There are several new developments when it comes to heavy indirect fire in the Finnish Army since I last visited the topic, so here’s a brief overview, including some BONUS-content:
The planned procurement of the Korean K9 Thunder self-propelled gun is moving forward. Perhaps the greatest talking point so far has been the discrepancies between reports in KoreanKorean and Finnish media. While Finnish media talks about ‘tens of guns’ for a price tag of ‘100 million Euros or slightly above’, the Korean media is more specific, and mentions 48 guns valued at 400 million US Dollars (375 million Euros), including technology transfer. While the number of guns certainly could be correct, the difference in price is rather staggering…
Contrary to my speculating last time around, the K10 resupply vehicle is not set to be included in the deal. However, Estonia has been invited to join in the procurement. The country has declared their intent to equip their mechanised brigade, the 1. Jalaväebrigaad, with self-propelled artillery. Estonia and Finland has bought defence equipment together before, and a joint buy might be a good way to put some additional pressure on the price.
The first K9 Thunder on Finnish soil attended trials at Rovajärvi firing range last year, as part of the Join Fires Exercise (MVH 2016). The preliminary contract is expected to be signed this spring.
Lost & Found
That the Finnish artillery park has been large is no secret. Exactly how large is.
In an interesting turn of events, the latest reform of the Defence Forces suddenly increased the number of Finnish artillery pieces, 120 mm mortars and up, with about 900 pieces.
This statement, widely presented by the press as Finland hiding information from OSCE, deserves some further comments. Yes, it is certainly not in the spirit of the Vienna Agreement, though part of the explanation lies in the known omissions of the document. The document only covers systems in units down to brigade/regiment level, meaning that those artillery systems deployed in independent battalions and companies, such as the Finnish local defence units, aren’t included. The same goes for the Navy/Marines, which also is outside of the agreement. A third potential issue is stored guns which are again assigned a wartime task, and as such are re-entering the document.
The more interesting part than speculating how it was done is why, and especially why the guns were brought back into the document. There are clearly some high-level signalling taking place.
For those keeping count, the current artillery park is shown as 698 heavy mortars, 18 AMOS self-propelled mortars, 34 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers, 471 light howitzers, 76 130 mm field guns, 156 152/155 mm heavy howitzers/field guns, and 113 MLRS.
The best artillery in Europe
The planned purchase of K9 does not take place in a vacuum, but is one part of the larger plan for upgrading the artillery. The aim, as explained by Inspector of Artillery colonel Pasivirta, is to get the best artillery found in Europe, and with some margin.
This includes already made steps, such as the introduction of the BONUS anti-tank round. The round has a range of up to 35 km, and once over the target area two sub-munitions are ejected. These are equipped with sensors, and search for armoured targets. If a suitable target is found, it is destroyed by a shaped-charge punching through the roof of the vehicle, normally the most lightly armoured part. The first firing in Finnish service of this highly potent artillery round took place at the above-mentioned MVH 2016 exercise.
The bigger headline was the announcement that the service is looking into counter-battery radars. These makes it possible to locate the position of firing units, and in some cases even to alert own troops in the enemy’s target area that enemy artillery is heading their way. The acquisition of such as system, Saab’s ARTHUR and ELTA’s ELM-2084 comes to mind, would certainly raise the deadliness of the Finnish artillery, and makes perfect sense.
More puzzling was the tweet issued by the official Finnish MoD Twitter-account. Where the colonel talks about a swift (though not rushed) procurement program with an RFQ coming out this spring, and the system being operational by 2020, the author of the tweet (grumpily?) claims that the ‘Defence Forces have wanted the radars for 30 years, but the acquisition hasn’t even been cleared for an RFI’.
PV on 30 vuotta halunnut vastatykistötutkia. Hankintaa ei ole käsitelty kaupallisessa JORYssä, joka on edellytys edes tietopyynnölle @hsfi
Herr Flax is a Swedish officer and helicopter pilot flying the Hkp 16 (UH-60M Black Hawk) in the Swedish Air Force. He started his military career by receiving basic training at P 4 Skaraborg Regiment on the Strv 122/Leopard 2A5, before transitioning to the Air Force. This is my translation of a recent blog post he published on his blog in Swedish, dealing with the merits of the Swedish Army’s Patgb 360 (XA-360 AMV) compared to the Strf 9040 (CV 9040) and Strv 122 (Leopard 2A5). As the same vehicles are a core part of the Finnish Army as well, I felt that the discussion would be of interest to Finnish readers. I have used the international designations for the vehicles in place of the Swedish ones as these are more familiar to the general reader. Any possible faults of the English translation are mine. In addition to his blog, Herr Flax is also found on Twitter (@HerrFlax).
A short reminder on Swedish geography: if Sweden was to be attacked from the east there are two possibilities, either through the heavily forested northern parts of the country (through Finnish territory) or over the Baltic Sea in the south and central parts of the country. The terrain here is more open and holds all major cities in the country. This creates a somewhat different threat scenario compared to Finland, and e.g. hostile airborne/airmobile units traditionally occupy a more central role in Swedish threat perception than in Finnish. Like Finland, the defence of the northern parts of the country is mainly handled by light jaeger style units, which are outside the scope of this discussion.
Some time ago I joined a map exercise as an invited guest participant. The exercise was part of the HSU (the Swedish Higher Staff Officer Course) organised by the Swedish Defence University FHS. The famous pendulum had started to swing back, and we had again started to focus on the question of defending Sweden, on Swedish territory, against a numerically superior attacker employing modern equipment. This was also the core focus of the exercise.
The exercise lasted for a week, and both myself and the other participants rated it highly. The majority of the participants came from Army units and staffs, with myself being one of the few exceptions. On one of the days as part of the exercise we were to evaluate our own army units against a potential future attacker.
The discussion quickly centered on the Leopard 2A5 and the CV 9040, and how these will perform on the future battlefield. This was only natural, as these two vehicles make up the core of the Army’s combat units. After a while, I put forward a vehicle which then was being introduced in the Army, the AMV, and the motorised infantry battalions these would be assigned to.
In my opinion, their role in national defence should not be dismissed, despite the fact that they originally had been acquired with an eye to international missions. The vehicles might lack the firepower of the Leopard 2 and CV 90, but they provided tactical and operational mobility on a scale not found in the Leopard 2/CV 90 units. This could be a factor making them an interesting and valuable card in the homeland defence role, especially considering the small size of the Swedish Defence Forces. The Army needs to be able to shift from one operational area to another. I argued that the AMV provided this capability.
My train of thoughts was interrupted by a another guest participant, an experienced and high-ranking officer with a background including time in the armoured units. He noted that AMV lacks the armament to meet the armoured spearhead of the enemy, and as such it is of little value in combat. My impression was that he felt that the question was settled with this short and snappy interruption.
I didn’t agree, and argued that firepower alone can’t be the sole measure when judging the fighting value on a unit level. Building the argument around fire-mobility-protection felt like a too simplistic approach, and I clarified that I obviously did not wish to replace our mechanised units with motorised infantry. After this, I repeated that we still should see the value of this kind of units. The AMV units can on their own wheels regroup between e.g. Revingehed [home garrison of the P 7 Southern Scania regiment] to Gothenburg/Stockholm while still maintaining most of its combat value. This is significantly harder for the tracked Leopard 2/CV 90 battalions. In addition I argued that a dismounted infantry battalion given a few hours of preparation could throw up a defence that certainly would give a mechanised attacker a significant headache.
The discussion ended when the other officer rhetorically asked ‘Sure they might arrive first, but what can they really do after they have arrived?’ I decided not to pursue the discussion further. Partly because I felt uncomfortable with an experienced colleague categorically rejecting my opinion, and partly because no-one else in the group joined in the discussion. None of the students in the course or the other participants seemed to have an opinion in the question.
My opinion is that the AMV as a vehicle has a poor combat value against enemy tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. This can be determined even by a simple visual inspection. If one uses AMV in combat in the same way as a CV 9040 one will come in second if the enemy wields anything heavier than a BMD.
But the fact that a unit type poorly used makes you lose a battle can hardly be said to make the unit type useless for homeland defence? The main weapon of the AMV battalions is not their vehicles, but the weapon systems carried inside them. Soldiers, machine guns, anti-tank weapons, mines, and systems for indirect fire. These, together with the mobility offered by the AMV, can create excellent units for those that can use them in the correct way. The whole issue should boil down to the simple question of using tactics suitable for the unit type, as well as training and exercises for the members of the unit in question.
There are obviously several possible enhancements in the AMV units before we can get the most out of their combat value! But to dismiss them because they lack vehicle mounted gun barrels or tracks is to look at an infantry unit from an armoured perspective! It might be an unavoidable consequence of the infantry having been disbanded for all practical purposes for 15 years, but it is rather unflattering for the one doing so.
AMV gives us motorised infantry units with a high level of protection and very good mobility over large areas. It does not provide us with armoured units with high firepower and good off-road mobility. But I will argue that a diversified vehicle park gives the Army more tools in the toolbox, thereby creating more freedom of action.
By combining the mobility and the ability to take key terrain early of the AMV battalions with the Leopard 2/CV 90 battalions’ superior off-road mobility and firepower we can create an asymmetric threat which will be very tough to face for the attacker.
Few post-war armoured vehicles can rival the fame of the BMP-1/2 family. While the tanks of the Soviet armoured groups changed rather dramatically during the cold war, the classic lines of the BMP was a mainstay of the operational manoeuvre groups poised to fight their way through the Fulda Gap from their introduction in the mid-sixties up until the fall of the Soviet Union, and onwards to this very day.
It isn’t hard to realise how this came to be. The vehicle was the first true modern infantry fighting vehicle, being able not only to transport the infantry to the battlefield, but to stay in the fight and provide supporting fire to the infantry squads once they had dismounted. As was typical for Soviet armoured vehicles, it featured a very low profile and proved to be both rugged and reliable. It was also one of the first combat vehicles to offer full NBC-protection, meaning that it could (in theory at least) fight its way through chemical weapons and radioactive fallout likely to be encountered on the battlefield of WWIII. The introduction of the modernised BMP-2 solved one of the main issues with the BMP-1, namely its outdated 2A28 73 mm low-pressure gun. This weapon sported comparable performance to the SPG-9 recoilless-rifle (video from Ukraine showing its use), but the continued increase in protection of NATO AFV’s and longer range of their weapon systems meant that it became increasingly doubtful if the BMP-1 would 1) be able to close within firing range and 2) whether the HEAT-round would cause any significant damage.
The solution was to fit a larger turret with a more modern weapons suite, the main weapon now being the 30 mm 2A42 autocannon, with heavy anti-tank firepower being provided by the 9M111 Fagot (PstOhj 82) and 9M113 Konkurs (PstOhj 82M) SACLOS-guided anti-tank missiles. The missile system could also be dismounted for use by the infantry squad carried. A number of other changes, most relatively minor, were also made, and so the ultimate Soviet IFV was born.
Finland bought both BMP-1 and BMP-2 in significant numbers, these being the most advanced and modern vehicles available to transport and support our panssarijääkärit in battle. The original TOE had the infantry units riding in the BMP-1, which due to its smaller tower fit a full squad of eight in the rear compartment, while the recon infantry and anti-tank units rode in the BMP-2, which only allowed for six passengers. But even the most successful of designs will not last forever. By now, the BMP-1 (with exception of specialised vehicles based on it) has been retired, and the BMP-2 has seen some modest modifications. These include the removal of the anti-tank missile system (due to the shelf-life of the missiles expiring), and the fitting of lighter side skirts made of sheet metal instead of the original flotation devices. The BMP has also been complemented by the significantly more modern Swedish CV9030 in service, and more than one observer probably expected the BMP-2 to slowly follow its bigger brother the T-72 into the melting pot, with more CV9030’s to replace it. This, however, was not to be.
Back in 2013, the Finnish authorities ordered technology demonstrators from two Finnish companies. The goal of this project was to see if the BMP-2 could be modified to meet the demands of the modern battlefield. Two key areas were the ability to operate at night without the use of the active infra-red searchlight, and reducing the heat signature of the vehicle. The original layout of the BMP means that the hot exhaust gases are blown straight upwards, a solution not uncommon in the days before thermal sights became commonplace. This, however, leads to a very high heat signature.
After comparative trials, the configuration suggested by Conlog Oy was chosen as the basis for the new BMP-2M/MD. A brief note on the designations: the current project feature two different communication suites, with the resulting vehicle being designated either -2M or -2MD depending on which of these are fitted. As this difference is purely internal, all updated IFV’s are usually referred to as simply BMP-2M, a designation also used for a number of other BMP-2 modernisation packages around the world. The modernised vehicle was first displayed to a wider audience at a special demonstration showing off a number of the Army’s newest fighting vehicles in August 2015, at the same time that the first Finnish Leopard 2A6 was unveiled. Externally the main difference is the Berberys-R multi-spectral camouflage from the Polish company Miranda. In layman’s terms, this is a highly advanced camo net, reducing not only the visual footprint, but the heat, IR, and radar signature as well. The net comes in pre-cut pieces, and allows for full movement of the turret and all other movable parts.
The BMP-2M feature a number of other changes as well. To further reduce the heat signature, the exhausts have been routed through a side-mounted exhaust port, and angled downwards for better shielding. Crucially, the night-vision suite is completely revamped, and both the gunner and driver have access to new displays which allow the vehicle to safely drive and fight during the dark hours. Other new equipment include a new anti-air sight, which allows for a higher efficiency when engaging helicopters and other low- and slow-flying targets. A number of external storage boxes have also been mounted on both the turret and on the rear part of the hull. The later cover the firing ports for the infantry squad carried in the passenger compartment. The value of IFV’s having firing ports for the rifles have however always been questioned, as the added firepower is marginal and the firing ports becomes potential weakspots in the armour. A single port remains, which is to be used by the squad’s light machine gun. The value of the added storage space for the soldiers can hardly be overestimated. The low profile of the BMP-2 means that it has always been a cramped vehicle, and the amount of personal equipment carried by the infantry soldiers has risen steadily during the last decades. Now part of this, including e.g. the bulky anti-tank mines, can be carried in the external baskets.
Amongst the other changes the cushioning of the seats have been improved, new command and communications systems have been fitted (an important update which the defence force naturally doesn’t give out much details about), a new wire cutter is installed, and there is now heating in the passenger compartment.
Added together, do these modifications bring the trusty old ‘Bemari‘ up to the same standard as the CV9030? Certainly not! But the real selling point, as usual, is cost. For somewhat over 35 million euros, the army will get about one hundred modified BMP-2’s. The same sum would barely give ten brand new CV9030’s. The BMP-2M won’t be the best IFV around, but it will be adequate, and is now going to serve into the 2030’s, over fifty years after the original BMP-2 rolled off the production line. Not bad for a family of vehicles first envisioned in the late 1950’s!
By an interesting coincidence, both the Finnish Defence Forces’ official podcast Radio Kipinä as well as Sweidsh author/historian Lars Gyllenhaal’s Militärt med Gyllenhaal-podcast dealt with today’s snipers in their respective defence forces. As such, this felt like a good opportunity to compare and contrast the training, equipment, and employment of these.
A short note on the podcasts. The links above go to their respective iTunes-pages, but they are also found e.g. on YouTube. The language is Finnish for Radio Kipinä and Swedish for Militärt med Gyllenhaal. For their sniper episodes, both interviewed an officer who has a long background as a sniping instructor, Major Tapio Saarelainen of the Finnish Army Academy and Captain Håkan Jorsell of the Swedish Army Ranger Battalion (AJB).
Let’s first get Simo Häyhä out of the way before continuing on towards the modern day. Arguably a prime contender for the title of best known Finnish soldier, Häyhä fought as a sniper at the Kollaa front during the Winter War, and is widely credited with being the most lethal sniper throughout history. Needless to say, there is quite a lot of legends surrounding Häyhä’s short but spectacular career. Saarelainen addresses quite a number of these during the podcast, and has also written a brand new biography on Häyhä. Having met Häyhä “roughly two dozen times”, Saarelainen notes that Häyhä usually aimed for the target centre and scored most of his kills at around 150 meter range, downplaying the importance of his longer shots (his longest record hit was at 450 meter), and that he never fired from up in trees. The experiences gathered by Häyhä still influences Finnish army snipers today, and much of the basic trade remains the same. However, some specific parts of Häyhä’s tactics have become obsolete, such as using iron sights to keep a lower profile. Saarelainen notes that optics gives a decisive advantage in speed, while Jorsell agrees that while learning to employ iron sights is an importance step and a good foundation for becoming a proficient marksman, out in the field optics still take the price.
The road to becoming a sniper is vastly different in the Swedish and Finnish defence forces, due to the basic difference of Sweden fielding a professional all-volunteer force compared to Finland’s model based on general conscription followed by reservist duty. It should also be noted that the Finnish force does not differentiate between snipers and designated marksmen, instead only using the term tarkka-ampuja (literally ‘sharpshooter’) for both, Edit: In fact the new Finnish rifle squads do feature designated marksmen, called tukiampuja (‘supporting shooter’), following the latest reform. These were not covered in the podcast. Sweden differentiates between skarpskytt (designated marksman) and prickskytt (sniper). The Swedish designated marksmen are found in infantry squads, where they provide accurate supporting fire at ranges out to 300 meters. The Swedish snipers are on the other hand part of the Swedish elite units, such as the marines, army rangers, the air force’s base security units, and the special forces. Here, the snipers are trained to operate in independent pairs at ranges up to and including 1,000 meters, during all weather conditions and all times of the year. Both the spotter and the shooter in the sniper team are trained snipers, with Jorsell noting that roles may change depending on who has the better capacity that day. For Finnish snipers, while they also always operate with a pair, he may or may not be a trained sniper.
To get into sniper training, the soldier must first accepted into the basic units, after which he (or she) can volunteer to receive sniper training. This means that to e.g. become one of Jorsell’s army snipers, one must first pass the basic (but demanding) tests to be accepted into the Army Ranger Battalion, followed by a 11 month long basic military training held in Arvidsjaur, in the northernmost parts of Sweden. After this, one can volunteer for sniper training, which requires slightly higher physical and psychological marks than a normal ranger (or jaeger, as the Swedish army calls them). On this follows an eight to ten week long sniper course, followed by a grand exam being held out in the field and lasting a few days. The test covers all aspects of sniper training, and if the sniper passes he is allowed to wear the sniper badge as proof that he is a qualified sniper.
Amongst the Finnish soldiers, all units training the infantry units train conscripts to snipers, and as such one has to first get into a infantry unit to be accepted into sniper training. The prospective sniper starts out with the normal eight week basic course, which trains basic soldier skills (including use of standard issue assault rifles). Following this, the snipers are trained in their particular field for nine weeks, with the final seven weeks focusing on the soldiers role as part of the greater unit. The other alternative is to be active in the reserve and get transferred into a wartime position as a sniper based on training received post-conscript duty.
Needless to say, the Finnish sniper being sent into the reserve is not up to par with a professional soldier such as the Swedish ones, something that Saarelainen readily admits. While the Swedish sniper fires approximately 1,000 rounds during a service year, a Finnish conscript fires approximately 300 7.62 mm rounds, and even less if employing a larger calibre. This is purely due to a lack of funds, and Saarelainen states that the bare minimum a sniper would need is 500 rounds.
This difference is also seen in the emphasise placed on prior knowledge. While Saarelainen wants snipers who are both hunters and have some basic competition results to show (air rifle, rimfire, …), Jorsell has trained skater boys from downtown Stockholm, although he also confirms that a solid hunting background naturally helps. Both officers agree that no-one is born a crack shot, but it takes hard and determined work to become one, and it is a skill that requires consistent training if it is to be maintained. For the Finnish snipers, this creates an additional challenge. In practice, for the reservist to maintain his proficiency, he has to acquire his own rifle and put his own time and effort into making sure he trains adequately. The big issue here is firing ranges, as firing ranges over 100 meters long are few and far between, especially those where a civilian can stop by to fire off a few rounds. MPK arranges a few courses each year, which gives access to the defence force’s own ranges. Also, Tarkka-ampujakilta, the snipers’ guild, provides a framework for those reservists that wish to maintain their know-how. Still, it is by no means a cheap hobby, and while both officers note that no amount of equipment and technology can replace the basic skill of marksmanship, long-range shooting certainly is a practice that rewards the use of high-end equipment. The current Finnish gun laws places very little restrictions on the ownership of medium-bore bolt-action rifles and their accessories, so as long as you aren’t looking for your personal Barrett M82 you should be good to go. And, yes, you are allowed to bring your own sniper rifle to war, as long as you make sure you bring the ammunition as well (or use army standard rounds).
When it comes to equipment, the standard Finnish sniper rifles are the 7.62 TKIV 85 and the 7.62 TKIV Dragunov, both chambered in the 7.62x54r, a rimmed cartridge dating back to Czarist-Russia and the Mosin-Nagant M91 (as in 1891). The M91 was adopted in different locally modified versions as the Finnish army’s standard rifle up until the introduction of the AKM in the early 60’s. The TKIV 85 is the last of this line, and is based on refurbished receivers. The exact age of the receivers employed is unknown, but the rifles very likely have a shot at the title of oldest operational small arm still in active service. The rest of the rifle is completely reworked, including using the somewhat tighter tolerances of the 7.62x53r standard (a Finnish version of the 7.62x54r developed during the interwar years). The Dragunov is the ubiquitous Soviet semi-automatic designated marksman rifle, and doesn’t require any further introduction. The most modern design in use is the 8.6 TKIV 2000, a Sako TRG-42 chambered in .338LM, with a Zeiss Diavari V 3-12 x 56 T mounted on top. For anti-material work, the Barrett M82 in .50 BMG is found. This highly-specialised rifle is known as the 12.7 RSTKIV 2000. The effective range increases with the calibre, with snipers equipped with 7.62 mm weapons being seen as having an effective max range of 5-600 meters, .338LM being able to achieve max ranges of up to 1,000 meters, and the .50 being effective beyond 1,500 meters if the conditions allow. However, due to the Finnish geography (read: forests), in practice shots above 350 meters are rare.
For the Swedish forces, there is basically two rifles in use. The larger is the Barrett, which the Swedish forces call the Ag 90. While the Barrett is today widely found in western forces around the world, it was in fact the Swedish Army which was the launch customer, narrowly beating the US Marine Corps with their order. The current Swedish version is the Ag 90C, which features a number of modifications to improve the overall quality of the weapon. Besides its use in the anti-material role using armour-piercing bullets at ranges up to and including 1,000 meters, the rifle is also used by the engineering corps for clearing explosives. The other rifle is the Psg 90, a locally modified version of Accuracy International’s Arctic Warfare, chambered in 7.62×51 mm NATO. The weapon is also commonly known by its British designations L96 or L118A1. The ballistics of the round very closely match those of the slightly longer round used by the Finnish weapons, something which further shows the demands placed on the Swedish snipers who are trained to use their Psg’s out to the 1,000 meter distance. For self-defence, the snipers are also equipped with Ak 5 (FN FNC) assault rifles. All snipers are trained on all weapons, but naturally the exact load-out is mission specific.
When it comes to additional equipment, the Swedish snipers are better off than their Finnish compatriots. Most Finnish snipers lack such basic equipment as range-finders and wind gauges, tools which are standard issue for Swedish snipers. Still, both countries place emphasis on the snipers being able to function with the bare necessities, going back to mildot charts, maps, home-made ghillie suits, and open sights if the need arise. When it comes to their employment in combat, the Finnish snipers are subordinated to the company commander. The company commander then sets the mission (destroy, disrupt, gather intelligence, …), with the sniper deciding how the mission is to be performed. This usually places geographic restrictions on the sniper (i.e. he can’t wander off into the neighbouring company’s zone of responsibility), but otherwise he has a high degree of freedom. Some Finnish recce and SF units also have snipers at the squad level. For the Swedish snipers, my understanding is that as the jaeger units themselves often operate in front of their own lines, their snipers more often operate as part of and subordinated to their squad compared to the Finnish ones.