The Silent Discussion

Finnish public broadcaster YLE has published a long article in Swedish under the headline “Who gets to have an Opinion on the Fighter Deal?

Everyone.

Everyone gets to have an opinion. However, the weight your opinion will have obviously depends on a number of factors. Case closed, you can all go home, and we’ll reconvene later.

On a more serious note – having followed the HX-procurement since the outset, it has throughout been no secret that a number of people hold views differing to those of the Finnish Defence Forces’ and the political mainstream. The criticism comes in a number of different forms, some I can agree with, some I don’t agree with but can understand the line of reasoning, and some are simply plain wrong. The article raises a number of these, and I do feel that separating the wheat from the chaff might add some value to the discussion.

If we start with the overarching idea that you can’t debate the procurement because the FDF and MoD has put a lid on everything, that is objectively not true. Granted politicians in one party or the other can be correct in that inside the party there is little room to question the party line, but that is an issue for their organisation to deal with and far from a blanket ban on debate. The irony here is probably lost on the usual suspects – who gets to decry that they can’t voice their opinion in national media. Of those interviewed, Kimmo Kiljunen (MP for the prime minister’s party the Social Democrats) is currently also editing a book(!) about the lack of debate. You might obviously feel that the discussion doesn’t get the media space it deserves, but to be completely frank the media doesn’t owe any single question space. And considering the number of articles written on the procurement, I fail to see that there would be much merit to the argument that in general there is little discussion surrounding the issue.

The criticism towards the Hornet replacement deals with a number of angles, including whether it is correct from a national security point of view, the cost of the program, transparency, and operational needs. However, much of this is based on shaky arguments. Source: Ilmavoimat FB

Moving on, professor Hiilamo feels that it is important that everyone gets to take part in the debate, and not just the researchers with a background in the FDF. You are currently reading a blog that has made its name as a solid source on HX-related topics, written by a naval private in the reserve, so I do believe we have that one sorted out. Granted some people have questioned whether the whole question is too complex to discuss based on open sources, but I do believe that a valuable discussion can be had as long as the limitations of such an approach are recognised. And so apparently does my readers.

However, what can make it feel like you aren’t getting your voice heard is if the ideas you are trying to push forward are unworkable and therefore encounter solid push-back, which unfortunately is the case with Hiilamo’s suggestion that we buy used fighters or launch a life extension program for the current Hornet-fleet, two potential paths forward which Hiilamo claims haven’t been evaluated.

Surplus Fighters and Life Extension Programs

Anyone who has been following the discussion knows that both claims have in fact been studied. As late as last summer the Air Force staff provided a memo entitled “Life Extension of the F/A-18 Hornet“, which also builds upon a number of earlier studies done internally, many of which are referenced by title in the memo (and which are classified SECRET / TL II). In essence, the issues are:

  • The fleet has been flown and maintained according to an expected 30 year lifespan. If this is stretched out, wear will start affecting the serviceability rates at an increasing level,
  • Finland will be left more or less alone as an operator of the legacy-Hornet, with most of the remaining operators being expected to withdraw their aircraft in the coming decade. This means all upgrades will be developed solely with Finnish money,
  • Finland would in other words be left with an ageing fleet where more and more planes are unserviceable at any given moment, and where the equipment is less modern relative to any potential adversary. This would create what the memo calls “an operational risk”, i.e. the capability of the Air Force to perform their missions and at the end of the day defend Finland would shrink.

None of this is new, but has been evident and stated publicly from the beginning. This would obviously also affect the budget, as the upgrades would incur a serious cost, and quite a bit of the HX procurement process would have to be rerun in a decade or so, adding further costs. The life extension program itself was estimated to cost 1.8 to 2.4 billion Euros in the memo. This has been called into question, as 0.7 to 1.0 billion Euros of this would be new air-to-air missiles, while at the same time part of the current stock will indeed be serviceable past 2030. However, these are earmarked for transfer to the NASAMS batteries, so in case the Hornet would use these longer than planned, the Army would instead have to increase their budget correspondingly, cancelling out any savings. Still, even the lowest estimate gives a price tag for at least 800 million Euros plus the cost of a re-launch of HX (1.8 – 1.0 = 0.8).

The Panavia Tornado is one of the few used aircraft that might be available on the market in any reasonable numbers. However, it is is a terrible fit for the Finnish requirements in that it lacks air-to-air capability, and the fleet is worn out and in serious need of upgrades if it is to serve on. Source: Airwolfhound / Wikimedia Commons

As for the question of used fighters, there really isn’t much on the market at the moment. Granted we can probably get the German Tornadoes or the Norwegian F-16’s cheap, but none of these would provide an increase in capability and all suffer from the same issues as a life extension of the Hornets have with increased costs and lower readiness rates. Eurofighters or Rafales might be available in small numbers, but these would also in most cases require upgrades and will need the same kind of investment in infrastructures and support systems that drives the price tag of HX (remember, the airframes themselves are a relatively small part of the total budget), so while we might get a somewhat cheaper aircraft, the costs will likely add up towards the later part of the aircraft’s service life to mean that by 2040 we are paying more than if we just would have ordered new ones and paid up front. Check the Canadian mess for a reference.

Col. (ret.) Ahti Lappi is more interesting, as he quite frankly should know better.

Ground-based Systems

Having a long career in ground-based air defences, Lappi argues for a very small number of fighters with a serious investment in ground-based systems for air defence and UAVs for reconnaissance. He also states that the report that launched the HX-program didn’t look into the question of air defence as a whole, something that is hard to agree with considering the fact that it did just that. I have earlier noted that any kind of even remotely complete ground-based air defence cover would be ridiculously expensive, and also leaves the system vulnerable in it being reliant on a single operational concept. It is quite evident even for laymen that fighters and ground-based air defences aren’t an apples-to-apples comparison, but rather have different strengths and weaknesses that complement each other in the defensive counter-air mission, and as such a mix (such as the one currently envisioned by the FDF and MoD) is more robust that going all-in for either. It is also rather uncertain how Lappi imagines that a number of other missions are taken care of, such as offensive counter-air, destruction of enemy air defences, long-range strike, support to ground and naval forces, and so forth? While Lappi talks about how unmanned systems have received a greater role in many armed forces worldwide, the truth is still that their roles remain very limited and constrained compared to manned multirole fighters. The FDF is also studying and investing in unmanned capabilities, so this really isn’t a case of HX having crowded out this development path in any meaningful way.

Lappi’s historical examples of the relatively small losses to enemy air units that fighters have caused “in wars during the recent years in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria” is also far from convincing. To begin with, I am unsure exactly which 250 losses he has included in his statistics. The mix of combat and non-combat losses also hides the ratio between air-to-air and ground-to-air victories. Unfortunately, this is a textbook example of choosing metrics that benefit your cause, and is at best careless and at worst dishonest. It also completely overlook how the situation on the ground shapes the events. If one of the sides doesn’t have a strong air force it naturally will lead to few air-to-air encounters. However, it is also notable that Wikipedia lists eleven instances in Syria alone where a fighter has shot down an enemy aircraft or UAS since the start of 2015 (plus a twelfth air-to-air-victory where an Israeli AH-64 helicopter bagged an Iranian-built Saegeh UAS). I won’t vouch for every single one of these, but at least six air-to-air victories are well-known and widely reported instances (24.11.2015 Turkish F-16 downing a Russian Su-24M, 18.6.2018 USN F/A-18 downing a Syrian Su-22, 20.6.2018 USAF F-15E downing a Syrian/Iranian Saegeh, 1.3.2020 Turkish F-16 downing two Syrian Su-24M, 3.3.2020 Turkish F-16 downing a Syrian L-39).

The most famous air-to-air loss in Syria is without doubt Su-24M ‘White 83’ of the Russian Air Force, shot down by a Turkish F-16 in 2015 following it briefly having entered Turkish airspace. Source: Mil.ru / Wikimedia Commons

Without seeing Lappi’s list (and I would very much like to do so), it is impossible to evaluate it further on its merits. However, keep in mind that that is largely a point of whether his argumentation is honest or not. As I noted earlier, the value of the statistics itself is limited. Often (and ironically I would argue in particular when it comes to ground-based air defences) the value of a system can also be better measured in other metrics than kills, e.g. through forcing the enemy to adapt their tactics and avoiding certain areas. But as noted, all of this is largely a question of whether Lappi is honest in his reasoning or not, because crucially: it is near impossible to evaluate how the Finnish mix of air and ground-based capabilities would fare in an all-out conflict versus Russia based on how a bunch of non-state actors have caused losses to the third-rate force that is the Syrian Arab Air Force of the 2010’s.

Luckily, the FDF which has insight into the finer details of the procurement isn’t trying to do that, but has instead run their own studies over the years.

Costs

I can understand the fear that this is a case of making the goat into the gardener. At the same time, it should be remembered that this is an acquisition program undertaken by the MoD and the FDF as a whole and not by the FinAF, meaning that there are numerous eyes keeping a watch over the project. Because let’s fact it: while there’s more or less universal agreement on the need for fighters, the one risk that everyone is aware of is that the operational costs would run over, and either crowd out other services’ needs or cause the Air Force to be unable to keep training its personnel and maintaining the aircraft properly.

There are obviously a number of steps being taken to mitigate this – including the FDF and MoD not accepting the given flight-hour costs but instead asking for individual numbers which are then run into the domestically developed model for how these costs are calculated. These will obviously be kept classified, as they are key competition data in the eyes of the manufacturers. The model will also be kept secret, as it would provide key information about Finnish Air Force operations in peacetime as well as how the force prepares for a potential crisis and include numbers for wartime stocks of spares and weapons. However, this is one area where there will inevitably remain some uncertainty, as predicting cost levels for 2055 will always be part guesswork (the same is true for the upgrades and capability roadmaps). Unless any one of the critics have a good solution to present, I believe this is one of those uncertainties that one has to learn to live it.

National Security

To go back to Kiljunen, Finland’s national security policy will undoubtedly be affected by who the supplier is, that’s a correct interpretation by him (although the fact that the discussions are made with the US – and French, UK, and Swedish – government is perfectly normal when it comes to these kinds of procurement). But here as well I fail to see how this would somehow be a particular issue for HX. Instead, this is part of the wider discussion of Finnish national security, and as recently as last autumn the “Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy” outlined the importance to Finnish national security of all potential suppliers. If buying a US fighter is an issue for Kiljunen, he should probably have tried to address it at this level rather than as part of HX. Instead, the Government Report feature rather strong language on the importance of US (and European) defence cooperation for Finland:

The increased operations and presence of NATO and the US in the Baltic countries and Poland have enhanced stability in the Baltic Sea region. The US commitment to the European defence is of great importance for the security of the whole of Europe. The EU and the United States will continue their wide-ranging cooperation. […] Cooperation with other Nordic countries and with the EU Member States and NATO countries – including the United States and the United Kingdom – is also important and in line with Finland’s long-term foreign and security policy and it is based on Finland’s own political interests.

The End

To sum up the criticism, it really is much ado about nothing. Everyone is obviously free to disagree with the path forward envisioned by a more or less united front of politicians and defences forces’ representatives. However, that is not the same as there being a lack of debate, and several of the points raised have already been met and discussed years ago.

On one point when it comes to transparency I do raise a careful red flag that we might have to return to later this year. My understanding is that the officially announced plan of the MoD is that when the winner is announced, that is all the information that will be released. I do believe that won’t do in this day and age. While there obviously will be a need to carefully weigh all information released based on both operational and commercial considerations, and we might very well choose not do a full report a’la Denmark, I do believe that there will be pressure to release some general information such as which packages have been able to pass which gate checks and potentially even a few short general comments on the evaluation of the combat effectiveness and national security considerations, though the last two are less likely. But that is a (potential) issue for another day.

Review: Naval Minewarfare – Politics to Practicalities

Naval MinewarfareOn some reading list during the closing months of 2020, can’t honestly remember which, a rather plain-looking book titled “Naval Minewarfare: Politics to Practicalities” (ISBN: 9781789630862) was described along the lines of being the best single volume on modern naval minewarfare. The book was also noted as being self-published, meaning that the risk of it becoming sold out and unavailable was rather real. It wasn’t perhaps the book I was most enthusiastic about last year, let’s face it – 2020 meant a host of interesting books going through the printers, including titles such as Harrier 809, Operaatio Punainen Kettu, and The Secret Horsepower Race – but naval mines is one of my personal fields of interest, and one in which good books are hard to find. Better get this one while it’s still around, I thought.

Upon getting my hands on it my interest was piqued. To begin with it was quite a bit bigger than I had thought, both in surface area and page count (19 x 23.5  cm and 414 pages). But the text was also flowing quite a bit easier than I had expected from the rather academic look. As such it quickly and unexpectedly climbed it’s way to the top of my reading pile. The book claims to be “an outstanding primary reference for politicians through practitioners of both military and civilians elements of conflicts that involve naval mines.” A tall order, let’s see if it can live up to it.

Let us start by noting that Captain (N) Chris O’Flaherty is a military professional in the field, with a long career in the Royal Navy dealing with mine hunting and mine countermeasures in a number of different roles. The book stems from research done following his election as the Royal Navy’s Hudson Fellow at St Antony’s College of the University of Oxford, with proceeds of the book going back to the Guy Hudson Memorial Trust. A nice gesture on the part of the author!

The book starts with the basic definitions – chapter one dealing with “Naval Mines” (what is a mine, different types of mines, the purpose and characteristics of different kinds of minefields, …), chapter two dealing with “Naval Mine Countermeasures” (sweeping versus minehunting, self-protection devices, passive versus active MCM, offensive versus defensive MCM, …), before going on to the third chapter that deals with “Naval Mining Events Through History”. Here the key events up to the end of World War II are looked into, before transitioning on to looking at all twenty-four mining incidents post-WWII in detail, up to and including current events as part of the War in Yemen. Chapter four looks into “The Legality of Naval Minewarfare”, including both mining and mine countermeasures. Chapter five deals with the role of “The Strategy and Doctrine of the Minewarfare Battle”, while the sixth chapter lifts it up yet one level further by looking at “The Statecraft of Naval Minewarfare”. The seventh chapter then rounds things up with a discussion on “Measures of Effect”, before the books ends by going to conclusions and appendixes.

The book certainly has given me a great appreciation for how versatile the new Katanpää-class minehunters are, not only from the viewpoint of the Finnish Navy, but as tools for diplomacy and statecraft as well. The picture shows the third sister MHC Vahterpää during exercise Sandy Coast 2020. Source: Merivoimat FB

As can be seen from the chapter headings, the narrative builds up from the smallest parts (what kinds of mines and countermeasures are there?) up to the highest levels (how can a nation use mines or MCM efforts to achieve their goals?). A key point here is that the book focuses on explaining things at a general level. You won’t get much in the way of “which mines are found in the stockpiles of country X?”, but instead there is a focus on thoroughly explaining any concepts encountered. This means that the text ends up in some rather interesting places: as the book looks into the role of minewarfare in the greater strategic and diplomatic considerations of nation states it also include a thorough looks on naval theory and suasion, as well as one of the better two-page primers on different theories of international relations. As such, the book does not really require much in the way of pre-requisite knowledge.

As said minewarfare has certainly been an area of interest for me earlier as well. Still, the book is filled with new information. I had no idea about how poorly defined the legal frameworks surrounding naval minewarfare are, and of the 24 mining events since WWII there were quite a few that were new to me (“Patriotic Scuba Divers of America” claiming to have mined Sacramento River in 1980? Had no idea about that one!).

As noted, I was in many ways positively surprised by the book. It was an easy flowing, yet highly informative read, with ample of notes and references to guide the reader to where one can find further information. The way it continuously keeps building upon previous chapters in a pedagogical way that helps even a novice understand complex theories of the interplay between the naval domain and statecraft and the role of mines and MCM-efforts in these is honestly nothing short of remarkable.

Personally I have for the last few years had a few different scenarios in my mind for how naval mines could be employed in the Baltic Sea in case of war or as a tool of diplomacy below the threshold of war, and what any single one of these would mean for Finland. Having read the book, these have changed. Both regarding how dangerous the individual scenarios would be – some being worse than I earlier imagined, some less of a danger – but also my appreciation for the exact nature of these and how they could play into the greater political game surrounding any given crisis. As a defence analyst, finding a book that can inform one’s own estimate of the capabilities and alternative courses of action for different countries is always of great value. Besides being a solid buy for happy bloggers as myself, I would also highly recommend the book to anyone that might come into (figurative) contact with naval mines in one way or the other. This includes not only seafarers (civilian and military, with one of the appendixes being a practical guide for mariners about how to deal with the mine danger), but also people involved in politics and in the general national security debate. As noted, the book is self-published, so if you are interested in it I recommend you head over to your favourite bookstore and grab it while it is available (it is currently given as in-stock for many major web-based ones)!

Advent Calendar #23: Blue Territorials

The Finnish Territorial Forces (Fi. Maakuntajoukot) are made up of reservists who volunteer for additional service. The vast majority of these make up the bulk of the Local Defence Forces (Fi. Paikallisjoukot), light infantry for different kinds of security duty in wartime and inter-agency cooperation in peacetime, to the extent that the terms are sometimes incorrectly used interchangeably. However, there are some that doesn’t fit the mold, of which Raivaajaosasto Sääksi (Minesweeper detachment Osprey) is the best example.

The unit consists of five small inshore minesweepers of the Kiiski-class, as well as the larger inshore minesweeper Kuha 26 and the small tender L-110. While all vessels are among the older ones in active service in the Finnish Navy, they still provide valuable service thanks to the basic design being sound and the equipment having been upgraded since launch. Making sure that the numerous sea lanes in Finnish waters are free from mines is a crucial mission for the Navy as the country’s supply lines rely on it, and it is a mission where the number of available hulls is important. As such, the use of motivated reservists being able to leverage their training is a win-win situation for the Navy, which always struggle with finding the right balance between the number of vessels and manpower requirements. Picture source: Rannikkolaivasto Twitter

Advent Calendar #22: Road Bases

One of the things that has been discussed numerous times during HX is the use of road bases by the Finnish Air Force. While no doubt being an interesting concept, in fact the road bases aren’t causing too much of an issue on their own. Rather, it is the general doctrine that the Finnish Air Force will disperse in wartime that leads to additional requirements when it comes to the fighter fleet. This includes the ability to operate with limited and easily transportable ground equipment, the possibility to do maintenance in austere conditions, and so forth. Then whether the asphalt belongs to your local airport or a widened piece of road isn’t of that big an importance from a systems point of view (though the pilot will have to aim better). Picture source: J. Häggblom

Advent Calendar #21: It Came from Beneath the Sea

You’d be excused for thinking the picture shows a soldier, but it is in fact an erikoisrajajääkäri, a member of the elite Finnish Border Guard unit that ranks among the top when it comes to the most demanding roles a Finnish conscript can train as. And as we noted a few days ago, the FBG sort under the Ministry of the Interior and not the MoD (though as we also noted, in wartime the FBG would be integrated into the FDF wartime chain of command, so the line regarding the conscripts is somewhat blurry). The erikoisrajajääkärit (special border rangers) are trained at the FBG Academy in Immola, and all conscripts reach at least NCO ranks, with approximately a quarter doing the SOF reserve officer course together with the paras in Utti. Picture source: Raja- ja merivartiokoulu Twitter

Advent Calendar #20: Tracked Mobility

Training troops that are supposed to be able to operate in a region where a meter (or more!) of snow isn’t unusual means that the Kainuu Brigade is one of the most prolific users of tracked all-terrain vehicles in the FDF. While the Swedish Bv 206 is well-known internationally, the unit also uses locally designed and built Sisu NA-series vehicles. However, both models are starting to be rather long in tooth, and while a small number of Bv308 have been acquired the requirement to replace the large number of Bv206 and NA vehicles remain to be solved in the upcoming years. As such Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, the UK, Norway and Sweden are working on a joint project for a replacement vehicle, but in the meantime the old vehicles are carrying on as they’ve done for the last few decades. Edit: Seems Finland (and Norway) has dropped out of the project since last year. Thanks to @nHenrikJ for pointing this out! Picture source: KAIPR Twitter

Advent Calendar #19: A Tank (or not)

You sometimes encounter defence acquisitions that make you shake your head in disbelief. However, most nations does not in fact acquire their systems through random acts of management, meaning that there’s usually a not insignificant amount of reasoning behind even the stranger ones – even if they might require a bit of explaining before one understands them.

This was most certainly the case with the Latvian decision to acquire the FV107 Scimitar (of the CVR(T)-family). While I have nothing in general against acquiring armoured fighting vehicles from the surplus market, the old British reconnaissance vehicle seemed an unlikely choice as the sole tracked AFV for a force undergoing modernisation and mechanisation. However, as usual there is method to the madness, and I was in luck to some time ago get to talk to a person who had insight into how the procurement decision was made. Thinking outside of the box is the key phrase.

When starting to plan the mechanisation of the force, it was clear that the Latvian Army wouldn’t have the funds to start fielding tanks of such an age and on such as scale that they could compete with the Russian units. But infantry likes to have direct fire support, so something was needed. This could be handled e.g. by infantry fighting vehicles such as the CV9035 bought by Estonia, or by arming wheeled APCs such as Lithuania had done with their Boxers. However, Latvia chose another path. The CVR(T) was available on the cheap, which was a key factor. Tracked AFVs are useful in other situations as well, as simply the sight and sound of tracks can have a psychological effect on your enemies. It’s not a tank, but on the positive side it is light and small enough to be carried around by normal trucks as opposed to requiring heavy loaders, meaning the logistics train required to give the vehicle operational and strategic mobility is also rather cheap. And did I mention, the CVR(T) is cheap?

The bottomline is that for a country with a limited budget – stopping tanks means infantry weapons and anti-tank missiles. Buying the dirt-cheap CVR(T) meant that there were more money left for Spike-missiles and enhancing the mobility of the infantry in the mechanised brigade, while still enabling the force to get a fire support vehicle. And while the CVR(T) isn’t much of tank, it actually isn’t much worse than the CV9035 or Boxer when it comes to providing fire support. Granted it has a 30 mm RARDEN which isn’t up to pair with the Orbital ATK Mk 44 of the Lithuanian vehicles, but the profile is quite a bit lower than the Boxer or the CV9035.

Unconventional thinking lead the Latvians to a 70’s designed light reconnaissance vehicle which became their heaviest land system. And with more than one analyst having called for different countries to think outside of the box to ensure that their force structures aren’t simply chosen based on old concepts, I have to say I respect the Latvians for actually doing so. Picture source: Latvian Armed Forces Flickr / vrsž. Gatis Indrevics and srž. Ēriks Kukutis

Advent Calendar #17: Abatis

Finnish officer cadets learn how to create a giant abatis as part of their countermobility course. The trees are felled at a 45° angle over the road from alternating sides which makes the interlock. In a country covered by forests many secondary roads are suitable for abatises, and while it is far from unbreachable, properly done it can cause significant delays for an advancing enemy. The fact that no additional building material is needed also means that it is one of few means an infantry unit can employ to quickly create a serious obstacle without the need for heavy machinery. Picture source: KAIPR FB