The only thing differentiating war from maneuvers is the last stage on the last day. The concentration of forces and the logistics is the same for both.”
– Lt.Col. Ben-Porat, AMAN, on the lessons drawn from the Soviet repression of the Prague Spring (as quoted in Abraham Rabinovich’s ‘The Yom Kippur War’)
There is a major problem with Russia’s continued large-scale military maneuvers, in that they could easily be used as a cloak for invading a neighbouring country.
There is nothing wrong with letting the defence forces train. In fact, it is a crucial part of maintaining a functioning armed force. Exercises not only let soldiers on all levels practice their skills and get used to life in the field, but it is also the best tool available (short of actual war) for evaluating the standards of the force exercised and identifying possible shortcomings.
However, as noted by Ben-Porat above, putting your forces in the field with equipment and logistical backup makes them ready to go to war. Especially if you include mobilising other supporting functions in the society and include live firings, as has frequently been the case with the large Russian exercise held during the recent years.
Due to this, non-aggressive countries usually employ a number of different measures to build confidence amongst other countries that they in fact do not plan to go to war. These include e.g. pre-announcing the exercises, including key information such as scope, location, and stated aim of the exercise in the communique. Inviting foreign observers will also ease the tension. Placing major exercises far from potential flashpoints also helps. Certain elements needed, e.g. bridging equipment, can also at times be left out of the major exercises, and instead be practiced in smaller scenarios (though this is not always advisable, as there is a great benefit in practicing all parts of the machinery at the same time).
Russia does none of these things. Instead, Russia has chosen to leave the CFE treaty. They have held a significant number of large and very large exercises, often in the western parts of the country, and sometimes very close to the border. In addition, the exercises are usually not pre-announced, but snap drills. These are exactly the kind of exercises that rapidly could turn into an invasion, and the fact that they take place with regular intervals also mean that a real build-up to an invasion would be hard to spot amongst the string of similar snap exercises. All of this wouldn’t be that much of a problem, if not for the continued aggressive behavior by the Kremlin, including invading and occupying part of two neighboring countries during the past eight years.
The latest round of exercises is in effect nothing short of a mobilisation of a number of units in a composition that would allow for a swift transition into combat operations, and Russia doesn’t really seem interested in trying to disprove this notion. This resembles the build-up to the invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, as well as the above mentioned intervention in Czechoslovakia, where a seemingly normal series of exercises in a number of Warsaw Pact countries suddenly turned into a full-blown invasion featuring over a quarter of a million soldiers from four countries. However, perhaps even more spectacular was the success of the Egyptian-orchestrated deception leading up to the Yom Kippur War.
A Case Study: Exercise Tahrir-41 becomes Operation Badr
In the spring of 1973 the Egyptian army massed a significant force on the west bank of the Suez Canal. This included not only combat-ready troops, tanks, and artillery, but bridging equipment as well. Amongst the Egyptians were found contingents from other Arab nations, including fighter squadrons from the Libyan and Iraqi air forces.
For Israel, standing on the opposite bank of the ‘best anti-tank ditch in the world’, this presented a problem. The Israeli army was made up largely of reservists, and mobilising would mean a significant disruption in the everyday life of the Israeli society. The Israeli intelligence community was also split, with the leader of AMAN, the military intelligence directorate, judging the risk of war as ‘very low’. The general staff of the IDF and the leadership of the foreign intelligence department Mossad disagreed. It was not that they felt that war was a certainty, but due to the consequences if war was to break out they argued for raising the level of preparedness.
War did not break out in May, and the whole situation would probably have slipped into obscurity, if not for the fact that half a year later, the same situation repeated itself. On October 1, Egypt launched a large scale exercise codenamed Tahrir-41. This had been preceded by a general movement of troops towards the canal and a raising of the alert level in all three branches of the Egyptian defence forces. The development was closely monitored by the Israeli intelligence community, who actually got wind of the exercise already on the night between 24 and 25 September, when a division was spotted being moved towards the canal. They then continued to follow the build-up, which included mobilisation of reserves, cancelling leaves, and works on fortifications. In the same way, a build-up by Syrian forces across the ceasefire line in the Golan Heights was monitored, but dismissed as simply a defensive move following fears of an Israeli response following an air battle held earlier in September.
A few dissenting voices were present in the higher echelons of the Israeli intelligence and defence communities. Notably, deputy chief of staff, and armoured corps legend, General Israel Tal, who insisted that Syria was preparing to launch an imminent attack, and that if the air force was neutralised due to weather or enemy air defences, the balance of forces was such that the Syrians would sweep through the Israeli defences in Golan and down into the Galilee. Inside AMAN, Lieutenant Colonel Keniezer, the officer responsible for Jordan, had got into an actual shouting match over the war threat with General Shalev, head of AMAN research sector, after Jordan’s king Hussein secretly visited Tel Aviv and warned Israeli prime minister Meir that Syria was preparing to go to war. Lieutenant Colonel Ya’ar, the officer in charge of Syria, also believed war was imminent, and bypassed the chain of command to warn IDF’s Northern Command directly. Colonel Ben-Porat, chief of AMAN’s SIGINT department, was also questioning the official line. He had been the one who studied the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on location the year after it took place, and now asked for permission to call up 200 intelligence reservists and to activate the most secret listening equipment available to the department. However, General Zeira, the commander of AMAN, was not impressed, and, pointing to the similarities to the exercise held in May, got the final word.
On the sixth of October five Egyptian divisions crossed the Suez Canal at the same time as three Syrian divisions launched an assault on the Israeli lines in the Golan Heights. The Yom Kippur War had begun.
All pictures taken by author at Emek Ha’Bakha (‘Valley of Tears’) in Golan, site of one of the hardest-fought battles of the war.
The discussion regarding the potential of an armed conflict, or even regional war, between NATO and Russia over the Baltics have become a staple of the post-Crimean world. Most of the focus has been placed on the difficulty in reinforcing the Baltic states in the face of a Russian anti-access/area denial ‘bubble’ (A2/AD) created with Kaliningrad as the centre of the bubble, and the potential of strengthening this bubble by rapidly occupying the Swedish island of Gotland. If this was to happen, the only way of reinforcing the Baltic states would be over the Polish-Lithuanian border, a strip of land which rapidly has become known as the Suwałki gap (named after the Polish town at one end of the gap). The Suwałki gap in turn is claimed to be extremely vulnerable, as it is wedged in between the Kaliningrad enclave and the Belarusian border.
I will argue that this is, in certain aspects, an oversimplification, but that contrary to what one might expect, this does not lessen the risk of a confrontation.
The A2/AD Bubble
With regards to the A2/AD bubble set up in Kaliningrad, it is usually seen as blocking maritime and airborne forces. By using a combination of long-range high quality surface-to-air missiles and anti-shipping weapons (land based missiles as well as surface and subsurface units), Russia would be able to deny NATO forces entry into the southern parts of the Baltic Sea, and any units operating there would be under constant threat. These two features are a key part of the definition of A2/AD challenges, see e.g. . As NATO is lacking both numbers and key capabilities (such as mechanized and armoured units) in the Baltic states, any NATO response to an incursion would have to include a rapid transfer of reinforcements from other NATO countries and into the Baltic states. The ability to hinder or disrupt these reinforcements would ensure that Russia can maintain superiority on the battlefield in terms of both numbers and lethality of the weapon systems employed.
This description is usually accompanied by maps featuring rings at 400 km, the stated maximum range for the longest ranged surface-to-air missile in current Russian inventory (the 40N6 missile of the S-400 Triumf system) , as well as at 300 km, the approximate maximum range of the K-300P Bastion-P coastal defence system’s P-800 ‘Yakhont’/’Oniks’ missiles .
However, this fails to account for a number of facts. To begin with, at maximum range missiles lacks the energy to be able to chase down and hit maneuvering targets such as fighters. The very long range nature of the 40N6 also by necessity dictates that the missile is extremely large, further degrading the performance against maneuvering targets. As such the main use of the 40N6 is likely against large high-value targets such as AWACS, tankers, stand-off jammers, and transport aircraft. A more fitting maximum range when discussing fighter-sized targets would be that of the somewhat smaller and shorter-ranged 48N6E missile, which in its latest version feature ranges over 200 km . This is still a highly potent weapon, but the area covered is roughly a quarter of that of the 40N6.
For anti-ship missiles, the need to maneuver isn’t as crucial, but going out to maximum range means that a measure of tactical flexibility is lost. This includes routing the missiles to attack from unexpected vectors, or simultaneous impact by missiles approaching from different directions, see e.g. video clip from Ruptly .
The main problem operating out at very long ranges is target acquisition. The range of radars are usually limited by the horizon, which is the reason that aircraft mounted radars are so popular. This is a problem for Kaliningrad, as the whole area is easily covered by NATO air defence networks (more on which later), and as such Russia has installed over the horizon (OTH) radar arrays in the area. In the case of Kaliningrad, it was recently disclosed that the Sunflower-E (Ru. Подсолнух-Э / Podsolnukh-E) long-range air- and surface radar will be installed in Kaliningrad . Note that the picture in the source is of the anti-missile radar Voronezh-M, also found in Kaliningrad , and not of the Sunflower-E. The exact range of this array is unclear, but the manufacturer claims it can be used to cover the 200-mile (320 km) economic zone of coastal countries , while the earlier quoted Russia Today article cited ranges ‘up to 450 km’. This latter figure is likely against large airborne targets at altitude, which is also in accordance with a widely circulated but unsourced graphic . The radar array is made up of a ‘forest’ of individual antennas, which means that it is likely very resistant to shock waves from bomb blasts. However, the largely immobile nature and size of the installation means that its exact location is well-known, and while the antennas might be hard to destroy and do feature a certain degree of redundancy if damaged, the system likely has other key components (power supply, transmitters, receivers, and operator centrals) which are more vulnerable.
Radars are also inherently active, which means that they can be located once they start transmitting. To avoid this both anti-ship missiles and the S-400 has the ability to be fed targeting data from passive sources such as emitter locators, which work by locating an emitting radar of the adversary. This is particularly effective if the enemy forces have used active jamming to make the use of own radars impossible, as the active jammer is a very strong source of emission, and hence easily targeted. As a general rule, these systems are however less accurate than active systems, and the difference is emphasised when operating at very long ranges. The fact that all missiles discussed here have their own active radars does remedy this to a certain extent.
The A2/AD bubble in Kaliningrad is made up of some of the world’s most modern anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles
To achieve accurate targeting data at extreme ranges, it relies on potentially vulnerable sensor systems
Secondary sensors are available, but offer a somewhat degraded picture
The bubble does not start at an absolute range (e.g. 400 km), but instead gradually increases in capability and lethality the closer one gets to Kaliningrad
Logistics and Kaliningrad as an enclave
Often overlooked in the discussion is the logistics of the A2/AD bubble and the vulnerability of Kaliningrad itself. The long range missiles of the S-400 and K-300P systems are large and bulky, with e.g. the 48N6E being 7,5 m long. The TEL firing units as well as transport units for reloads are all based on either 6×6 all-terrain trucks pulling semi-trailers or self-propelled 8×8 heavy all-terrain vehicles. The pure size means that the battery won’t have too many missiles with it in the field. Notable for Kaliningrad, if reinforcements are needed fast, only large transports are able to airlift the loaded vehicles, and only a limited number at a time.
Out in the field, the battery moves as a large convoy of bulky vehicles. The firing battery comprises an engagement radar and up to twelve TEL’s, each with four missiles. These are then backed up by the supporting vehicles, including missile transports (roughly similar to the TEL’s in outward appearance) and the reload vehicle with a heavy-duty crane. The firing batteries are then linked to a centralised command vehicle and a long-range acquisition radar. This means that any S-400 battery on the move will include ten to twenty oversized trucks. For the K-300P, the composition is roughly similar.
This mobility is one of the great benefits of the S-400 and K-300P systems. The whole battery can be moved around quickly, and deployed in a spread out fashion to hide from enemy units, see e.g. example of K-300P firing P-800 Yakhont from a concealed position . However, as soon as the radar starts emitting, the rough position of the battery can be found out. This means that for the the systems to heighten its chance of survival, the battery will frequently need to change positions. This in turn means that there needs to be several batteries moving around in a coordinated fashion, so that at any given time there will be a firing ready battery somewhere. For the anti-ship batteries the need to operate with the battery’s radar on is smaller, and by extension they can more easily stay hidden.
Kaliningrad is roughly 200 km long (east-west) and 100 km wide (north-south). This rather small area would have to host a number of S-400 batteries, one or two of which at any given time are shifting from one firing position to another. It is clear that during the movement phase the large trucks would be vulnerable to detection, and by extension suppression and destruction. The same would be true for the large resupply vehicles bringing new missiles from warehouses out to the firing units deployed in the field.
The logistics for the missile batteries is but a small piece of the larger logistical headache concerning the Kaliningrad enclave as a whole. As mentioned, it is wedged in between NATO countries, and while it can disrupt air and seaborne reinforcements into the Baltic countries, it is in fact even more tightly besieged itself.
If we for a moment turn the table, and start drawing range rings based upon NATO weapons systems, it soon becomes clear that current medium/long range systems such as the Patriot PAC-3 or the SAMP/T could seal of the airspace of Kaliningrad. Similarly, the narrow width in the north-south direction means that large areas of Kaliningrad are covered by current Polish and Lithuanian artillery systems deployed inside their own borders. This means that the suppression of enemy air defences mission (SEAD) could in part be undertaken by artillery units equipped with modern munitions instead of risking aircrafts and pilots as would usually be the case. If long-range surface-to-surface systems such as the US ATACMS missile system are used, the whole enclave can be covered by ground based systems.
The small size of the Kaliningrad is problematic with regards to keeping the location of the SAM batteries concealed when shifting position
The whole enclave would be under siege from the onset of hostilities, as the whole airspace can be covered by a small number of units operating current surface-to-air missiles
The size of the enclave means that NATO ground based systems would have a large impact, including performing missions usually reserved for airborne systems (such as SEAD)
The Suwałki gap
As a consequence, the importance of the Suwałki gap to both sides becomes clear. The gap, roughly the area coloured yellow in the map below, constitute the sole land route between the Baltic countries and the core of the NATO countries found in the European mainland. Similarly, the area marks the shortest distance from the Kaliningrad enclave to Belarusian territory, and as such is the most likely place for a Russian attempt to relieve the surrounded enclave.
The gap is often described as ‘vulnerable’ from a NATO point of view, mainly due to it being only 65 km wide at its narrowest point. This means that the entire width of the gap is within range of Russian artillery, and ground units could cover the distance in a matter of days (or less if unopposed).
However, this fails to account for a number of factors. While disrupting the movement of troops on the two main roads (Suwałki-Kaunas and Augustów-Alytus-Vilnius) and single railway that passes though the gap is possible not only with artillery as well as with e.g. special forces on foot, cutting it off completely and opening a corridor to Kaliningrad is another thing completely. The main transport arteries of the gap, as mentioned, traverse the region in the northeast-southwest direction, i.e. between Poland and Lithuania. There are a number of smaller roads going in the opposite direction, but in general it is easier to move troops and materiel between Poland and Lithuania than between Kaliningrad and Belarus. The main road going east from Kaliningrad goes north of the gap, and passes through the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius, before continuing on to Minsk. The terrain is also very varied, with especially the area bordering Belarus being heavily forested. As such, the terrain is well-suited for the kind of light infantry that makes up the majority of the Lithuanian army. Below is an example of the terrain found in this area, featuring the road from Belarus to Druskininkai, Lithuania.
Perhaps the most often overlooked factor is the Polish army. At the same time many NATO countries have shifted to lighter and smaller units, Poland has maintained a core of heavy units, lead by the formidable 11th “Lubuska” Armoured Cavalry Division . The unit is a full-fledged armoured division, featuring two armoured brigades equipped with Leopard 2A4 tanks, to be upgraded to the Leopard 2PL standard . Backed up by two mechanised divisions equipped with PT-91 Twardy, a locally modernised MBT based on the T-72, it could provide the core of a complete armoured corps, one of very few left in NATO.
The big difference between the Polish army and others large armoured units in NATO is that it is based close to the Baltic countries, and, crucially, that the political leadership in Poland and the Baltic states largely shares the same view of Russia and the need to counter an increasingly aggressive Kremlin. As has been noted in other scenarios, the key to countering a Russian aggression in the Baltic states would be to get qualified units on the ground as soon as possible, to boost deterrence and provide an answer to the heavily mechanised Russian ground units that otherwise would be hard to counter for the light infantry units that make up the core of the Baltic armies . Importantly, if a crises were to start to unfold, the Polish units might be the only ones where there would be both the political will and a short enough transfer time that they might pass through the Suwałki gap and take up position before the gap would be under serious threat. The distance from Suwałki to e.g. Tartu is just over 600 km by road, a far cry from the logistics involved in getting a US or British armoured division deployed to Estonia.
It is obviously not without problems to deploy these units to the Baltic states. To begin with, the eastern Polish border can hardly be left undefended. Also, there is a gauge break between the Polish and Lithuanian railway systems, meaning that, until Rail Baltica is ready, what would otherwise be the most efficient way of rapidly moving tracked vehicles from Poland to the Baltic states feature a severe bottleneck. Also, the 11th “Lubuska” division is deployed in the southwestern parts of Poland, more or less as far from Lithuania as possible. The 16th “Pomeranian” Mechanised Division is however deployed opposite Kaliningrad, and while its PT-91’s are inferior to the Leopard 2PL, they are superior to anything currently deployed in the Kaliningrad enclave.
The main logistical arteries of the Suwałki gap, constituting two major roads and a railway, all go in parallel from Poland to Lithuania, with only smaller roads in the gap connecting Kaliningrad and Belarus
While part of the Suwałki gap is open ‘tank country’, other parts are heavily forested and/or broken up by water. A mechanised force would be vulnerable to ambushes and being funneled into bottlenecks
The Polish army fields a considerable striking force in the form of heavy armoured and mechanised units, as well as what is likely a lower threshold to deploy these in the Baltic states in the face of a crises compared to NATO countries located further from Russia
All in all, the Kaliningrad enclave does constitute a strategic problem for NATO in times of crises, due to its location at the entrance to the Baltic states and with the long ranged systems based there interfering with any NATO operations in the southern Baltic Sea. However, it is not an absolute hinder to NATO operations in the area, and in a prolonged conflict it would effectively be under siege. Similarly, the Suwałki gap is not necessarily as vulnerable as it is sometimes portrayed. Also, while the draw down amongst the traditional major NATO countries have left gaps in the ability of NATO to rapidly project military power with heavy units, Poland still upholds a sizeable mechanised force within striking distance of the Baltic states, coupled with a more assertive political leadership compared to what is often seen in the traditional NATO countries.
However, while all this might seem to be good news for NATO in the face of increased Russian aggression and the reckless behavior displayed by the Kremlin in relation to several of their neighboring countries, I will argue that the opposite is in fact the case.
The ability of NATO to respond to a Russian aggression aimed at the Baltic states, as well as the possibility to move Polish units into the Baltic states at short notice, create a scenario where, in an unfolding crises, time would not be on Russia’s side. In fact, if Russia would conclude that a confrontation was inevitable, it would make sense to strike sooner rather than later. Through this, the capabilities of NATO and the relatively weak position of Kaliningrad might actually become catalysts for instead of deterring an open conflict.
While a regional conflict over part of the Baltic states would be bad enough, this is far from the worst scenario. St Petersburg is within 150 km from the Estonian border. If the Kremlin actually start believing their own narrative of an aggressive and expansionist NATO, even the possibility of NATO moving a mechanised division into Estonia might be the spark that ignites a larger confrontation. And a conflict in which Russia feels that its very heartland is threatened by NATO tanks is one from which it won’t back down. I am strongly of the opinion that appeasement is not the best way forward when it comes to Russian aggression. But if Putin makes a move towards the Baltic, NATO just might be out of good options.
In 1980 Canada declared the F/A-18A Hornet the winner of their New Fighter Aircraft program, which meant it would be brought into service as the CF-18 to replace three different fighters as the country’s sole fast jet. In doing so it beat a number of other fighters, crucially the F-16A. It is important to remember that the F-16 back in those days wasn’t a multirole aircraft, but rather a within visual range fighter with a limited secondary ground attack capability. The F/A-18 with its AIM-7 Sparrow medium-range missiles was arguably the more competent aircraft, and one of the main worries of the Canadian air force was Soviet bombers and cruise missiles swooping down over the Arctic. Canada is also a large and sparsely populated country that include large swaths of land were bailing out does not necessarily mean you’re in for a happy landing. This combination of BVR capability, longer range, and twin-engine safety in the end meant that Canada went with the more expensive option of the F/A-18 over the F-16 (it has to be mentioned that the government did claim that the economic incentives was better for the Hornet, making it cheaper for the Canadian economy. However, these kinds of arguments usually have a tendency to depend upon who’s making the calculations).
Thirteen years after Canada received their first F/A-18’s, the first four Hornets for Finland landed at Tampere-Pirkkala. Finland, though markedly smaller than Canada, had a largely similar set of requirements, including cold-weather capability, twin-engine safety, long-range, and focus on the interceptor role. In the end, both Canada and Finland have been very happy members of the Hornet club, but the end of that era looms at the horizon.
Now the alert reader interrupts, if Finland has to replace its Hornets by 2025 due to their lifespan being up, Canada, having bought theirs ten years earlier, by the same logic should have replaced theirs already?
Yes and no. Finland operated the Hornet up until now as a single-role fighter, have placed a higher focus on traditional dogfighting maneuvers, which are extremely taxing on the airframe. In other words, not all flight hours are created equal, and not all aircraft fly the same amount of yearly hours. Also, the Canadian Hornets have been through a number of upgrade programs. Currently they seem to be looking at another set of programs which will take the aircraft up to and past 2025, not bad considering that the original lifespan was envisioned as 20 years (i.e. up to 2002). Canada also did have the replacement figured out, having been a partner of the F-35/JSF program since its beginning, and is currently a Level 3 Partner, i.e. the ‘normal’ level of partnership (only the UK, the Netherlands, and Italy are ranked higher).
Still, the F-35 has been beset by delays, and the project has been something of a hot potato in Canadian politics. The latest major turn was when Justin Trudeau led the Liberal Party to a victory in the federal elections last year, with the party’s position having been that they will ditch the F-35 and instead launch an open tender for a new fighter (with the F-35 being banned from participating). However, Canada have continued to make the required payments to stay a partner in the program while reviewing how the Hornet should be replaced.
Enter July, and amidst it becoming increasingly clear that there is an urgent need to replace, or at least supplement, the Canadian Hornets, the Canadian government launched what can best be described as a non-binding Request for Information. The aircrafts under consideration are the usual suspects: Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, Lockheed-Martin F-35 (which is back in the running), and Saab JAS 39 Gripen.
Now, the interesting thing here is the schedule, with the answers to the questionnaire having been requested within three weeks (compare to the eight months allocated for the RFI issued by the Finnish HX). The details are rather sketchy, mainly because the questionnaire is “neither a Call for Tenders nor a Request for Proposals”. The background information provided also emphasises that “no procurement decision has been made“ and that “no summary or final report will be issued following the collection of information from industry”. The schedule for replacing the Hornets is literally given as “as soon as possible”, which ought to make things interesting. The whole thing feels like it is done under extreme time pressure.
Interestingly enough, the flight scenarios in the attached file requires the respondent to use “actual aircraft configuration (utilize systems which are operational with Armed Services today only – non-developmental)”. This requirement pans out very differently. While Saab currently is the only one to sport the Meteor operationally, they only operate the 39C Gripen and not the longer-ranged 39E which would add considerably to their odds when flying intercepts far out over the Arctic. On the other hand, the F-35 is currently only operational in the V/STOL F-35B version, and if the Canadians decide to interpret the requirement literally, this is effectively a way to make certain the F-35 is a non-starter without explicitly writing so. Another problem for the F-35A is the bases used in the scenario. As fellow blogger Doug Allen noted over at Best Fighter 4 Canada, the 6,000 feet runways are too short for comfort. The Typhoon in turn is designed for exactly the scenario described in the evaluation, transiting high and fast to meet an enemy aircraft far out, but is a few years from getting an AESA radar and the Meteor. The Rafale does feature supersonic drop tanks and a potent AESA set, but the repeated requests for “seamless” integration with Five Eyes ISTAR and other tactical and strategic assets might not play to its strengths. The weapons are also uniquely French.
Enter the Super Hornet, which features the AN/APG-79 AESA radar, is seamlessly integrated into the US-Canadian NORAD air defence network, and carries the same munitions and missiles that the ‘legacy’ Hornet does. The last part is explicitly asked for in the questionnaire, something which is not the case in any documents regarding the HX which are openly available. The Super Hornet manufacturing line is also struggling with having too few aircraft to produce each year, so quickly ramping up to supply the RCAF with a limited number of stop-gap aircraft would be *relatively* easy. Boeing also has an established partnership with the Canadian defence forces and aviation industry. All in all, the stage seems set for Boeing’s fighter, and Canada is indeed one of the countries for which stealth isn’t necessarily a big deal, at least not for their homeland defence/NORAD contribution. Noteworthy is also that the questionnaire does mention cost for 100 pilots being trained, which would imply that the information could serve as a base for the complete Hornet replacement program (though one should remember that there isn’t a procurement decision for anything as of yet).
Another possibility is that, despite his continued official anti-F-35 view, Trudeau is trying to set the stage for a F-35 purchase, by creating the foundations for a competition, which the F-35 then can sweep clean (compare to Kampfly in Denmark). For Canada, a mix of Super Hornets (or Typhoons) for NORAD duties combined with F-35A’s for expeditionary work under NATO and UN commitments might actually be the ideal solution. Only time will tell if this will be the final outcome.
A big thanks to Karl Rieder for the link to the Canadian source material! Do follow him on Twitter if you don’t already.
The skirmish of Schmarden was one in a long line of battles fought along the eastern front during the First World War. Like countless other battalion-sized operations, it would probably have slipped into total obscurity, if not for the fact that the German Landwehr Bataillon that conducted the attack was reinforced by the Pionier Kompanie of the Königlich Preussisches Jägerbataillon Nr. 27.
Just south of Schmarden, today’s Smārde in central Latvia, the Russian troops had managed to create a forward line of defenses that extended close to the German lines, and a decision had been made to perform a nighttime attack to destroy this forward line. A German battalion of reserve infantry would perform the attack in two waves, with the first wave capturing the target and moving up 500 meters past it, in order to let the second wave destroy the fieldworks. After this was done, all German troops would then withdraw back to their starting position.
To facilitate the destruction of the fieldworks, it was decided that combat engineers were needed, and it so happened that nearby the 27th Royal Prussian Jäger Battalion had a company of engineers grouped as the battalion reserve. This unit was made up of Finnish volunteers, who had managed to leave the Russian Grand Duchy of Finland in order to reach Germany and get military training there. This was all done in anticipation of the coming War of Independence. The members of the battalion, simply called Jääkärit in Finnish, came to provide the core of the ‘White’ Finnish Army in the Finnish Civil War of 1918, and several of the key officers in the Finnish Army during the Second World War had received their training in the clandestine battalion. As such, the importance of the battalion for the development of the Finnish armed forces is hard to overstate.
In July of 1916 the infantry component of the battalion was responsible for a rather calm stretch of the frontline in today’s Latvia, but the engineers had been held in reserve and hadn’t seen any real fighting. The attack near Schmarden would be their baptism of fire. Probably due to this, the company would not operate as a whole unit, but the engineers were attached to German squads either in pairs or in small groups of three. Exactly a hundred years ago, at midnight the night between the 24 and 25 of July, the troops started moving.
While the sky was relatively dark, the tall vegetation in no-man’s land meant that the Russian sentries was alerted by the sound of troops moving, and soon the advancing forces were fired upon by not only rifles and machine guns, but heavy weapons and artillery as well. Despite this, they managed to press on, and soon reached the first line of defences. These were relatively lightly defended, but when moving up the additional 500 meters they met harder resistance in the main and rear trenches.
The battle as a whole was a rather messy affair, with the advancing troops becoming split up and intermixed. It also seems like the Russian positions weren’t completely destroyed, and the withdrawal was complicated by both Russian and German artillery targeting the no-man’s land. According to the battle reports, the Finnish engineers had by and large shown great courage, and five of the sixteen Russian prisoners of war captured were captured by the Finns. However, it was also reported that in the heat of the battle some had forgot that their primary task was the demolishing of the Russian fortifications, with the Finns at times having advanced in front of the German infantry, and some even ditching their shovels to be able to keep up with the more lightly equipped infantrymen! Still, the general consensus seems to have been that the engineers performed well for being completely ‘green’, and Lt.General Wyneken is said to have thanked the Finns for their part in the fighting.
Unremarkable as Schmarden was, the total losses for the Finns were two soldiers killed in action and a further seven suffering minor wounds, it marked the first time since 1809 that a Finnish combat unit had taken part in an attack against a Russian force on the battlefield. It was also destined to remain the single major offensive operation undertaken by the 27th Jäger Battalion. Schmarden Day is today each year celebrate on the 25 of July as the service branch day of the Finnish combat engineers, so happy Schmardenin päivä to all my pioneeri readers!
The description of the battle is largely based on this text on from the homepage of the Ostrobothnian Guild of Combat Engineers.
Growing food in northern Europe is the perfect example of a market failure.
The weather is cold and unpredictable, the labour costs high, and few of the areas here are known for being particularly fertile. In strict economic terms, we would be better of letting someone in a warmer place produce the food, which we then could trade for something else.
However, food is amongst the most basic needs of human beings, and maintaining a certain degree of self-sufficiency is a strategic interest. Enter the need for the government to step in and subsidize the farming sector.
Interestingly enough, while the Finnish agricultural sector is very limited in the scope of people employed by it, the former Agrarian party is still a dominant force within the current Finnish political landscape. Exactly how this has come to be is an interesting question, but for now it is enough to note that the Centre Party currently is the largest party and holds the Prime Minister’s seat, and apart from including a strong agricultural wing, the party also has a history of leading the Finlandisation process during the Cold War.
With this in mind, it came as no surprise when Jari Leppä, member of parliament and chairman of the Parliamentary Committe for Agriculture and Forestry, now joined a number of MP’s calling for an end to the EU imposed sanctions on Russia, so that the “market would get moving again”. While the EU has not imposed any sanctions regarding food products, Finnish farmers, and especially the dairy farmers, have been hit hard by the Russian counter sanctions. The alternative, according to Leppänen, is that EU would compensate the farmers “fully” for the downturn in exports to avoid “a single segment of the population paying for great power politics”, as he describes the current situation.
This was rapidly shot down by both leading Centre politicians and the minister in charge of foreign trade (coming from the National Coalition Party). The government stands firmly behind the common EU-line, was the message, and minister Mykkänen also pointed out that with the Ruble being roughly half of what it was before the invasion of Crimea, the exports would unlikely be at the same level anyhow.
While I greatly sympathize with the hardship endured by the Finnish farmers in general and due the Russian sanctions in particular, I still feel that Leppä’s move is purely populist in nature. Russia, Finland’s authoritarian neighbour, has invaded and forcefully annexed a part of another sovereign country two and a half years ago, as well as continuing to wage a low-intensity war there. Discussing ending the sanctions in the hope of getting Russia to end their sanctions, because we have to remember that it is a Russian and not a EU’s decision that stops Finnish dairy exports, is the completely wrong signal for militarily non-aligned Finland to send. Saying that that agriculture is the single sector affected by the sanctions/counter sanctions is also plain wrong. Several different manufacturing and service branches have been affected, either directly or indirectly by the downturn in Russian economy. The difference is that companies in other sectors have to bear their geopolitical risks themselves, which they also factor in when making export pushes in potentially unstable markets, a description which was apt for the Russian market long before Crimea.
For the agricultural sector, the situation has been different, as the primary producers sell their wares to one of a very limited number of buyers, who then makes the decision where to sell the goods to the consumer. This means that the individual farmers can’t take part in deciding where to push their exports, while still, unlike workers in other sectors, they share in the economic risks due to often being small-scale entrepreneurs. This is in many ways the core of the problem for the Finnish agricultural sector, and has nothing to do with Russia in particular. Rather, it is a case of a poor negotiating position and a high economic risk leading to a very small room to maneuver when it comes to sudden shifts in the market. It is in many ways imperative that the government aids in trying to solve this puzzle, but if further compensation is to be paid, it should be done due to the disastrous rainfall this summer, and not because Russia has decided to invade their neighbours and implement sanctions on Finnish milk.
The Eurofighter Typhoon has long been one of the prime contenders for the title of fighter with the most untapped potential. While the combination of excellent fast/high performance, a sizeable radar dish, and a large battery of ASRAAM and AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles have long made certain that it is one of the best BVR interceptors available, the lack of a AESA radar and limited range of ground attack weaponry available have made it seem lackluster when compared with other multirole fighters, and in some aspects even with the very Tornado it is set to replace.
While this comparison is somewhat unjust and oversimplified, it is also true that there has been a marked lack of interest on the part of the governments of Spain, Italy, Germany, and the UK with regards to keeping the Typhoon at the forefront of technology. In a way this is understandable, as all of the air forces operate older types which already largely have the ground attack capabilities that the Typhoon is lacking. Allocating precious funds from limited defence budgets to unlock capabilities that’s already there in another form have been hard to justify. Especially with two of the four air forces already having received their first F-35’s.
But nothing lasts forever, and that include both Tornadoes and Hornets. After having already had to push back on the retirement date for a number of Tornado squadrons, the RAF in particular have finally decided to put some effort into actually unlocking more of the Eurofighter’s potential.
The current situation is that the RAF is operating their Typhoons in the somewhat ungainly named P1E(B)-standard, which is adding on to the original P1E (the first standard to bring multirole capability) by, amongst other things, introducing the very capable Paveway IV guided bomb. The Paveway IV adds a dual GPS/INS-seeker as well as being aerodynamically more efficient compared to earlier members of the Paveway-family, and has rapidly become the RAF’s weapon of choice when requiring more punch than the Brimstone.
The past weeks’ major story has been that the Typhoon has performed at RIAT and Farnborough with the upcoming P3E weapons kit, in a configuration that include:
Four Meteor very-long range air-to-air missiles
Two ASRAAM mid/long range air-to-air missiles
Six Brimstone 2 anti-vehicle/low-collateral damage guided missiles
Two Paveway IV guided bombs
Two external drop tanks
While a single aircraft might be unlikely to employ both Brimstones and Paveways on the same mission, it does show a well-rounded capability to target many different kinds of air and surface threats. What is even more interesting is that the aircraft flies during the airshows with this loadout, further emphasising the impressive thrust and manoeuvrability available to the Typhoon.
“This display will also demonstrate is that Typhoon, even with this weapons fit, loses none of the incredible agility and manoeuvrability for which it is known.”
Nat Makepeace, BAE Systems Typhoon Experimental Test Pilot
Notable is also the fact that of these weapons, only the Brimstone 2 is actually a P3E weapon, with the Meteor being integrated under the earlier Phase 2 Enhancement (together with the Storm Shadow stealthy cruise missile), and the Paveway IV and ASRAAM being available already today. In an export configuration, the Typhoon also benefits from having already integrated both the long-range ASRAAM and the highly-manoeuvrable IRIS-T (used by non-UK Typhoons), giving it an interesting mix of heat-seeking missiles. In addition the brand new SPEAR missile has also been successfully test-fired earlier this year, and though no decision has yet been taken, integrating it would open up even further capabilities. The only piece of the puzzle currently missing is the CAPTOR-E AESA radar, which is currently about to start flight testing as well under the P3E-program. It seems like the Typhoon finally is starting to show its true multirole potential.
That is, to the best of my OSINT-knowledge, the number of artillery pieces currently active in the Finnish army.
Ever since World War II, artillery has played a key role in the Finnish take on warfare. The reasons are many, but include having fought the Winter War with preciously little artillery support, the brilliant General of the Artillery (and Mannerheim Knight) Nenonen and his trajectory calculations making what artillery Finland had very effective, having been on the receiving end of the Red Army’s massed artillery strikes in 1944, and a lack of ground attack aircraft for battlefield interdiction. Artillery has also been seen as extremely cost-effective, and has a very long lifespan (thereby reducing life-cycle cost). A measure of the importance placed on artillery during the post-war years was the fact that Finland not only bought the widely-spread 2S1 Gvozdika 122 mm self-propelled howitzer, of which around 72 still serve under the 122 PSH 1974 moniker, but was also one of the few export customers for the more powerful 2S5 Giatsint-S 152 mm long-range self-propelled gun. All 18 pieces of this impressive (but poorly protected) vehicle have now been retired.
Apart from these two self-propelled vehicles the Finnish artillery relies on mass amounts of traditional towed pieces. The most important artillery piece based purely on numbers is the old (or rather, antiquated) 122 mm D-30 2A18 (122 H-63) Soviet light howitzer, of which just under 500 still remain in service, a number of ex-Finnish howitzers having been shipped to Estonia where they provide an important part of the 1. Jalaväebrigaad’s indirect fire support. For a heavier punch, the 152 mm 2A36 (152 K 89) heavy gun and the legendary 130 mm M-46 (130 K 54) of Khe Sanh fame are available. The final pieces are the Tampella-designed (now Patria) 155 K 83-97 and 155 K 98, the later being the first towed piece with a 52-calibre barrel length to enter service in Europe.
The target area during an artillery bombardment by 130 mm M-46’s, footage from Finnish Army Vaikuttamisharjoitus 2013 (literally “Impact Exercise 2013″) Edit: Correct designation is ‘Joint Fires Exercise 2013′.
While getting hit by a 40 kg howitzer shell still hurts as much as it did in 1946, development on the battlefield has not stopped, and a quick look at the Finnish artillery park shows that it is headed for massavanheneminen, a Finnish word which means “many things reaching obsolescence at the same time”. The gap left by the old 122 mm D-30 is largely being covered by advances in heavy mortar technology, and the indigenous 155 mm guns still have useful years left (despite a troubled beginning), but the 2S1 as well as towed 130 and 152 mm guns needs to be replaced.
This isn’t something new, and the Finnish Army held trials with a number of modern SPG’s already back in the early years of the millennium, with the German PzH 2000 reportedly coming out victorious. Budgetary constraints however pushed the acquisition back ‘past 2006’, and the process was restarted with the issuing of a request for information last year. My personal bet was that the PzH 2000 would have come out on top (unless the Army would have thrown a curveball and decided to go for wheels in the name of better operational mobility) The PzH 2000 have bagged an impressive amount of export orders in addition to having proved its worth in Afghanistan.
However, early July the Ministry of Defence released a surprise statement saying they were in negotiations with the Republic of (South) Korea over the acquisition of used K9 Thunder SPG’s. The exact details are still unconfirmed as the negotiations are ongoing, but according to an interview in Finnish tabloid Iltalethi ‘tens’ of guns will be bought for ‘around 100 million [euro] or slightly more’. Notable is also the fact that the original press release says that the deal ‘partially covers artillery becoming obsolete in the 2020-2030 time span’, indicating that further buys, either of more K9’s, another SPG, or some other weapons system, are likely.
The K9 Thunder might not be as widely seen in Europe as the PzH 2000, but it isn’t a complete stranger to our part of the world either. Turkey has placed a major order on a slightly modified version under the local name T-155 Fırtına, and the chassis was used to salvage the troubled Polish AHS Krab SPG-programme. Perhaps more importantly, the K9 Thunder has been evaluated for the Norwegian new artillery programme, with Finnish (and Danish) observers having attended the trials in Norway.
The K9 Thunder is pretty much everything you would expect from a modern SPG. The gun is of 52 calibre length, and sports an automatic loader. This allows MRSI (multiple rounds, simultaneous impact), in other words a single artillery piece can fire off a salvo of shells at different angles and with different charges (giving them different speeds), making them all hit the same spot at the same time. This is a key component in allowing the K9 to make shoot and scoot surprise attacks. A battery of vehicles drives into firing position, fires off a number of shells which impact on the unprepared enemy position all at the same time, and then drive away before counter-battery fire hits their position. Interestingly, the K9 Thunder beat the Russian 2S19 Msta-S in an Indian tender, with the K9 now being on track to enter local license production.
To maintain such a high rate of fire, the vehicle is supported by a dedicated loading vehicle, the K10 Ammunition Resupply Vehicle, which connects a munitions transporter to a loading port on the K9, and then feeds ammunition into the SPG at up to 12 shells per minute, until all 104 shells have been transferred. Presumably a number of K10’s would also be bought to support our K9’s.
The K9 Thunder has seen combat in the Bombardment of Yeonpyeong, in which a total of 80 shells were fired at North Korean installations in retaliation of a North Korean artillery bombardment. The bombardment was not a particularly glamorous combat debut, as of six Thunders returning from an exercise in the area, two were damaged by the initial shells and unable to return fire, with a third getting a dud shell stuck in the breech, leaving the other three to conduct the retaliatory bombardment. As the vehicles had been on a live-firing exercise, their stocks of shells were also running low, and as no K10 was available, new 155 mm shells had to be carried by hand through the North Korean bombardment to the K9’s, something which severely limited the rate of fire. In addition, the North Korean artillery was placed in emplacements dug into the cliffs, and as such extremely well protected.
…and when discussing the nickname thirty years from now, remember where you heard it first😉
.@SalmuSami Sure, but then again the conscripts will probably name it Ukkosen Musti anyway😉