Big and Small Sisters

On October 7, 2019October 7, 2019 By Corporal FriskIn Finland, Naval9 Comments

The Finnish naval news keeps dropping at a high rate following the contract signing ceremonies two weeks ago. A few further details have emerged on the Pohjanmaa-class, while the FNS Tornio is currently undergoing acceptance tests as the first of the four Hamina-class sisters to pass through their mid-life update.

Screenshot 2019-10-01 at 20.21.54 — Still from Saab’s system video, featuring a NH 90 on the helideck. Source: Saab

Saab released a video highlighting the different systems they supply to the Pohjanmaa-class. An interesting detail is the inclusion of a grey-painted NH 90 on the helicopter deck. It nicely illustrates the size of the Finnish Army’s main helicopter relative to the ship, showing that while it can touch down on the deck, it is too large for the hangar and won’t be based aboard. The fact that the helicopter is grey is curious. All Finnish NH 90s are painted in a three-colour green-black camouflage, so either the color is an oversight (likely) or it may portray one of the Swedish Air Force’s maritime Hkp 14F on a visit. This will likely be a somewhat regular occurrence beginning in the last years of the next decade, considering the tight cooperation between the two navies. The Hkp 14F are also the sole non-Russian ASW-capable helicopters of the northern Baltic Sea region, meaning that once they have achieved FOC they will certainly be welcome visitors.

HKP14F — The Hkp 14F showing its whole-grey look and search radar. Source: Lasse Jansson/Försvarsmakten

Speaking of sub-hunting, it had escaped my attention (or memory) that a rather detailed description of the propulsion arrangement had been found in Maanpuolustuksen osto-opas 2/2018. The system will be twin-shafts with controllable-pitch propellers (CPP), powered by combined diesel-electric and gas turbine (CODLAG). Four diesel engines will be working as generators, producing electricity to two electric motors which power the vessel during normal operations. When requiring max speed the gas turbine is fired up, and it will be connected through gearboxes to the two shafts. The total power will be around 30 MW (40,200 hp). An interesting comparison is the German F125-class frigates which sport a very similar CODLAG arrangement rated at 31.6 MW, and consisting of a single LM2500 gas turbine from General Electric (20 MW), four 20V 4000 M53B diesel gensets from MTU Friedrichshafen (totalling 12 MW), two electrical motors (totalling 9 MW), and Renk gearboxes. For those wondering where the rest of the power from the gensets go, there’s quite a bit of electronics aboard a modern warship, as well as a 1 MW bow thruster in the bow of the F125. While no manufacturers have been announced for the Pohjanmaa-class, the F125-suppliers can be considered low-odds candidates. The Rolls-Royce MT30 has scored a few impressive references recently, including replacing the LM2500 on the ROK FFX Batch II, but it might be a tad too big for the Pohjanmaa. For sub-hunting, two of the gensets on the Pohjanmaa will receive additional signature reducing features (acoustic and vibration). This allows slow-speed operations in extreme silence, in essence providing the corvettes with a trolling mode to use a boating analogy (even if the gamefish is on the bigger side in this case). The Pohjanmaa-class is also equipped with twin bow thrusters, a crucial feature to ensure that the vessels can get around unassisted in the narrow waterways of the archipelago, including when mooring at the spartan infrastructure used for dispersed operations.

codlag-diagram — Principal view of a twin-shaft CODLAG system with one gas turbine, twin electrical motors, and four diesel generators. Source: Alureiter via Wikimedia Commons

Commodore Harju, CinC of the Finnish Navy, also published a blog post on the Finnish Defence Forces’ blog discussing the vessels. While giving few details, the blog hints at an endurance of at least two full weeks at sea, quite possibly longer. Considering that the operational environment will rarely sees the vessels being further than half a day of sailing away from the nearest friendly port, this is a significant number and a game-changer compared to the Hamina-class.

Perhaps the most significant message of the post was that the commodore acknowledges the strain currently being placed on the servicemen and -women of the fleet. The service has seen the workload increase with the increased level of readiness that has become a staple of the Finnish Defence Forces post-Crimea. This has hit the small number of vessel crews particularly hard, especially when coupled with the fact that few of the vessels are available during wintertime as well as the prolonged absence of the Rauma-class during their MLU and while dealing with the issues caused by hull cracks following it. This has placed even higher demands on the crews serving aboard the mineships and the Hamina-class FAC. With the change over from the Hämenmaa- and Rauma-classes to the Pohjanmaa-class, crews will have to be trained for the new vessels in parallel with keeping up the operational tempo with ever older vessels. It is most welcome that the Navy leadership already at this early stage of the Pohjanmaa-project acknowledges this, and are making plans to handle this additional requirement.

The Hamina-class MLU this has also seen improvements in this regard. The cabins and berthings of both the sailors and the command have been revamped and moved, allowing for more space. In addition the crews will increase by a few persons, though mostly caused by new functions being added. However, the introduction of newer systems will allow for longer rest periods for the crew members. The ergonomics of the bridge has also been improved. Hopefully these changes will together play their part in lowering the workload aboard the vessels. However, for the Navy as a whole there is unlikely to be any quick fixes, but rather a long and dedicated process is needed to bring the workload down throughout the force. The signs now point to the work having begun, hopefully it will prove successful.

FNS Hanko escorting Kvitbjorn — FNS Hanko (’82’) showing the pre-MLU configuration with the large deck gun and small tower on the rear part of the superstructure. Here the vessel is escorting ro-ro ship Kvitbjørn as part of the buildup to Exercise Arrow 19, a mission that works well close to port and as long as there is no ice. Source: Merivoimat FB

As has been mentioned earlier, the Hamina-class post-MLU will be small but highly competent ships, employing many of the same sub-systems as their larger corvette sisters. The replacement of the large 57 mm deck guns with the smaller 40 mm Bofors in their truncated hexagonal trapezohedron-shaped turrets has freed up weight to allow for the Kongsberg towed arrays to be installed, something that together with the torpedoes (TP 45 for the time being, to be replaced with the NLWT/TP 47 in a few years) gives the vessels serious sub-hunting capabilities. The physical installation of the PTO 2020 (Gabriel) on the other hand proved a bit challenging, with the ceiling having to be raised and new doors being installed. This further underscores exactly how significant an improvement the new missiles has to be, as the RBS 15 Gungnir they beat would have been a drop-in solution when it comes to the physical dimensions. The vessels will get the same combat management system, the 9LV, as the Pohjanmaa-class, allowing for synergies in training and joint operations. The ITO 04 (Umkhonto) in their individual VLS-tubes remain the primary air defence weapon, but the Saab Trackfire has made it onto the rear part of the superstructure. Likely to be fitted with the NSV heavy machine-gun as standard, the remote weapon station allows for better close-range defence against small targets such as small craft, drones, or low and slow aircraft and helicopters compared to the earlier pintle-mounted versions of the same weapon.

Speaking of the Navy’s favorite RWS, the inclusion of two Trackfires on the Pohjanmaa instead of any dedicated hard-kill CIWS raised some eyebrows. The exact capabilities of the Trackfire naturally depend on the sensors and weapon carried, but I decided to place the hypothetical question to Saab: if the RWS carried a suitable weapon and was hooked up to a suitable sensor, would it be able to bring down incoming anti-ship missiles?

In an impressively long answer, the Swedish defence company explained that the system is “designed for very high stabilisation and fire control requirements”. This provide the system with “extremely good performance” when tracking and engaging airborne targets. However, it also notes that the system is set to receive new counter-missiles capabilities in the future, upgrades that will “commensurately increase” the system’s capacity for engaging incoming missiles. In short, Trackfire isn’t yet a mature CIWS-platform against incoming missiles, but the technical possibility is there. Another question is if the Finnish Navy is interested in getting yet another calibre in its arsenal, as the CIWS role would require at least a 20 mm gun, but preferably a 25 or 30 mm one. Something like the 30 mm M230LF could likely be fitted to the Trackfire, but it is questionable if the Finnish Navy would find such an integration project worthwhile. The more likely path is to continue with the NSV, and once the money is available fit a dedicated autocannon (likely as part of a future MLU, which would also include the fitting of a second Mk 41 VLS-module to increase the number of cells to 16).

pieni_PGG TORNIO MLU.JPG — FNS Tornio (’81’) with her new and significantly smaller deck gun. Also note some minor changes to the rear parts of the superstructure. Source: Merivoimat.fi

For the time being, the defence against incoming missiles rests largely on soft-kill systems based on electronic countermeasures and decoy launchers. This isn’t necessarily a purely budgetary decision, as the value of small calibre cannons against incoming missiles at high speeds have been questioned. In essence, if three tons of metal and explosives are hurling towards you at Mach 2, even if you hit it and break something you still have a good chance of getting hit by a lump of scrap metal weighing three tons and bringing a healthy dose of energy (around 706 MJ in our example) into your superstructure. Since that energy transfer is undesirable, having the missile go somewhere else in the first place is preferable.

And what about it being a frigate? To quote commodore Harju’s post:

Some of those who have recently analysed the class have stated that the Pohjanmaa-class corvette is the same size as a frigate and has almost destroyer-like weaponry. A frigate is generally understood as a vessel capable of operating in oceanic conditions […] For us in the Navy, more important than the orthodox definition of the ship class is the military capabilities of the vessels […] And finally, the Pohjanmaa-class is part of our defense system, meaning that evaluating the performance of an individual vessel does not give the whole picture of the vessel, nor the significance and impact of the acquired package.

A further look at the Gabriel 5

On July 16, 2018 By Corporal FriskIn Finland, Naval14 Comments

The field of advanced weaponry such as anti-ship missiles is rarely a transparent one. Still, the new PTO 2020 is turning out to be quite something, being about as opaque as your favourite Ostrobothnian river following heavy spring rains.

The ANAM / Gabriel 5

The best source on the ANAM that is currently available is likely the single cutaway found on IAI’s homepage. This can then be compared to the dimensions of the Harpoon, which are well-known. Under the assumption that the diameter of the ANAM and Harpoon are similar(ish), which seems reasonable considering their very similar layout, a closer comparison can be made.

Harpoon vs ANAM — Comparison between non-ER RGM-84 Harpoon (cyan) and ANAM (dark blue). Notably the ANAM has the engine sligthly more forward, but otherwise the two match surprisingly closely both when looking at internal compartments and external features. Source: Own picture based on available cutaways

My original impression which I voiced in the last blog was that ANAM is longer and with a slightly different arrangement of the fins. Having compared the cutaway of the ANAM with that of the Harpoon (see e.g. Think Defence’s piece on the Harpoon), it does seem clear that this was a mistake, and the ANAM is in fact almost impossible to externally differentiate from the Harpoon. It should be noted that this conclusion rests on the assumption that A) the ANAM cutaway supplied by IAI is at least remotely correct, and B) that the diameter of the missiles are indeed the same. On the first account there does exist a possibility that the supplier isn’t completely honest when it comes to marketing material, but it is an OSINT-risk I am prepared to live with for the time being. On the second account, there seems to be little reason to produce a new weapon so closely modeled after the layout of the Harpoon, unless it is designed to fit the current logistics chain, including storage containers and possibly the launchers themselves. This is as I see it the only possible explanation why the Israelis chose the exact same layout and size of fins to the exact same external body. Small caveat here that the inlet might differ, as it is shrouded by the fins in the cutaway, and a retractable scoop a’la BGM-109G GLCM is a possibility. Something like this is visible in the Skimmer-video referenced in the last post, though it is unclear if that is the ANAM or a generic anti-ship missile (it does look somewhat like IMI’s Delilah HL, but the configuration of the fins is different).

One interesting point that stands out in the cutaway, however, is the internal component layout compared to the non-ER versions of the Harpoon. Crucially, the warhead occupies more or less exactly the same space as the 500 lbs (227 kg) warhead of the Harpoon. If the cutaway is correct, this would indicate that Finland has decided against downsizing the warhead compared to the current MTO 85M. The size of the fuel tank would also likely indicate a range in the 150 km class rather than the 200+ km ranges of the RBS 15 Gungnir, NSM, and Harpoon Block II+ ER. Crucially, as 150 km is more than “about 100 km“, this does not contradict that the PTO 2020 has longer range than the MTO 85M, one of the few capability details revealed by the Finnish authorities (this being confirmed by captain Valkamo).

For the sensors available to the Finnish Navy and for the relatively limited firing ranges of the Baltic Sea, blast size for range isn’t an unexpected trade-off. However, in a field where only the RBS 15 and Gabriel had a 500 lbs warhead, this might certainly have been one of the deciding factors. Notably, the traditionally conservative Finnish Defence Forces seems to continue favouring radar-seeking missiles with large warheads, operating at high-subsonic speeds.

All in all, it does seem likely that at some point after the introduction of the RGM-84D into Israeli service, the Israelis were not happy by the continued development path of the Harpoon, and decided to make a better version on their own (note that “better” might be in the narrow sense of better suiting Israeli requirements). This is not unheard of when it comes to Israeli weapons development (see e.g. Magach contra M60 Patton, or Kfir compared to Mirage V), and would make Gabriel 5 something of a cousin to the Harpoon Block II+ ER.

The DCSA-request

The Harpoon DSCA-request was discussed when it arrived, and while the Harpoon wasn’t picked, it does give some interesting pointers regarding the scope of the Gabriel-deal. It covered 112 live missiles and eight exercise ones, for a total sum of 622 million USD (532 million Euro). This is likely the absolute maximum, and corresponds to the Gabriel order including options. The quoted sum for the latter was 162 million Euros for the firm order and options for an additional 193 million Euros, for a total of 355 millions. In other words, the Israeli offer including options was 40% cheaper than the DSCA-request. Even if there are discrepancies between the two offers, the difference is big enough that the Israeli offer must have been objectively cheaper by all standards.

flickr_-_israel_defense_forces_-_chief_of_staff_visits_navy2c_jan_2011_28229 — Israeli Sa’ar 5-class corvette sporting the Israeli stealthy Harpoon-launchers behind the forward tower. Here only a single quadruple launcher is mounted, but two can be carried (one pointing port and one pointing starboard). Source: IDF via Wikimedia Commons

In Israeli Service

As noted the last time around, the Israeli decision not to upgrade their RGM-84D Harpoons to even -84L standard is rather revealing. In an article from 2014, a ‘senior naval source’ discusses the improvements to the anti-air and land-strike capabilities of the Navy, and reveals that “planned upgrades are also scheduled for sea-to-sea missiles.” These are all part of the “overall strategic vision in which the navy plays a growing role in the IDF’s integrated warfare capabilities.”

In 2017 INS Hanit, an Israeli Sa’ar 5-class vessel, took part in the international exercise ‘Novel Dina 17‘ with a single quadrupel-launcher of a new design (note that at least one of the pictures described as showing the INS Hanit in fact shows a Sa’ar 4.5-class vessel). This was captured on picture by AP press photographer Jack Guez, and labelled as the ‘Missile boxes Gabriel’. The box-shaped launchers have to the best of my knowledge not been seen either before or since. This is not surprising, as their unstealthy and generally crude look does give the impression of them being a test-installation rather than the final mount.

Screenshot 2018-07-15 at 20.15.37 — Israeli Sa’ar 5-class corvette with striped launchers. Source: Israeli Navy YouTube-channel

The Sa’ar 5 employs their Harpoons in two stealthy launchers, each holding four missiles. As discussed above, it is possible that the Gabriel can be fired from the same launcher, with only the missile control unit inside the vessel being switched out. As such, identifying which missile is carried based on the launcher is hard to impossible. However, in a YouTube-video posted by the Israeli Navy on their channel in the spring of 2017 a launcher with two longitudinal ‘stripes’ is visible. These might be vents, but in any case they differ compared to the standard version. If they are related to the Gabriel or not is impossible to tell, but there seems to be an upgraded version of the launcher introduced into service within the last year(s).

…and abroad

When Svenska Yle asked the Armed Forces about which other countries use the system, they could only confirm that other countries also use the system. Individual countries could not be mentioned because the information is classified.

An interesting question is where the Gabriel is in operational use. There is a small caveat that since this isn’t a direct quote and the interview might have been conducted in the secondary language of either the journalist or the Defence Forces’ representative, it is possible that this was a misunderstanding. However, the quote above, from an article by the Finnish public broadcasting company YLE, gives the impression that more than one country uses the missile. This obviously raises the question which country that might be?

Books can, and indeed have been, written on Israeli arms trade. In oversimplified terms, Israel is ready to export their weaponry to most anyone who can guarantee that it doesn’t end up in the hands of any of the countries actively promoting the destruction of the Israeli state. In effect, this has lead Israel to exporting arms to numerous countries in Africa, Asia, and South/Central Americas. Deals to western countries usually go through local partners (see today’s announcement about Lockheed Martin cooperating on the SPICE guidance kit). Export of earlier versions of the Gabriel have usually been tied to the export of Israeli surplus naval vessels, something which isn’t the case with the Gabriel 5 as it is so new.

In recent years, three countries stand out when it comes to Israeli exports: India, Vietnam, and Azerbaijan.

The missing link between the jewish democracy of Israel and the muslim dictatorship of Azerbaijan is Iran. Azerbaijan is in fact somewhat western-aligned, in part as neighbours Armenia and Iran are aligned towards Russia, and operate an impressive array of Israeli equipment. This includes Israeli Shaldag-class fast patrol craft and Sa’ar 62-class offshore patrol vessels. The latter are based on the Israeli Sa’ar 4.5-class fast attack crafts, and can likely lay claim to the title of the world’s most heavily armed coast guard vessels. Interestingly, Azerbaijan’s Turan news agency reported in 2011 that the country was buying an unspecified version of the Gabriel (secondary source, primary link broken). As the Sa’ar 4.5 in Israeli service is armed with the Harpoon, it is plausible that the missile system was destined for the Sa’ar 62. However, there are no indication of the system ever having been delivered to Azerbaijan, and the Sa’ar 62 currently operate with the SPIKE-NLOS (as seen in the infamous music video which confirmed the presence of Harop in Azerbaijani service). As such, it seems likely that the Gabriel was axed and replaced by the SPIKE-NLOS in the arms package.

India has bought Barak surface-to-air missiles for their newer vessels, and Vietnam is in the midst of a naval expansion program. While there are reports that some Vietnamese vessels are set to get improved firepower, nothing tangible indicate that the Gabriel would have been exported to either country.

Enter the Singaporean Formidable-class frigates. These are based on the French La Fayette-class, and is certainly one of the most formidable classes in operation in Asia. However, one odd feature is the fact that most sources list their main armament as being the outdated RGM-84C Harpoon, first introduced in 1982 and only marginally better than the original 70’s design of the -84A. While the Singaporean Navy isn’t exactly open with their armament choices, it seems that the assumption is that they share the RGM-84C version with the older Victory- and Sea Wolf-classes (the latter now retired, and curiously enough originally fitted with the Gabriel 2). The continued use of the RGM-84C would place the vessels at something of a drawback in a neighborhood featuring Exocet MM40 Block 2 and NSM, and would seem a strange decision considering the considerable cost sunk into the frigates.

There has been some rumours* that IAI participated in and lost the tender to arm the Formidable-class. Looking back, it might just be that they did participate, but in fact won. And no-one even noticed.

rss_intrepid_286929_at_imdex_20152c_singapore — RSS Intrepid, second vessel of the Formidable-class. Source: Rjv25 via Wikimedia Commons

*The post reporting the rumours also discusses an Israeli missile shot showing a slender and fast missile, and speculates this could be a scramjet powered Gabriel 5. If that is the case, it is something completely else than the ANAM. My personal opinion is still that the ANAM is the likely Gabriel sold to the Finnish Navy.

Gabriel announced for PTO2020

On July 6, 2018July 6, 2018 By Corporal FriskIn Finland, Naval16 Comments

The decision on one of the most important weapon systems for the Finnish Navy has become public today with the surprise announcement that Israeli Aircraft Industries’ Gabriel has been chosen for the PTO 2020-contract. The PTO 2020 will be the main ship-killing weapon of the Navy, being used on the Hamina-class FAC and the Pohjanmaa-class corvettes (Squadron 2020) as well as from truck-mounted batteries ashore. As such, it will replace the current MTO 85M (the RBS15 SFIII, a customised RBS15 MkII). This also effectively kills alls speculation that there would be a joint anti-shipping weapon operated by the Navy and by the Air Force, as there seems to be no air-launched version available for fast jets.

First a short discussion regarding the designations: IAI never mention Gabriel on their homepage, but they do market the Advanced Naval Attack Missile, and most sources agree that this is the Gabriel V. The odd one out is CSIS, which lists two versions of the Gabriel V, of which the ANAM is a shorter-legged and newer version of the original Gabriel V, which instead is designated Advanced Land Attack Missile. Also, the version of Gabriel bought is not publicly confirmed by the Finnish MoD, but there’s few possibilities. My working hypothesis is that while there might be slightly different versions the missile most commonly described by the Gabriel 5 / Advanced Naval Attack Missile designations is in fact the one bought by the Finnish Defence Forces.

Screenshot 2018-07-06 at 10.10.03 — Probable Gabriel V launch from a Sa’ar 5-class corvette during Israeli SINKEX in 2016. Screenshot: IDF exercise video

Looking at the field, it was clear from the get-go that the big dividing line was between the IIR-seeker of the NSM compared to the traditional radar seekers of the rest of the field. Coupled with the stealthy body of the missile, this allows the NSM a completely passive approach. The phrase “they never knew what hit them” has never been truer. However, the world of physics also dictate that IIR-seekers perform worse in adverse weather conditions (snow, rain, fog, …) compared to radar ones, a serious drawback for any weapon designed to operate in the northern parts of the Baltic Sea. While Kongsberg always claimed that the NSM offers true all-weather capability, it has remained impossible to judge the true differences based on open sources. Also, the Finnish Defence Forces is known as being somewhat conservative when adopting new technology, preferring evolution over revolution. This became evident once again with the decision to opt for the tried and tested radar seeker, and notably stealth isn’t as important for a sea-skimming missile were detection ranges are extremely short.

The Gabriel has an interesting history. A month after the end of the Six Day War in 1967 the Israeli (ex-Royal Navy) Z-class destroyer was attacked without warning by three P-15 Termit anti-ship missiles from an Egyptian Project 183R Komar-class vessel sitting inside the harbour of Port Said. While tactical lessons of a WWII-vessel being hit by three missiles fired from inside a port basin might be discussed, it was clear for the IDF that a modern anti-ship missile was needed, and the Navy took over the failed Luz-program of surface-to-surface missile to produce what became the first version of the Gabriel. This proved to be an excellent weapon in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, where the Israeli Navy was the sole service branch to completely sweep the floor with the enemy.

The Gabriel missile was already once on its way out. Here the launcher of INS Mivtach, an ex-Israeli FAC currently a museum ship in Haifa which originally sported the Gabriel but changed to Harpoon from 1984 to its decommissioning in 1996. Source: Own picture

Development of the Gabriel continued, but by the mid-80’s the Harpoon was being introduced in Israeli service, and it looked like it spelled the end of the indigenous weapon. However, in a country famous for resurrections, death should never be taken for granted, and by the early years of the new millennium analysts where starting to question why Israel wasn’t upgrading their stocks to the new RGM-84L standard. Rumours started spreading about a new weapon being development.

The exact specifications of the Gabriel V are shrouded in secrecy, but it seems to be built according to generally the same form factors as the Harpoon. The first relatively confirmed sighting of the new weapon came two years ago, when a SINXEX involved the Israeli Navy firing a Harpoon followed by a new weapon. The stills are blurry to say the least, which seems to indicate a faster launch speed and/or worse camera than used to shoot the corresponding Harpoon launch. Another one of the few publicly available pictures/renders is found in this video, where an unspecified anti-ship missile is available as part of the IAI Skimmer-package for maritime helicopters. An air intake below the missile fuselage is found on the helicopter video but not visible upon launch in the SINKEX, but might be retractable or specific to the air-launched version.

On their homepage, IAI offers a few choice insights into the weapon. It does sport and active radar seeker, and while Israel has no archipelago whatsoever, they are situated close to one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes with the number of civilian and neutral vessels vastly outnumbering those of potential targets at any given time. This means that the missile should feel right at home in the Baltic Sea. The weapon also reportedly “copes with rapidly evolving tactical situation”, which can only mean that it sports a datalink.
It also “penetrates hard-kill defenses”, which likely is a cover phrase for end-phase maneuvering. From the video of the SINKEX the impact point low on the hull is visible, though it is impossible to tell whether the missile shown impacting the tanker is in fact the Harpoon or the Gabriel. On the cutaway it is evident that the weapon has a jet engine.

The size of the warhead is unclear. RBS15 sports an impressive 200 kg warhead, while Exocet sports a 165 kg one, the Harpoon ER has shifted down from a 220 kg to a 140 kg warhead, with NSM also having a 120 kg one. The question of what kind of destructive firepower is needed for the Navy to effectively stop the Baltic Fleet short in their tracks is an interesting one. In short, 200 kg of explosives going off won’t send a frigate or destroyer-sized target to the bottom of the Baltic Sea. A good example here is the attack on the Iranian 1,100 ton frigate Sahand. which was hit by five 220 kg warheads (including three Harpoons) and cluster bombs, and still floated for hours before fires reached the magazines of the ship. A common theme is that fires might however prove troublesome, as was seen with both the Swift, hit by an Iranian C-802 near Yemen, and the HMS Sheffield hit by a single Exocet in the Falklands war. In both cases the ensuing fires caused significantly more damage than the warheads themselves. In the case of the Sheffield, the warhead seems to have failed to detonate, but the impact put the main firefighting systems out of action, severely hampering the fire-fighting effort.

Screenshot 2018-07-06 at 10.02.44 — Probable Gabriel V in the leftmost picture. Screenshot from IAI marketing video

If I had to take a guess, the warhead size of the Gabriel is likely closer to 120 than 200 kg. However, it can be argued that A) vessels need not be sunk to be effectively put out of action, and B) the majority of the vessels of the Baltic Fleet are relatively small compared to blue water ships such as destroyers. Also, modern warheads do pack a larger punch compared to similarly sized ones dating back to the 80’s. All in all, the choice to downsize from the current warhead size probably wasn’t a major factor in deciding the lethality of the Finnish Navy

One thing that has potentially been seen as an issue for the Gabriel has been the lack of shore-based systems. While the technical difficulties of creating a new launching system by mounting the tubes on a truck aren’t overwhelming, the certification process still will require some additional funding. Apparently this still fit within the given cost/capability brackets, especially as the MoD states that the deciding factors have been “performance vis-à-vis acquisition costs and schedule, lifecycle costs and security of supply, and compatibility with existing infrastructure and defence system”. Notably the maintenance will be done in Finland.

The Gabriel was decidedly something of an underdog, but it is clear that the Navy went into the project with an open mind and looking for the best option instead of just continuing in the tried and tested tracks of the next RBS15. Following the Polish and German export orders for the RBS15, diversifying the anti-ship missiles of the western countries around the Baltic Sea is also a good thing, as this makes it harder for the Baltic Fleet to optimise countermeasures.

pikiwiki_israel_29171_missle_firing — INS Haifa (S322) firing an early Gabriel. Source: Nir Maor via Wikimedia Commons

The weapon also has a secondary land-attack capability, although the damage of the comparatively light warhead deals to any kind of hard target isn’t too impressive and the missile comes with a relatively hefty price tag. It could potentially have a role in taking out soft high-value targets, such as the kind of long-range radar systems. This demonstrates another case of a Finnish defence program moving into what the US likes to call ‘cross-domain’. In other words, joint capabilities where the ground, naval, and air domains interact over the boundaries to support each other either through kinetic effect or by providing targeting data for each other. As such, it does provide another part of the Finnish deterrence picture, further strengthening the ability of the Finnish Defence Forces to hit targets at long-ranges (most sources seem to agree upon at least 150 km range).

Imagine the following scenario: an HX-fighter identifies an enemy brigade headquarter being temporarily set up in the terrain close to highway E18, outside of the range of the Army’s long-range multiple rocket launchers. The maritime threat level is however low, and the Navy dispatches two Hamina-class FAC’s which in a few hours travel from their hiding locations near Örö, to take up positions west of Suomenlinna within the air defence umbrella created by the Army’s ground-based SAM systems covering the capital. From there they fire a salvo of PTO 2020’s, which strike the target 150 km east, not necessarily putting it out of action but dealing severe damage to it. While the missiles are still in the air, the Haminas retreat back to the safety of the cluttered archipelago, stopping for a refill of missiles at one of the several smaller ports found along the Finnish coastline. The whole operation is over well within 24 hours from that the fighter first spotted the target. That is cross-domains fires and joint capabilities.

RBS15 – on the road to the Next Generation

On April 28, 2018 By Corporal FriskIn Finland, Naval2 Comments

“Psychedelic” is the word I hear someone standing next to me use to describe the room. I agree. We are standing inside what is roughly a 13 m long cube, with all the surfaces being covered with soft blue spikes of different sizes. The room is completely void of echoes, and they say that if you stand here alone, you will eventually hear your heart beating. Loudly. The only objects standing out is a large frame mounted halfway up one wall, and a pattern of blank discs mounted opposite the frame, these being the flight motion simulator and the antenna wall respectively. We are in the anechoic chamber at ELSI, and I almost expect GLaDOS to start talking to us.

ELSI, or the Electrical Warfare Simulator, is at the hearth of Saab’s anti-ship missile program. The seeker-head of the RBS15 missile is mounted on the flight motion simulator, which moves the seeker in 3-axises as it ‘flies’. On the other end of the room the antennas sends out signals corresponding to what the seeker would see at any given moment during its course. This includes not only target signatures, environmental effects, and countermeasures in the form of false targets and active jammers. All this, coupled with the seekers simulated position and real-world direction, are then used to create the model, which is fed to the antenna wall’s signal generator which creates artificial radar returns for the seeker head. As noted, it is very much a case of the actual hardware being in the loop during testing.

OK IMG_6980 Gimped — RBS15, sporting a 200 kilogram warhead to dissuade enemy ships from getting within 200 kilometers of your waters. Source: Own picture

The story of ELSI goes back to the early 90’s, when the board decided upon the investment, partly to ensure that Saab would be able to expand their share of the export market in an age of shrinking defence budgets. 1994 the site was running its first tests, and four years later it was operating at the desired level, a host of teething problems having been fixed.

Finland is no stranger to the RBS15, having operated the first generation of the missile from ship and shorebased batteries under the local designation MTO-85 since the late eighties. As such, a Finnish delegation visited ELSI early on in 1999, with the latest Finnish threat pictures. The purpose was to run a comprehensive round of tests with the MTO-85 seeker, which then provided the basis for an upgrade program launched at Saab. The upgraded seeker was then run through the same set of tests the following year. The tests can’t have gone too bad, as two years later the upgraded RBS15 SFIII, a customised RBS15 MkII, was introduced in Finnish service as the MTO 85M.

Now the RBS15 is a hot topic again for Finland. The anti-ship missile is one of the candidates for the PTO2020-program, the current acquisition to replace the MTO 85M on the Hamina-class following their ongoing MLU and in the truckmounted batteries, as well as becoming the main surface-to-surface weapon for the new Pohjanmaa-class corvettes (Squadron 2020). And Saab is confident that the RBS15 will be a prime candidate this time as well.

Saab has two distinct versions on the table. Noting that the baseline version was nearing the end of its life, Saab embarked on an ambitious upgrade program. While the step from MkI to MkII was an upgrade, the Mk3 was a radical redesign resulting in what was basically a completely new missile. Following a four-year test program it was adopted by the German Navy, and shortly after that by the Poles. The Swedish Navy is still soldiering on with the MkII, and would have been happy to adopt the Mk3. However, the Swedish Air Force had other thoughts, and had a requirement for the weapon to be lighter to allow four missiles to be carried simultaneously by the upcoming 39E Gripen. The result was the RBS15 ‘Next Generation’ (still lacking an official designation, though Mk4 wouldn’t come as a surprise), which is an upgraded Mk3 with a lighter launch weight, longer range, and generally improved performance. The weapon is contracted for introduction into Swedish service for both the Navy and the Air Force during the next decade, and Saab doesn’t mince words: “It is the most capable and advanced anti-ship missile on the market”, as was explained to us during a briefing.

OK IMG_6973 Gimped — The new launch tubes for the RBS15 Mk3 are seemingly of a more complex shape than the older ones, but under the surface ease of manufacture actually means they are cheaper. Source: Own picture

The new launchers are a chapter for themselves, with the original box-like launcher having been replaced by octagonal tubes. The reason behind this is cost-savings, as the original box held the missile tilted 45° to one side, meaning that the railings holding the missile inside the box have very demanding tolerances. The newer launch tube instead holds the missile level, which is somewhat more forgiving on the structures. But it in turn leads to new questions. “The Visby-class will fit the NG, but we have already cut square holes in the side for the MkII, so in that case we will use the old launcher,” a technical sales support engineer explained. “The missile itself doesn’t really care, it can handle both positions.”

OK IMG_6981 Gimped — The humble MSU (Missile switching unit) is the only major piece of hardware except the launch container that is needed aboard a vessel to be able to fire RBS15. Source: Own picture

What then is so special about the RBS15? From a Finnish standpoint, the Baltic Sea as the design environment of choice is interesting. The often poor weather combined with a cluttered archipelago and lots of civilian traffic makes for a challenging battlefield, and Saab is one of very few companies designing their anti-ship missiles from the outset for littoral waters as opposed to the open sea. This is also where ELSI comes into play. allowing for advanced simulations of the performance of the seeker, something which plays a key role in evaluating parameters such as ECCM and target discrimination. The weapon is also capable of performing the land-attack role against ‘soft’ targets, though it is not optimised for the role in the same way as ‘true’ land-attack cruise missiles.

The ships we are firing against are not that keen on being hit.

The flight path of the missile is guided through a number of pre-set 3D waypoints, and the missile then navigates using both GPS and inertial navigation to make sure it hits all waypoints on time. Timing is key for features such as simultaneous time-on-target, a default feature for the RBS15, and as such the missile will throttle up and down in flight as needed to hit all waypoints on the exact time given. The exact height of the sea-skimming part of the trajectory also varies according to sea state, with larger waves naturally forcing the missile to fly at higher altitude. And in case the missile misses its target, it will swing around and do a reattack. If no target is found at all, it will eventually head off to a pre-set destruction point, which can be altered by the operator to make sure the missile doesn’t fly off and self-destruct over the nearest town.

Next Generation Anti-Ship Missile System.jpg — Saab’s technology demonstrator 39-7 displaying the capability to carry two RBS15 under each wing, giving a four-ship of Gripen E an almost unrivalled firepower against enemy shipping. A full salvo will be devastating against enemy warships, but also comes at a hefty price. Picture courtesy of Saab Ab

For PTO2020, Saab hasn’t offered a specific variant, but instead opened the shop and described the Mk3 available today and the NG available tomorrow. The systems will also be interoperable, with NG launchers able to fire Mk3 and Mk3 launchers able (after a software update) to launch NG missiles. Customisation, as has been the case with the earlier Finnish versions, is also an option, but Saab notes that less and less countries are willing to pay the premium of having a customised missile. From a Finnish perspective, the supply chain is interesting. Diehl in Germany handles final assembly, with Saab building many major subassemblies and handling much of the development work and testing in Linköping. However, a new location on the map is Saab’s brand new technology centre, the STC, in Tampere, which is heavily involved in the electronic warfare side of the technology for the RBS15 NG.

The first draft of the text and pictures has been provided to Saab for screening to ensure that no classified, export controlled, or company confidential information is included.

No Finnish Harpoon/ESSM-order (at least for now)

On February 7, 2018 By Corporal FriskIn Finland, Naval16 Comments

As the headline says, yesterday’s big news from the naval sector is not that Finland has ordered the Harpoon and/or the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM). In fact, what has happened is that the US offers for two major Finnish naval programs have become open knowledge. This happened as the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency has requested clearance for the sale of 112 RGM-84Q-4 Harpoon Block II+ ER anti-ship missiles (of which twelve are of the older RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II version which will be upgraded) and 68 ESSM missiles. These kinds of pre-clearances are not uncommon, and allow for a rapid deal following a (potential) procurement decision by a foreign customer (thanks to Aaron Mehta for providing insights about US export).

iwjcvnp — One of the latest renders, showing the refined corvette concept. Source: Finnish Defence Forces / Insinööriupseeriliitto

The background is two ongoing Finnish projects: the Pohjanmaa-class multirole corvettes and the PTO 2020 heavy surface-to-surface missile. The PTO 2020 will be found aboard the Pohjanmaa-class as well as replacing the current MTO 85M (roughly a RBS 15 Mk II) on the Hamina-class as part of their MLU as well as in truck-mounted batteries. As the MLU for the Hamina is very much underway already, the winner of the PTO 2020 will be announced during the first half of this year. I am still standing by my opinion that the RBS 15 Mk 3+ and the NSM are the two frontrunners, and would be somewhat surprised if Harpoon won the trophy (and even more so if the Exocet MM40 Block 3 did, though everything is possible).

The Pohjanmaa-class is still in the design stage, with the main contract(s) to be signed this year, and the building phase to start next year. The armament shown on renders include two quadruple mounts of PTO 2020 amidships, the new lightweight torpedo from Saab, the BAE/Bofors 57 mm Mk II deck-gun, and a battery of vertical launch system-cells (VLS). The two main VLS-systems on the market are the French Sylver and the US Mk 41 (a modernized version called Mk 57 is also available, and mounted on the Zumwalt-class). Both are available in different lengths, with the shortest Sylver, the A43 (an earlier A35 concept seems to have been dropped), being around 4.3 m long (or rather, high), and the shortest Mk 41 being 5.2 m long. The 8-cell module of the Sylver is also smaller and lighter than the corresponding 8-cell Mk 41 module, in part because the silos themselves are a few centimeters smaller. For a full run-through of the differences, see this post by the UK Armed Forces Commentary-blog, where the differences are discussed with a keen eye to the pros and cons for the British Type 26 Frigate.

essm_launch_m02006120700079 — An ESSM leaving a Mk 41 cell. Source: US Navy via Wikimedia Commons

Now, while some vessels, such as the current Finnish Hamina-class and the upcoming British Type 26, feature dedicated cells to their main air-defence assets, the VLS on the Pohjanmaa will likely be home to the ships main air defence weapons. This becomes evident as the ESSM offer is for the weapon quad-packed in Mk 25 modules, designed to fit the Mk 41-system. If the ESSM would be chosen, the Pohjanmaa-class would be by far the smallest vessel to feature the system. The decision to offer the Mk 41 is interesting, as there is a dedicated Mk 56 ESSM VLS-system if the sole use would be for the ESSM.

The ESSM is certainly a competent weapon, and shows what the Navy is aiming for. 8-16 cells with quad packs would provide for 32-64 medium-ranged missiles, a huge boost compared to the current 8 short-range Umkhontos found on the Hamina. While the Mk 41 is too big for the Hamina, the Mk 56 mean that half a dozen ESSM’s could potentially be fitted as part of the MLU if the Navy choose to go down that (unlikely) route. More interesting is that the ESSM could be fired from the Army’s NASAMS surface-to-air batteries, letting the Navy and Army use the same missile stock. The upcoming ESSM Block 2 will feature an active seeker based on that of the AMRAAM, and is potentially the version offered to the Pohjanmaa.

Interestingly, the AMRAAM-ER is a AMRAAM married to the engine of the ESSM, and no, I don’t know what exactly is the difference between an AMRAAM seeker married to an ESSM engine and an ESSM engine married to an AMRAAM seeker.

I am still inclined to believe that the Sylver might be the Navy’s preferred VLS due to the smaller footprint. However, as with the PTO 2020, we will just have to wait and see.

Saab Bound for Naval Grand Slam?

On January 5, 2018January 6, 2018 By Corporal FriskIn Finland, Naval8 Comments

As the modernisation of the Finnish Navy’s surface fleet continues, Saab has managed to secure two key contracts. Earlier, it was announced that Saab would provide the new anti-submarine torpedoes set to be fielded by both the modernised Hamina-class FAC as well as the new Pohjanmaa-class corvettes (Squadron 2020). In many ways this was the low hanging fruit for Saab. Not only is development of their new torpedo well underway with Sweden as the launch customer, it is also based on proved technology in the form of the earlier Torped 45, making it possible to operate the older version from the installed tubes until the new Torped 47 is ready. Perhaps crucially, it is one of few weapons of its class designed with an eye to use in littoral and brackish waters, key features of the operating environment of the Finnish Navy.

PCG Hamina 2015 — Leadship of the class, FNS Hamina (’80’) two years ago. Note forward 57 mm main gun, roof-mounted CEROS 200, and 12.7 mm NSV heavy machine gun behind bridge. Source: Merivoimat FB

This week Saab landed a bigger fish, as it was announced that they will provide the combat management system, fire-control system, integrated communication systems, as well as optronic sensors for the Hamina MLU. The odd bird out is the fact that the order include the CEROS 200 optronic sensor, which is already fitted to the vessels. Either these are worn out to the extent that buying newer is cheaper from a maintenance point of view, or there have been internal upgrades of the CEROS 200 since the original deliveries almost twenty years ago that have not been reflected in the name of the product, but are extensive enough to warrant buying complete units and not simply giving the CEROS its own MLU.

Another interesting inclusion is the Trackfire remote weapon station, with the Hamina now being the third class in the Finnish Navy to receive the RWS. The use of the Trackfire on the Hamina isn’t specified, but the wording in the press release does seem to indicate a single system per ship. As such, while it is possible that two stations per vessel will replace the port and starboard manually operated 12.7 mm NSV heavy machine guns mounted amidships, the likelier scenario is that they will take the place of the main armament. There has been talk (so far unconfirmed?) that the main 57 mm guns (Bofors Mk 3) of the Hamina vessels will be removed as weight saving measures and transferred to the four Pohjanmaa-class vessels, and this would fit right in. While the Trackfire is usually seen fitted with a heavy machine gun as the main armament, it is capable of holding “lightweight medium calibre cannons”, i.e. weapons up to and including low-pressure 30 mm ones. This is not an unheard of solution, with e.g. the Israeli Typhoon RWS being used with a number of the different Bushmaster-series of cannons as the main or secondary gun on a number of different naval vessels out there. A 30 mm Bushmaster, the Mk 44, is already found in Finnish service on the CV 9030 IFV, but before anyone gets too enthusiastic it should be noted that this uses a longer high-pressure round, so there is no synergy to be had. Instead, something like the M230LF, based on the chain gun found on the Apache helicopter, is the more likely candidate.

Dropping down in calibre from 57 to 30 mm is not necessarily a bad thing, as the main use of the weapon will likely be air defence and intercepting light craft. Modern 30 mm rounds will do quite some damage against soft targets such as warships as well, though naturally you won’t win a gun fight against a large vessel sporting a 3 or 5 inch gun anytime soon (to be fair, if you find your FAC up against a destroyer at gun range something has likely gone very wrong already at an earlier stage of the battle).

13266107_825964914203716_103010983375369993_n — Jehu-class landing craft with a Trackfire RWS on top of the superstructure. For the landing crafts the usual mount is either a 12.7 mm NSV or a 40 mm GMG, with a 7.62 mm PKM as a co-axial weapon. Source: Merivoimat FB

At the heart of the Hamina order is the 9LV, an open architecture system which allows integration of different sub-systems, sensors, and weapons into a single integrated package. As such, different building blocks can be integrated into CMS systems from other manufacturers, or other manufacturers’ subsystems can be integrated into the 9LV CMS. That Saab gets this kind of a complete deal including both the CMS, FCS, integrated communication systems, and part of the weaponry is significant, especially when looking towards the soon to be decided contract for a main systems integrator for the Pohjanmaa-class, a job which will likely be of significantly higher value than the Hamina MLU.

The main implications is that this makes Saab the front-runner for the Pohjanmaa-class CMS. Earlier the Rauma-class FAC received the 9LV during its MLU, and now on the Hamina 9LV is replacing Atlas Elektronik’s ANCS 2000-system. While the requirements for the CMS of the Hamina and the Pohjanmaa are not completely identical, there certainly is something to be said when the former replaces one of the shortlisted CMS’s with the another one, instead of simply upgrading it. It should also be remembered that several subsystems, including most weapons, will be the same for both vessels.

Yet another noteworthy development is that Saab recently announced a new fixed face version of their Sea Giraffe, in the form of the Sea Giraffe 4A FF. I have earlier questioned whether Saab’s twin rotating mast solution would satisfy the requirements of the Navy, and it seems clear that the 4A FF is a possible solution for the Pohjanmaa’s main long-distance sensor. As Saab is also well positioned to secure the order for the new PTO2020 surface-to-surface missile, they just might be on track to secure all major Finnish naval contracts they are bidding for.

18699896_1058538577613014_610446093282984977_n — FNS Pori (’83’), the newest of the four Hamina-class vessels, underway. Source: Merivoimat FB

Flotilla 2020 – A Strategic Acquistion

On March 21, 2017March 21, 2017 By Corporal FriskIn Finland, Naval5 Comments

The Finnish corvette program is steadily moving forward, and it is nice to see that the Navy is also becoming more open regarding the project. A while back the Navy published a 20-page long document which in quite some detail went through the background of the project, and how it ended up with four multipurpose corvettes being the vessels of choice for Flotilla 2020. This was followed up by a four page article by captain (N) Valkamo, the Navy’s Assistant Chief of Staff / Plans, published in the personnel magazine Rannikon puolustaja (fi. Defender of the Coast). The latter provide a good overlook over the project, including the background research and some further nuggets of information compared to the longer text.

While the program seems to enjoy broad support amongst the Navy (unsurprising) and politicians, it continues to be something of a hot topic amongst parts of the general population and other service branches. With this in mind, it comes as no surprise that both texts place a heavy focus on the solid groundwork made before the decision to focus on four multipurpose corvettes was made.

First, the nature of the future naval battlefield was predicted, and yes, that include the presence of K-300 Bastion anti-ship missile system. After this, the question of how to cost-effectively solve the missions of the Finnish Navy in this threat environment was looked into, including a number of different configurations with vessels of different sizes and roles and in different combinations. Unsurprisingly, it was concluded that due to operational and tactical flexibility as well as economic factors (including both acquisition and life-cycle costs) a single class of multipurpose vessels was preferable over numerous different designs specialising in one or two roles and operating together. I’ve earlier discussed the issue of trying to coordinate different ships into a working unit, ensuring that the right one is always in the right place. A metaphor could be the merger of light, medium, heavy, infantry, and cavalry tanks as well as the tank destroyer into the jack-of-all-trades Main Battle Tank. Other alternatives that were looked into was transferring whole or part of the missions to air- or ground-based systems, but this was also deemed impossible to implement cost-effectively. Especially as e.g. mining require vessels out at sea in any case.

Screenshot 2017-03-21 at 19.52.23 — An infographic depicting the timeline for all major surface units, including scheduled service date, MLU, decommisiong, as well as roles and capabilities. Source: Finnish MoD

This then caused the slight growth in size compared to the current mine ships, as the vessel needs to be able to fit numerous weapons and their sensors, as well as maintaining the crew complement and provisions needed for prolonged stays out at sea during escort or surveillance missions. Something which hasn’t been widely discussed is the need for speed. While the light fast attack crafts have impressive sprint speed, their ability to transit a high speeds over longer distances isn’t stellar, especially if you encounter adverse weather. In the same way, while a Ferrari might be faster than a Land Rover on the Nürburgring, the roles would quickly be reversed if they set off on a bumpy dirt road through the Finnish forests. The larger size does also allow for the ability to operate in ice, as well as better resistance to combat damage due to compartmentalisation.

Still, the size won’t grow too much. Partly because larger vessels aren’t an end in itself, and partly because both acquisition and life-cycle costs grow with the hull size. The Navy also face an issue with having a limited number of crew members with which to man the vessels. All of these factor in, and has lead to the current design. Importantly, keeping the total length around 100 meters and the draft low means that the vessels can use the current naval infrastructure in the Finnish archipelago, including the current network of secondary bases and the extensive network of inshore waterways.

Screenshot 2017-03-21 at 19.53.11 — The 7 meter long and 900 kg heavy 1:15 scale hull model is pushed through the ice as part of the test program. Source: Finnish MoD

The hull form has been finalised, and scale test have been performed with an eye on different requirements. These include both resistance, manoeuvring, and ice-going capability. In addition, the new propeller design has been tested in full scale on the Navy’s auxilliary FNS Louhi. As was expected, the vessels will have a drop of MEKO-blood in them, as the concept has been fine-tuned by German design bureau MTG-Marinetechnik GmbH.

Sumua — FNS Hämeenmaa (02) showing the 57 mm Bofors Mk I. Source: Puolustusvoimat

For the weapons and sensors, the RFI resulted in a number of suitable packages being identified, all fitting within the budget. One of these will then be chosen, with the (foreign) main supplier being responsible for providing an integrated warfighting capability (sensors, weapons, C3I, battlefield management, and so forth). One interesting change which I did not expect was the renaming of the anti-ship missiles from meritorjuntaohjus (sea-defence missile) to pintatorjuntaohjus (surface-defence missile), with the Navy’s new missile being slated to become PTO2020. It is possible that this change reflects the secondary land-attack capability many modern missiles have. The PTO2020 program is handled as its own program as it is destined for both the updated Hamina, the corvettes, and the land-based launchers. As such it is not included in the 1.2 billion Euro price tag of the corvettes, as is the case with the new light ASW-torpedo which will be acquired as part of the Hamina MLU.

In addition to these systems, several systems will also be transferred from the Rauma- and Hämeenmaa-classes, as well as from the already decommissioned Pohjanmaa. These include the deck guns, towed arrays, decoy launchers, mine-laying equipment, and fire control director. The deck gun is an interesting issue, as the Rauma is equipped with the Bofors 40 mm, of which there are four, while the Hämeenmaa feature the 57 mm Bofors Mk I, a considerably more suitable weapon for a corvette. Still, the Mk I is quite a bit older than the corresponding 57 mm Bofors Mk 3 which is found on the Hamina, and as we all know there are only two Hämeenmaa vessels in service. However, it is possible that there are more guns in storage, as the two scrapped Helsinki-class vessels as well as the Pohjanmaa also had a single 57 mm Bofors Mk I each, and the Finnish Defence Forces is famous for not throwing away something that might prove useful further down the line. As a matter of fact, I wouldn’t be surprised if the current guns mounted on the Hämeenmaa-class are these recycled Helsinki-class guns… In any case, I expect to see the 57 mm Bofors L/70 mounted on the corvettes, and probably upgrade to a Mk 3-ish standard in order to be able to fire smart ammunition remotely.

The decoy launcher is more straightforward, as both classes feature the modern Rheinmetall MASS. The towed arrays currently in service are the active Kongsberg ST2400 variable-depth sonar and the SONAC PTA passive sonar. Very little information is available on the latter, but it is understood to be a rather conventional system well suited for littoral operations with both narrow- and broadband waterfall displays. As the current number of arrays has been quite small, and as the Hamina will also take up the ASW-role as part of their MLU, it is entirely possible that more arrays will be acquired. It is also unclear if all corvettes will get both active and passive arrays, or whether they will be limited to either mode of operation.

The scale model shown by Saab at Euronaval 2016, featuring a Giraffe 4A and a 1X above it in the cut-outs. This combination of shrouded rotating radars (the cut-outs are for illustrative purposes only) gives both long-range search capability and short-range tracking of rapidly closing targets. Photo: Saab, used with permission

Interestingly, the fire-control sensor is the Saab CEROS 200 radar and optronic tracking fire control director. This will likely strengthen Saab’s already strong offering, as they already have a tried solution for integrating the CEROS into their 9LV combat managment system, together with their RBS15 MK3 missile and Sea Giraffe radars. The 9LV is already a familiar product to the Finnish Navy, and it would come as no surprise if Saab would be the prime contractor for systems integration. Other companies likely in the running include Atlas Elektroniks (prime contractor for the ongoing Pansio-class MLU), Kongsberg (best known for the NSM anti-ship missile, but has a wide portfolio of naval products), and Raytheon (sporting strong references).