Following the announcement by A.P. Møller-Mærsk that their fleet – 700+ vessels representing 15 % of the world’s container vessels – will avoid the Suez Canal-route passing the Bab el-Mandeb-strait, it seems we are a set for something of a nightmare scenario which has worried people in the logistics and the marine spheres for a few months. Up to a sixth of world trade passes through the strait, and we seem to be on the verge of this key trade route being shut down.

Needless to say, this will require a response. The immediate response highlights an increased need for protection of the shipping in the area – from airborne threats (including from UAS, anti-ship missiles, and apparently ballistic missiles!) as well as from hijacking attempts such as the one which befell the M/V Galaxy Leader car carrier. With the countries currently involved being the usual suspects when it comes to defending free usage of waterways – the US Navy, Royal Navy, and the Marine National – it seems likely that the international response will be led and organised by our key allies. This will have an effect for us, even if the eventual response isn’t formally a NATO-led operation or relying on NATO’s command structure. We might also note that while there is a very real VLS-gap between the US Navy and the Europeans – ask Jeremy if you don’t understand how big a factor that is – this is in fact a case of (two) European countries participating in a way that is felt.

Unfortunately, the limitations of the Finnish Navy’s current out-of-area capability is evident. We can in theory send one of our mineships, either Hämeenmaa or sister Uusimaa, but the lack of range of the ships’ Umkhonto air-defence missiles and low number of VLS tubes makes them poorly suited for the air defence mission. So while a Finnish mineship is perfectly capable of hunting pirates, this is another mission set. A VBSS-team could be an option, we’ve earlier e.g. cooperated with the German Navy on staging our boarding team aboard their vessels. Unfortunately, we don’t really have a shipboard helicopter to go with them either. Of course, if there’s a frigate/destroyer heading that way that is a helicopter short, we could offer a non-navalised NH90 TTH for general transport and liaison missions. However, the corrosive effect of operating helicopters aboard is not to be underestimated, so make sure to wash it with plenty of fresh-water and be ready to spend a lot of time on maintenance! A maritime patrol aircraft based in Djibouti might certainly be appreciated, but our Do-228 are so worn down it might be asking too much from the old warhorse (again, we really are missing those new MVX-aircraft we so eagerly are waiting for).

So there isn’t too much we can do in the current protection of the shipping operation. The obvious military answer is to pick up more responsibility in the Baltic Sea to free up primarily British and German resources to head south. However, politically that is not preferable. Keeping our major allies active here works to ensure that the Kremlin isn’t (wrongly) counting on the potential of decoupling, while at the same time increasing cooperation with our new allies and promoting their understanding of the Baltic Sea as a battlefield.

…and, yes, the Pohjanmaa-class would be excellent for this scenario.

So – and seriously, I beg TP-UTVA to think through these things now, before we are faced with a hard decision – let’s turn to the question of whether there is a Finnish contribution to what is looking as an increasingly probable campaign to degrade Houthi capabilities.

The answer here is “Yes”, both our Hornets and special forces (including the helicopters mentioned earlier) provide capabilities that could be used. Any campaign is likely to include air- and sea-launched strikes as well as special forces doing reconnaissance and target acquisition on the ground – the extent of the latter being a huge question mark for the time being, but it seems likely that some boots on the ground can’t be avoided. The Hornets are also able to hunt certain UAS and the conventional anti-ship missile. However, are we ready for a limited campaign alongside our allies, where our soldiers and pilots would fire their weapons in anger alongside our allies to protect civilian shipping?

A Finnish AIr Force F/A-18D Hornet sporting two AGM-158A JASSM heavy cruise missiles. The weapon has received almost mythical status in Finnish media, and while some of its reputation is exaggerated, there’s no denying it is a key capability. Source: Finnish Air Force FB

Or to put it differently – can we afford to not show a willingness to contribute, following all grand talk about being a reliable ally without restrictions on our participation? In particular as we are not involved in any of the ‘sharp’ NATO-missions currently underway, including air policing in Iceland, the Baltic States, or over the Black Sea, any of the Enhanced Forward Presence-missions, or the enhanced ground-based air defences set up at potential flashpoints. Notable is also that from a national point of view, the Suez Canal-route is a crucial national interest, and the current events have already meant that Finnish companies will see delays that will be visible on the accounting sheets by the end of the month. Probably nothing that can’t be solved, but it certainly is something that will put pressure in an already harsh economy.

And speaking of this, this is one of those days I know perfectly well what whoever currently sits behind my old desk at Kongsberg will be doing come Monday. Best of luck to you!