this is very much the case for the SAM’s at Khmeimim Air Base as well. The latest strikes on targets in western Syria, including those well-within 100 km of Khmeimim AB, showed that coalition aircraft can strike presumably protected targets without issue. And not only that, if one looks closely at the map, the 400 km range extends well beyond Cyprus. The very same Cyprus which was the base of the RAF aircraft participating in the strikes. In other words, British aircraft took off and landed inside the stated range of the system, and all cruise missiles, both ship- and air-launched, penetrated the bubble without seemingly any of them having been intercepted.
The short answer is that Russia, according to Washington, didn’t try. There is said to have be no indication that the S-400 was fired against anything, and most likely this was a political decision. However, it does tell you something.
4. Russia blinked, they know they blinked, we know they blinked, but we will pretend they didn’t.
If Russia had the magical steel dome that some lay out A2/AD to be, why didn’t they at least swat down some of the cruise missiles, even if they decided to leave the aircrafts themselves (or rather, their pilots) alone? At the crucial moment, Russia decided not to try to protect the assets of their ally. Whatever the reason, the result is a razed block in the Syrian capital.
However, while there without doubt are intelligence services around the world plotting the decision as yet another data point, the immediate outcome isn’t necessarily too dramatic. As TD noted, the West will continue to act like Russia didn’t blink, and Russia will continue to claim that they control the skies over (western) Syria.
The problem is that while Russia might be the great power on location in Syria, the other actors, including Assad, Iran, and Hezbollah, all have their own agendas as well. More importantly, it is highly doubtful that any of them would hesitate to jump the Russian ship if they saw more benefits to be gained elsewhere.
Enter Israel, which is likely the western state that has been cooperating most effortlessly with Russia. In part this stems from a pragmatism that is a strong part of Israeli foreign policy, but it should also be noted that current defence minister Lieberman (and a sizeable Israeli minority) is in fact born in the Soviet Union. By most accounts the Israeli-Russian deconfliction agreement is working nicely, with Russia more or less accepting Israeli strikes on targets in Syria.
Israel has on the whole tried to stay out of the Syrian conflict, in no small part likely based on the experiences from the Lebanese civil war. However, a red line has always been drawn at the “transfer of advanced weaponry” from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. What exactly constitutes “advanced weapons” is left open, but it is usually taken to include long-range rockets and ballistic missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-ship missiles. The Israeli answer to transfers has been air strikes, often carried out with stand-off weaponry from Lebanese or Israeli airspace.
As the war has been dragging on, the Israeli involvement has deepened at the same time as the Iranian impact on the ground has increased. While Assad constitutes a know quantity, Israel has been extremely wary of the long-term impact of allowing Iran a foothold in the region. And while brig. gen. (res.) Shafir of the Israeli Air Force a decade ago confidently could say that Iran is isolated in the Muslim world, recent developments have opened up avenues of approach for Teheran on a broader scale than has been seen before. The recent downing of an Iranian drone that entered Israeli airspace and the following air raids (including the first downing of an Israeli fast jet in a very long time) has increased the temperature further.
Israeli official told me PM Netanyahu's conclusion from his phone call with Putin last week was that Russia has no real ability to contain Iran in Syria
A very worrying detail was the fact that Israeli media claims that the aftermath of the raid left Israeli prime minister Netanyahu with the impression that Russia has no real ability to contain Iran in Syria. The problem here then is that the logical conclusion is that Israel will have to deal with the Iranian presence in Syria alone, and while I doubt that anyone inside the IDF is dusting off the plans for a drive to Damascus just yet, a more comprehensive air campaign aimed at severely crippling the Iranian forces in Syria might be in the cards.
While this kind of Israeli-Iranian showdown is bad enough in and by itself, the big kicker is how that would reflect upon Russia. Having two gangs fight it out on what should ostensibly be your backyard does not leave the onlookers with the feeling that you are in control, no matter how often you say so. In addition, if Russia goes through with the idea to supply the S-300PMU-2 to Assad, this opens up further risks of losing face. While the S-300 is one notch below the S-400, the system is vastly superior to anything currently in operation by the Syrians themselves. As such, it would likely be a prime target in any Israeli air campaign, and echoing the aerial battles of 1982, it would likely be destroyed sooner rather than later.
This all would leave Russia in a bad light, and erase much of the gains in prestige and diplomacy that the Syrian intervention has so far given Russia (in certain places, one should add, as others are less impressed by people regularly bombing hospitals and supporting dictators who use chemical weapons). While attempts at predicting Putin’s next moves are notoriously hard, it is safe to say that he has not shown an inclination to count his losses and leave the table. Instead, when the rest of the players believe him to have overplayed his hand, what usually happens seems to be that Putin will press on regardless. And there’s no telling whether his next move would come in Syria, or somewhere else.
“They had three buildings there [Barzah scientific research center] and a parking deck,” McKenzie said.
“Now they don’t.” via USNI.
As information about yesterday’s strikes against targets in Syria has been slowly to trickling out throughout the weekend, it is by now possible to piece together a picture of the raid. Perhaps the single most informative piece was the press briefing held by Pentagon.
Alert readers will note that the total amount given is 105 cruise missiles (36 air-launched, 63 ship-launched, and 6 sub-launched), coming in two above the 103 given by Russian sources. The missiles hit the following targets:
Barzah/Barzeh Scientific Research Center
Situated in the western parts of Damascus, the center was hit by 57 TLAM and 19 JASSM missiles.
Sputnik published a video reportedly shot at the scene, which seems to match the location below. It also matches the description given by the Pentagon, in that three large buildings have been completely destroyed.
Interestingly, the dual weapons used says something about the nature of the target. While the TLAM has a rather standard 1,000 lb (454 kg) class blast/fragmentation warhead (i.e. it explodes and creates shrapnel), the JASSM sports what Lockheed Martin calls a “2,000-pound [908 kg] class weapon with a dual-mode penetrator and blast fragmentation warhead” (i.e. it is made to penetrate hardened structures such as bunker before then exploding and creating shrapnel). Another thing to note is that the number 57 does not correspond to any possible combination of the salvos from individual ships, meaning that at least one vessel targeted two different sites.
Him Shinsar chemical weapons storage facility
The bunkers and facilities used for storing chemical weapons were hit by 22 weapons, these being 9 TLAM, 8 Storm Shadow, 2 SCALP EG, and 3 MdCN. This clearly shows the different nature of the target compared to the research center, as the number of missiles is much smaller, but also the fact that 13 out of 20 missiles were bunker-busting Storm Shadow/SCALP EG/MdCN (which are simply different local designations for the same missile, with MdCN being the ship-launched version). The Pentagon briefing described the target as ‘destroyed’, and while it is harder to verify when it comes to underground installations, significant damage is visible in the satellite imagery posted since.
The final target was a command facility associated with the Him Shinshar site. This was hit by the last 7 SCALP EG. Pentagon described the facility as having taken ‘damage’, as opposed to the two others which were rated as ‘destroyed’. It is unclear if this is a failure, or simply representative of the different nature of the target. Command facilities might be able to continue to function to some extent even if key buildings are wiped out, which is not the case with a storage facility in which the storage buildings are hit.
In any case, satellite imagery shows what looks like two larger and one smaller hardened building having been targeted and destroyed.
Despite wild claims of the majority of the missiles having been intercepted and the rest having missed, it is clear that the raid was an unequivocal success on the tactical level. The targeted sites have all suffered heavy damage. If the description of the nature of the targets is correct, it is highly possible that the use of sarin has been made harder by the strikes. Obviously, this does not stop the regime from using a whole number of other ghastly weapons and tactics, including barrel bombs, starvation through sieges, and quite possibly industry grade chlorine (which has been featured in numerous attacks in Syria).
Notable is also the fact that several of the weapons and systems used were making their combat debuts. These include the JASSM and MdCN, as well as the Virgina-class SSN. From a Finnish viewpoint, the combat launch of JASSM (albeit not in the exact version used by the Finnish Air Force) was certainly of interest. However, it should be noted that ‘damaging’ a single command facility virtually undefended by air defences required 7 missiles of the same class as the JASSM, something which puts the Finnish acquisition of (a maximum) of 70 JASSM into perspective.
When it comes to the defences, it is clear that the talk of the S-400 deployment in Syria creating an impenetrable A2/AD-bubble stopping western strikes was not correct. While many of the earlier Israeli strikes had taken place in areas which present difficulties for the S-400 (and supporting shorter-ranged systems) to see and intercept the targets, the strike waves approaching over the eastern Mediterranean would be more or less the perfect scenario for long-ranged SAM-systems, and is very similar to the setup of systems operating from Kaliningrad which often are described as being able to deny NATO access to the Baltic Sea. While it likely was political will that stopped the Russian air defence systems from being activated, the Syrians did their best, with around 40 missiles having been reported by Pentagon as fired. While it is not impossible that some of the cruise missiles were intercepted, it is clear from the pictures linked above that even this barrage of air defence missiles was unable to serious lessen the damage suffered by the Syrians. A significant issue was likely that all missiles struck their targets within an extremely short time span, leaving the individual air defence batteries saturated.
Carrier aviation has always had a tendency to interest people. After all, flying aircraft of ships sounds crazy enough than one wouldn’t think it was a viable plan of operations if not for the very fact that a number of navies does so on a regular basis. Interestingly, quite a number of important changes have taken place when it comes to worldwide carrier operations in the last decade or so. This includes several new carriers being commissioned, and new aircrafts coming into service, making much of what is written on the subject out of date.
Enter Harpia’s Carrier Aviation in the 21st Century – Aircraft carriers and their units in detail. The book goes through all navies currently sporting a commissioned carrier and fixed wing aircraft, and with “currently” that means the end of 2017. In short, the Royal Navy and Queen Elizabeth is included, but the Thai Navy is not following the retirement of their Harriers. Navies with more or less suitable ships but not having fixed wing aircraft, e.g. the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, are left out.
Readers can, and most likely will, have opinions about this line. Some will undoubtedly feel that it is a stretch to include Brazil considering the state of the NAe São Paulo (ex-Foch) or the Royal Navy considering that shipboard F-35 operations are yet to commence. Others will likely argue for a inclusion of a number of big-deck helicopter carriers and amphibious ships which arguably sport more shipbased aviation than some of the smaller ‘Harrier carriers’. Personally I would have liked to see some discussion around the feasibility of F-35B operations from a number of ships that have been speculated to be more or (usually) less ready to handle the V/STOL bird, such as the Japanese Izumo-class, the Australian Canberra-class, and the Dokdo-class of the ROKN. Still, I get that the line has to be drawn somewhere, and the basis of who’s included and who’s left out is clearly stated, which is nice.
One interesting feature of the book is that it puts the carriers and their aircraft into context. While chances are you have read a text or two about the INS Vikramaditya and its MiG-29K’s before, the book does not only (briefly) discuss the history of Indian naval aviation to put the latest program(s) into context, it also explains the contemporary doctrine and what role the carrier plays in today’s Indian armed forces, the likely composition of a carrier battlegroup, and not only lists but describes all embarked aviation units, fixed and rotary winged.
More or less the same is the case with each and every country-specific chapter of the book. I say more or less, because every chapter is written by a country-specific expert (hence the ‘editor’ after Newdick’s name), and the setup and sub-headings vary slightly. While purists might find this irritating, I personally find it good that the authors have been given some leeway, as the unique situations in different navies are better served by getting more custom fit descriptions compared to being shoehorned into a ‘one size fits all’ template. I was a bit worried upon opening the book that the variances would be so big that the book wouldn’t feel like a coherent work, but having read it I don’t feel that is the case.
Over all the book is a very enjoyable read, though the Italy-chapter does suffer from the same kind of language-issues that I mentioned in my review of Harpia’s Tucano-book. However, I am also happy to say that the good points of the Tucano-book carries over as well. These include highly enjoyable pictures and top-notch full-colour illustrations, as well as excellent build-quality of the book. In fact, I am yet to manage to break any single one of my Harpia-books, and that include bringing an earlier review book along for a camping trip in the archipelago.
The gorilla in the room when writing about carrier aviation worldwide is the completely outsized role of the US Navy. In short, the US Navy fields more and larger carriers and carrier air groups than the rest of the world together. How do you tackle this, without the book feeling unbalanced? The USN does indeed get a longer chapter than the rest of the countries. However, US carrier aviation is also remarkably homogeneous, being built around two clear templates: the Nimitz (and now Ford) with a carrier air wing and the smaller amphibious ships with their aviation elements, and the number of flying platforms has shrunk considerably compared to the classic cold war wings. This means that there is no need to give ten times the space for the USN compared to e.g. the French just because they have ten times the number of carriers. This makes the book feel balanced, and laid the last of my worries to rest. The sole issue I foresee is that developments in carrier aviation is moving rapidly in several countries at the moment (USA, UK, China, India, …), and that means that parts of the book run the risk of becoming outdated quite fast. Still, that will be the case with any book on the topic released during the next five to ten years (at least), and there is certainly enough ‘longlasting information’ to make sure that the package as a whole isn’t going anywhere soon.
Compared to the Tucano-review which I was very excited for, I was somewhat more lukewarm to the prospect of what felt like yet another carrier book. However, the book surprised me, and certainly grabbed my attention. The chapters are deep enough to include plenty new information to me, and of such a length that it is easy to pick up and read through a single chapter if you suddenly have a need for a quick rundown of the current status of Spanish carrier aviation (yes, such things do happen to me occasionally). Harpia’s telltale illustrations and tables are also found in abundance.
Highly recommended for anyone looking for an update of carrier aviation worldwide!
The book was kindly provided free of charge for review by Harpia Publishing.