Finland currently runs a tank force of a nice even 200 Leopard 2, split between 100 of the newer ex-Dutch 2A6 and a 100 remaining operational gun-tanks out of the total of 139 ex-German 2A4 delivered since the early 2000’s – with the balance having been converted to support vehicles, cannibalised for spares, used as training hulls, or other similar non-operational roles. As I have earlier discussed, this makes NATO-member Finland uniquely situated to supply Ukraine with a large number of Leopards, but instead of repeating all those arguments, let’s look at the possible future of the force instead.
The Leopard 2A4 is starting to show its age. The version dates to 1985, which means that in addition to the obvious performance aspects, questions about obsolescence for basic systems such as hydraulics, electronics, and the powertrain are becoming ever more pressing. It’s not so much that they wouldn’t work, but for any system approaching 40 years of service you will start running into issues with how easy it is to source spares and whether engineering solutions and standards used are up to today’s requirements? It deserves to be reminded that the original Finnish 2A4-upgrade program was shelved due to high costs well over a decade ago, and while the acquisition of the 2A6 means that FDF has a sharp tip of the spear, even when you accept that the 2A4 make up the secondary tank in the hi-low mix they won’t live forever in the current configuration.
The first serious signs of movement on this front came in an article by Tobias Heimbach published in Stuttgarter Zeitung earlier this summer (“645 neue Leoparden für Europa“). In short, Germany sees the possibility for a major multi-national buy of new Leopard 2A7 (or whatever the standard would be designated in the contract) and to get some serious economies of scale they have offered other countries (including through discussions in the LeoBen Leopard’s user group) the ability to join. SZ’s article noted Finland among the countries which have sent an RFI for an unspecified number of new-builds at an unspecified schedule to KNDS (The Artist Formerly Known as Krauss-Maffei Wegmann). While the big story from a German point of view was the potentially huge order (to put it in perspective, production of all Leopard 2s so far stands at 3,565, meaning 645 new-builds would constitute an approximately 18% increase in the total production numbers), the inclusion of Finland in the internal document referenced caused Helsingin Sanomat to call up the FDF and start asking around (“Saksa tarjoaa Suomelle mahdollisuutta olla mukana Leopardien suurostossa“).
Colonel Juhana Skyttä, the FDF inspector of infantry, confirms the RFI regarding procurement availability, delivery times, and costs. However, he also in no uncertain words state that there is no active acquisition program for tanks in the “near-term”.
The time will come in some years. Then we have to think about either MLU or new-builds. That isn’t topical right now.
Col. Juhana Skyttä to Helsingin Sanomat
Crucially, Skyttä states that this is only one RFI of several sent out to different manufacturers regarding Leopards and related systems. Together with his comment about there not yet being a firm decision on whether an MLU or new-builds are the way forward, and there not being an immediate need to “renew or enlarge” Finland’s Leopard-fleet, what does seem clear is that Finland is not planning to go back to a 100-tank fleet.
At this stage it deserves to mention that we know NATO wants a brigade out of Denmark and another one out of Norway, neither country which is known for being army-centric or for their long land borders. What NATO wants from Finland is an unknown in the public discussion, and one which wasn’t a factor in FDF planning two years ago.
The possibilities in case Finland opt for an MLU are quite varied. The deep option is to go all-in and in essence build 2A7s on 2A4-chassis. The big question are the cost and whether it actually would be an upgrade, or if everything is so worn out and old that in essence you would build a Leopard version of the Ship of Theseus? Another possibility is to tailor a uniquely Finnish upgrade which aims to enhance synergies with the current Finnish 2A6-fleet when it comes to spares. The flip-side here is obviously that you are paying for a unique set of upgrades, which means you pick up the tab for the research and development and any certification work that goes into that. Being able to streamline the 2A4 with the 2A6 might certainly make it more affordable, and it could be combined with a lighter 2A6-upgrade – call it an mid-life extension along the lines of what we are doing to the CV 9030-fleet. Still, the scope of the program would be somewhat unique.
An interesting third option recently appeared. The Austrian 2A4-fleet faces a similar set of issues, and they are not interested in paying for the full 2A7-fit despite still needing to address obsolescence issues. As such, they have recently ordered an upgrade program from KNDS which they describe as “2A7 on the inside, 2A4 on the outside”, fitting new sensors and optics, a modern CAN bus electronic architecture, and an electronic turret drive instead of the earlier hydraulics. While the devil is always in the details, this kind of limited upgrade where someone else has paid the development costs and fielded the final outcome first might certainly be something that the FDF could fall for – in particular if money is tight by the time the Leopard replacement/upgrade program is coming to the front of the queue.
However, a crucial part of the thinking behind the RFI sent out by FDF was that the force wants to have a picture of how aid to Ukraine affects the fighting capabilities of FDF, and how quickly and at what costs can any potential gaps be covered by replacement equipment? This is in itself not surprising, but also indicates that the FDF indeed has done their homework when it comes to actually checking (as opposed to guessing) what impact the delivery of Leopard 2s to Ukraine would have on the Finnish tank force. And any tank delivered to Ukraine is one that you don’t upgrade under a Finnish program (reasoning which likely is one part of why KNDS include new-built Strv 123C/2A7 SWE for Sweden in their list of possibilities). However, regardless of whether any significant amount of Finnish Leos are heading to Ukraine or not, letting go of the 2A4s and ordering a new batch of tanks as replacements – possibly to the same standard as either Norway or Sweden – might certainly make sense in the medium to long-term even if it is more expensive up front. One would imagine the contingency planning spans all of these scenarios, from delivery of a handful of tanks up to the grand question of what to do when 100 Leo 2A4s moves on – either to Ukraine or the scrap yard.
And this is where we are missing another large cat. One with more melanin.
I wrote a few posts about (and caused a bit of an kerfuffle in the process) the recent Norwegian tank program. The showdown between the (now) Leopard2A8 and the K2NO Black Panther was a rather interesting affair, as it included serious trials and comparisons in Norwegian conditions (including in the unforgiving Norwegian winter). In the end it was won by the German team which not only could rely on a solid vehicle, but also on the fact that more or less all of Norway’s close allies – in both the geographical and policy sense – operate the Leopard, as well as Norway’s close defence cooperation with Germany and the importance of that connection. These are very much relevant considerations when choosing high-end defence systems, but it should at the same time be noted that Forsvarsmateriell (FMA, the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency) recommended that the K2 be acquired. Twice.
According to documents which were leaked to the Norwegian press, both tanks performed similarly and where more or less evenly matched in the field. However, the K2NO tipped the scale at below 60 tonnes, while the Leo in the Norwegian configuration came in just shy of 70 tonnes. Needless to say, that ~15 % difference in weight will make a difference in mobility considering the similar powerpacks, in particular in snow and on soft terrain. The Korean tank was also “significantly” cheaper, and while KNDS planned on cutting corners by starting deliveries of series produced vehicles before the pre-production vehicles had passed acceptance tests – potentially leading to rework of delivered vehicles in case the local configuration would be altered based on these tests – Hyundai planned on first getting the acceptance tests done, and only then delivering the series produced vehicles.
It deserves to be stressed that according to all accounts, the FDF is a very happy Leopard-operator, and all the Norwegian arguments about synergies with allies, geographic and political closeness to Germany, and so on, are all equally valid for Finland. Perhaps even more so, as the Leopard 2A4 replacement/upgrade will serve alongside our 2A6-fleet for the foreseeable future. It also should be emphasised that according to the Norwegian tests, the Leopard 2 in its latest version is not inferior to the K2 on the battlefield, but is extremely evenly matched, in itself a statement to the greatness of the design of a tank that by now is twice the age of its crews.
At the same time, the FDF is always short on money.
Finland gets its fair share of snow in the winter, and bogs cover almost a third of the country.
Personnel questions and the shrinking size of the conscript classes are a constant headache.
Now, better Leopard 2s does sound like the obvious answer to what we need when our current ones are getting old, but it is hard to argue that a competition wouldn’t be in everyone’s interest. Case in point HX, which turned out to be quite the success even if the end result was that the favourite won (sometimes the pre-race favourites are that for a reason, go figure). That FDF in the RFI-stage apparently hasn’t even bothered to ask Hyundai Rotem what they are able to offer, or ask permission from the Norwegians to see their evaluation results (we’re after all supposed to be allied, and the requirements they have drawn up are in all likelihood rather closely matched to ours) does strike me as strange. This is further emphasised by the fact that even Lithuania (despite their known preference for anything German-built when ordering heavy defence materiel) thought it prudent to at least check out the K2 (and M1 Abrams), before settling on the Leo. And speaking of allies, while Poland certainly is something of a special case, the Polish mixed M1 Abrams/K2 Black Panther-force will be the major armour formation to our right until someone lands a division or two in the Baltics.
I am not going to tell FDF which tank to buy any more than I had opinions on which fighter to get, but in the current situation, are we really not even going to look at all our options?
Corporal Frisk 
That the K2 is both cheaper and lighter would seem to militate in favor of at least giving it a look. There’s also the fact that S. Korea and Poland also seem well on their way towards development of a new K3 version – which will have a lower, stealthier profile with a lighter unmanned turret – which may sport a new 130mm cannon: https://www.armyrecognition.com/defense_news_june_2023_global_security_army_industry/south_korea_unveils_design_concept_of_future_k3_mbt_main_batle_tank.html
I’m not sure about the 130mm cannon – something Rheinmetall has also proposed for its new tank as I think there are logistics synergies associated w/ everyone using 120mm ammo and improvements to the tank munitions and barrel velocity might well obviate the theoretical advantages of larger caliber munitions. I do, however, think that the lighter, lower unmanned turret makes sense – which also reduces the crew size to 3. Active protection systems and better lighter armor are part of all the new and upgrade tanks, but I think hybrid power will be an important upgrade as it can allow for silent operation. Lowering the thermal signature is also important. Both are more easily accomplished with a lighter, lower, stealthier shape to begin with.
I’m super happy you’re back blogging!
Do you think there are going to be more tank transfers? What is the holdup? Getting them up to snuff before sending them? Be nice if the various NATO countries could work out some plan with respect to equipment consolidation
One aspect the war in Ukraine has revealed has been the lack of ability of a tank force to make the gains (mobile warfare) that tanks are supposed to enable. Even before the preponderance of JAV, NLAW etc, the Russians made poor progress with their armor.
Flip now is Ukraine can’t make progress because of anti tank mines and any Eastern European clash will likely have both in play from the start. Combined arms is not going to change that in my view (and there is the learning curve, ie, per WWII it did not happen overnight.
In WWII the Germans had breakthrough as no one was prepared for the tank armies, but as the war went on, those breakthrough ceased and it turned into a slogging match (Normandy had no defense in depth and total air superiority to stack fighter bombers up over the battlefield)
Is it even worth investing in Tanks now? The Leos have done no better than the T-72-90 have done. Crews may be surviving and that is a good thing but the way tanks are eaten up only a WWII production of huge numbers (T-34/Sherman) could make up the losses (and or need)
Modern reality is that production can never replace losses or even close.
Poland got its initial group of K2 (and K9) because the South Korean Government pulled them out of issue to their own forces and only a huge tank heavy force like South Korea could risk it.
Even if tanks are not road bound (and they can be) supply is done via roads and the choke-points are also obvious.
The reality evident in the Ammo shortages in Ukraine (and the same was true in WWII post Normandy break out, a significant amount of time was spent with ammo rationing,
It seems any conflict becomes a slogging match and artillery (and its ammo) is what dictates what is an is not possible. Invest in artillery and ammo.
Sweeping conclusions about the death of maneuvre and mobility.
I have not seen a lot of data on what type of tactical communication networks, reconnaissance and combat engineer systems the Ukrainians have and how they operate them in battlegroups.
I have seen more on how they operate artillery and other indirect fire systems and there is a lot of room for improvement from a Finnish perspective.
So much so that I actually question their ability to conduct offensive operations just by this alone.
They dont have much of an air force offensive capability left so these are the fires they have.
Ukraine naturally is different with large open spaces but I am not convinced that minefields and fortifications can block movement.
But mobility does require the subsystems I mentioned at start.
(And others I did not mention.)
They allow the constant dispersal-concentration cycle and flexible combined arms coordination that modern maneuvre warfare requires at the tactical and operational level.
Basic requirements for the movement not stopping when it faces opposition.
Keep in mind the Maginot Line did its job. There was no German pentration of that into France.
The armor penetration went through the Ardennes where the Maginot Line was stopped on either side due to a stupid assumption on neutrality the Germans did not care about as well as failure to defend the Ardennes.
Montgomery failed to break through at El Alamein trying to throw armor into the attack. Only a lucky break got them through. And Montgomery had Enigma info.
Fortifications and mines will block armor. Artillery is not a major help against mines and aircraft are useless.
Too long a line to fortify and mine are possibles.
The Soviet in WWII despite attacking where the Germans were weak or other troops still took huge casualties and massive tank losses.
Tanks are not useless, they are good infantry support, but the sweeping mobility and doctrine behind it have only worked a limited number of times and places.
Battle of the Bulge was classic counter, hold the shoulders, fighting retreat in the attack direction (not that they had a choice to star with) and then squeeze in the shoulders.
“Fortifications and mines will block armor. Artillery is not a major help against mines and aircraft are useless.
Too long a line to fortify and mine are possibles.
The Soviet in WWII despite attacking where the Germans were weak or other troops still took huge casualties and massive tank losses.
Tanks are not useless, they are good infantry support, but the sweeping mobility and doctrine behind it have only worked a limited number of times and places.”
If you view and use tanks as infantry support then fortifications and mines will block armor..
It would be attrition warfare and that is what is being fought in Ukraine.
If you view tanks similar to air power, LRPF and C6ISR they are an operational and strategic level asset, part of the maneuvre warfare toolkit.
Mobility is not dead but it requires mission command transferred to the level that technology allows to generate the required tempo and iniative.
Think Napoleon and Genghis Khan with modern technology.
I
To help in it defense and armor force, maybe Finland should do what Poland did and propose to the US to setup a permanent US tank/infantry base, maybe start with a battalion.
Also do what Poland did when Germany was slow in providing the Leopard 2 and consider other tanks, at least to make Germany a little more pro-active.
The US can’t locate an Armored Brigade in all places and the most likely attack lines would be where they would and have put them.
I don’t see Russia able to attack anyone in the next 15 years (and it could be longer) and Finland is simply not a prime target.
I don’t blame Finland for its efforts and in fact think it is hugely laudable for making sure any attack has major losses and that then make any attack mute.
Russia key interest there is the basses in Murmansk etc and as long as those are no threatened it would be quiet front.
Pole here.
On K2:
K2 was optimized for Korean theater which is mountainous and therefore limits maneuever, options for flanking etc. Because of that it has adjustable suspension for vertical adjustment but only 15 degrees off-axis frontal armour coverage in horizontal plane compared to 20-25 degrees for NATO tanks and 25-30 degrees for Soviet tanks which were designed for plains in Europe where maneuver and flanking were norm.
Norway may match Korea’s terrain but Finland does not.
On Poland buying K2:
Poland bought K2 because it is run by corrupt morons – since 2016 – who made Russia a constant talking point for political reasons but did NOTHING to prepare for war. When the war began Poland found itself with stocks of Soviet tech that could be passed on but with nothing to replace it. The only source of large numbers of tanks were US or Korea but only Korea was remotely affordable.
It was a panic buy. The military tested K2 a few years ago and said they don’t want it because of insufficient protection. Koreans offered Polish variant K2PL that would have protection improved but it would require new chassis with 7 wheels instead of 6 and the cost was higher than baseline K2. The current licensed K2PL is baseline K2 just made in Poland. Military wanted Abrams or Leopard. K2 was pushed by industrial cliques within the ruling party because Koreans offered licensed production which allows for corruption and clique building which is all the current government cares about.
Also the ongoing emergency purchases are also only partly caused by actual needs. A lot of it comes due to the upcoming elections. Government is trying to play the security angle and develop a cushion of business interests to shield them in case they lose. This is why they don’t care about sustainability and just throw wild numbers because if they lose and opposition takes over they will be “guilty of endangering Poland”. If the government stays in power they’ll just do whatever… their electorate are just ad dumb and corrupt as they are. The government did nothing to improve defense for eight years while endlessly screeching about evil Russia and constantly blaming evil Germany and nobody cared.
Another aspect is the fact that the current government is tied to US Republicans and functions to a degree as a puppet government therefore works with the current right-wing Korean government and the Korean industry to develop a backup for Korean arms industry in case of war – only paid by Polish tax money.
The whole buildup stinks of political corruption but with the current government and most of media owned by Americans there’s little that can be genuinely done to put some oversight or limits.
Defense journalist Tomasz Dmitruk of NTW calculated that of all the funds already declared 30% went to US, 25% to Korea, 20% to Europe including UK (SHORAD, frigates, helicopters) and only 25% to Polish defense industry. This is blatant steal but nobody says anythign because corrupt foreign-owned media keep up a facade to push corporate interests US-pseudodemocracy style.
My recommendation is that whatever Poland does, you don’t do that. One country shooting itself in the head thanks to corruption and foreign business and political interference is enough.
Most of what Finland did so far was rather sensible so stay on that path. Poland is corrupt, run by agents and completely retarded thanks to the morons in power. We’re not an example to follow. We’re an example to avoid.
Why everybody is customizing their tanks, vehicles and systems so much?
I suppose the Ukrainian war has shown how useful it would be to use exactly the same equipment as others, even If that equipment lacks some details, which would be useful in own use.
And using same equipment as others could have implicstions for ATGM and MANPADS procurement. They will be 1st thing that allies will send in a risk of a war. Maybe it would be wise to purchase 4…5 of the most common types, even If the most cost efficient solution (in peace time) would be to buy only one type at a time.
“I am not going to tell FDF which tank to buy any more than I had opinions on which fighter to get, but in the current situation, are we really not even going to look at all our options?”
I think this might be related to other combat vehicle procurement programs coming up both in Finland and Germany..
Or just purely logistical reasons.