Skipper is a well-recognized voice in Swedish discussions on defence and national security. Following the questionable reporting on details surrounding the subhunt of 2014, reporting that now has been quoted in Finnish media as well, he wrote a blog post on his personal blog which I have received permission to translate into English. Any errors in the translation are fully my own.
I practically never write blog posts any longer, but sometimes I feel the demand to do so. The following is due to SvD’s damaging reporting on the submarine question published yesterday.
I will not in any way comment upon the substance of the article. The only thing I will discuss in this post is the unquestioning attitude of the media. Conclusions presented in headlines and introductions to articles are flat out damaging for Sweden and cannot be seen as anything but pure disinformation. Where then lies the problem?
The headline and introduction used by SvD is phrased in a way that a reader not familiar with the issue cannot be expected to understand in any way other than that there never was any foreign submarine activity at all in Swedish waters in October 2014. This conclusion is utterly incorrect. Even worse is the fact that all other media repeat this statement without further questions.
This narrative constitutes direct disinformation, and was quickly established through national Swedish media during yesterday evening, and soon all established national news-channels sported a rewrite of the article, none of which showed any signs of questioning the narrative. All featured the same or similar misleading and erroneous headlines. [Today Finnish media has also repeated the claims.]
Even public service in the form of Sveriges Radio and Sveriges Television did such rewrites in blind trust, and as such played their part in spreading disinformation. SR and SVT that are trusted to continue working in times of war and serious crises, and as such form “protection” against influence and information operations directed against Sweden.
Following a social media storm against this both SvD and SVT, as well as other media, have rewritten their headlines and introductions. The problem is that the damage is already done. The narrative is set, and the man on the street now lives with a picture that all that was written by SvD and the others were correct, and that there was no foreign submarine activity in October 2014.
This morning several editorial boards have responded and corrected their headlines and introductions (see below).
If media had bothered to check the facts before publication none of this would have had to happen. The facts on the ground have not changed since September 2015, something that SvD knows while still deciding to make a grand fuss about this.
To get the facts one can read the Swedish Defence Forces article from 23 September 2015 with the headline “Beyond all reasonable doubt“. Some extracts from the text (my bold):
The Defence Forces’ final analysis shows that, as was stated last autumn, it is beyond all reasonable doubt that the Swedish internal territorial waters were violated in the Stockholm archipelago in October 2014.
The basis for this conclusion is now a significantly larger material than what was available in the immediate aftermath of the intelligence operation [i.e. the subhunt].
Of the roughly 300 reports that came in approximately 150 has been analysed in further detail of which 21 were judged to be particularly interesting.
Following the analysis several of these have now received a higher classification compared to the earlier analysis. The combined evaluation based on the amount of observations in the area provide a very high level of confidence.
The observation that last autumn was judged to be of the highest level of confidence has been reevaluated. Here additional information have come to light that give this particular observation another explanation, and as such it is not included in the basis for the combined evaluation. Despite this the conclusion remain that through the analysis work it is concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the Swedish internal waters have been violated.
The conclusion that media should have identified is that the “news” SvD built its article on wasn’t part of the final analysis work and combined evaluation. This was obvious already four years ago, but still media tries to spin this to mean that this news should be taken as proof that there was no underwater activity.
As such, this is pure disinformation, and it is regrettable that next to all media without question jumped the bandwagon on this sensation piece. It would – as many have pointed out – be interesting if SR medierna [an investigative public service radio show] would look into this reporting and investigate it from the point of view of source criticism.
That SVT did a rewrite of the article without looking into the sources with a critical mind is particularly interesting as SVT themselves recently launched a campaign for increased media literacy and critical evaluation of sources.
Starting today, SVT launches a new campaign about the role of public service in the modern media landscape. The first film discusses the need for fact-based journalism.
The film “Hen out of a feather” [Swedish expression meaning to make a mountain out of a molehill] focuses on the great importance of fact-based journalism in a world where rumors easily become truths, and information risks being corrupted. Where the border between opinion and fact becomes ever more fluid, and the current fast digital media landscape contribute to making a hen out of a feather.
The campaign has also been heavily criticized, including by the comedy show Svenska Nyheter.
A significantly more nuanced text has been written by Mikael Holmström (DN).
A well-written editorial is found in Expressen by Linda Jernek with the headline “Don’t spread the spin that the submarine was just a bouy”
The Finnish naval news keeps dropping at a high rate following the contract signing ceremonies two weeks ago. A few further details have emerged on the Pohjanmaa-class, while the FNS Tornio is currently undergoing acceptance tests as the first of the four Hamina-class sisters to pass through their mid-life update.
Saab released a video highlighting the different systems they supply to the Pohjanmaa-class. An interesting detail is the inclusion of a grey-painted NH 90 on the helicopter deck. It nicely illustrates the size of the Finnish Army’s main helicopter relative to the ship, showing that while it can touch down on the deck, it is too large for the hangar and won’t be based aboard. The fact that the helicopter is grey is curious. All Finnish NH 90s are painted in a three-colour green-black camouflage, so either the color is an oversight (likely) or it may portray one of the Swedish Air Force’s maritime Hkp 14F on a visit. This will likely be a somewhat regular occurrence beginning in the last years of the next decade, considering the tight cooperation between the two navies. The Hkp 14F are also the sole non-Russian ASW-capable helicopters of the northern Baltic Sea region, meaning that once they have achieved FOC they will certainly be welcome visitors.
Speaking of sub-hunting, it had escaped my attention (or memory) that a rather detailed description of the propulsion arrangement had been found in Maanpuolustuksen osto-opas 2/2018. The system will be twin-shafts with controllable-pitch propellers (CPP), powered by combined diesel-electric and gas turbine (CODLAG). Four diesel engines will be working as generators, producing electricity to two electric motors which power the vessel during normal operations. When requiring max speed the gas turbine is fired up, and it will be connected through gearboxes to the two shafts. The total power will be around 30 MW (40,200 hp). An interesting comparison is the German F125-class frigates which sport a very similar CODLAG arrangement rated at 31.6 MW, and consisting of a single LM2500 gas turbine from General Electric (20 MW), four 20V 4000 M53B diesel gensets from MTU Friedrichshafen (totalling 12 MW), two electrical motors (totalling 9 MW), and Renk gearboxes. For those wondering where the rest of the power from the gensets go, there’s quite a bit of electronics aboard a modern warship, as well as a 1 MW bow thruster in the bow of the F125. While no manufacturers have been announced for the Pohjanmaa-class, the F125-suppliers can be considered low-odds candidates. The Rolls-Royce MT30 has scored a few impressive references recently, including replacing the LM2500 on the ROK FFX Batch II, but it might be a tad too big for the Pohjanmaa. For sub-hunting, two of the gensets on the Pohjanmaa will receive additional signature reducing features (acoustic and vibration). This allows slow-speed operations in extreme silence, in essence providing the corvettes with a trolling mode to use a boating analogy (even if the gamefish is on the bigger side in this case). The Pohjanmaa-class is also equipped with twin bow thrusters, a crucial feature to ensure that the vessels can get around unassisted in the narrow waterways of the archipelago, including when mooring at the spartan infrastructure used for dispersed operations.
Commodore Harju, CinC of the Finnish Navy, also published a blog post on the Finnish Defence Forces’ blog discussing the vessels. While giving few details, the blog hints at an endurance of at least two full weeks at sea, quite possibly longer. Considering that the operational environment will rarely sees the vessels being further than half a day of sailing away from the nearest friendly port, this is a significant number and a game-changer compared to the Hamina-class.
Perhaps the most significant message of the post was that the commodore acknowledges the strain currently being placed on the servicemen and -women of the fleet. The service has seen the workload increase with the increased level of readiness that has become a staple of the Finnish Defence Forces post-Crimea. This has hit the small number of vessel crews particularly hard, especially when coupled with the fact that few of the vessels are available during wintertime as well as the prolonged absence of the Rauma-class during their MLU and while dealing with the issues caused by hull cracks following it. This has placed even higher demands on the crews serving aboard the mineships and the Hamina-class FAC. With the change over from the Hämenmaa- and Rauma-classes to the Pohjanmaa-class, crews will have to be trained for the new vessels in parallel with keeping up the operational tempo with ever older vessels. It is most welcome that the Navy leadership already at this early stage of the Pohjanmaa-project acknowledges this, and are making plans to handle this additional requirement.
The Hamina-class MLU this has also seen improvements in this regard. The cabins and berthings of both the sailors and the command have been revamped and moved, allowing for more space. In addition the crews will increase by a few persons, though mostly caused by new functions being added. However, the introduction of newer systems will allow for longer rest periods for the crew members. The ergonomics of the bridge has also been improved. Hopefully these changes will together play their part in lowering the workload aboard the vessels. However, for the Navy as a whole there is unlikely to be any quick fixes, but rather a long and dedicated process is needed to bring the workload down throughout the force. The signs now point to the work having begun, hopefully it will prove successful.
As has been mentioned earlier, the Hamina-class post-MLU will be small but highly competent ships, employing many of the same sub-systems as their larger corvette sisters. The replacement of the large 57 mm deck guns with the smaller 40 mm Bofors in their truncated hexagonal trapezohedron-shaped turrets has freed up weight to allow for the Kongsberg towed arrays to be installed, something that together with the torpedoes (TP 45 for the time being, to be replaced with the NLWT/TP 47 in a few years) gives the vessels serious sub-hunting capabilities. The physical installation of the PTO 2020 (Gabriel) on the other hand proved a bit challenging, with the ceiling having to be raised and new doors being installed. This further underscores exactly how significant an improvement the new missiles has to be, as the RBS 15 Gungnir they beat would have been a drop-in solution when it comes to the physical dimensions. The vessels will get the same combat management system, the 9LV, as the Pohjanmaa-class, allowing for synergies in training and joint operations. The ITO 04 (Umkhonto) in their individual VLS-tubes remain the primary air defence weapon, but the Saab Trackfire has made it onto the rear part of the superstructure. Likely to be fitted with the NSV heavy machine-gun as standard, the remote weapon station allows for better close-range defence against small targets such as small craft, drones, or low and slow aircraft and helicopters compared to the earlier pintle-mounted versions of the same weapon.
Speaking of the Navy’s favorite RWS, the inclusion of two Trackfires on the Pohjanmaa instead of any dedicated hard-kill CIWS raised some eyebrows. The exact capabilities of the Trackfire naturally depend on the sensors and weapon carried, but I decided to place the hypothetical question to Saab: if the RWS carried a suitable weapon and was hooked up to a suitable sensor, would it be able to bring down incoming anti-ship missiles?
In an impressively long answer, the Swedish defence company explained that the system is “designed for very high stabilisation and fire control requirements”. This provide the system with “extremely good performance” when tracking and engaging airborne targets. However, it also notes that the system is set to receive new counter-missiles capabilities in the future, upgrades that will “commensurately increase” the system’s capacity for engaging incoming missiles. In short, Trackfire isn’t yet a mature CIWS-platform against incoming missiles, but the technical possibility is there. Another question is if the Finnish Navy is interested in getting yet another calibre in its arsenal, as the CIWS role would require at least a 20 mm gun, but preferably a 25 or 30 mm one. Something like the 30 mm M230LF could likely be fitted to the Trackfire, but it is questionable if the Finnish Navy would find such an integration project worthwhile. The more likely path is to continue with the NSV, and once the money is available fit a dedicated autocannon (likely as part of a future MLU, which would also include the fitting of a second Mk 41 VLS-module to increase the number of cells to 16).
For the time being, the defence against incoming missiles rests largely on soft-kill systems based on electronic countermeasures and decoy launchers. This isn’t necessarily a purely budgetary decision, as the value of small calibre cannons against incoming missiles at high speeds have been questioned. In essence, if three tons of metal and explosives are hurling towards you at Mach 2, even if you hit it and break something you still have a good chance of getting hit by a lump of scrap metal weighing three tons and bringing a healthy dose of energy (around 706 MJ in our example) into your superstructure. Since that energy transfer is undesirable, having the missile go somewhere else in the first place is preferable.
And what about it being a frigate? To quote commodore Harju’s post:
Some of those who have recently analysed the class have stated that the Pohjanmaa-class corvette is the same size as a frigate and has almost destroyer-like weaponry. A frigate is generally understood as a vessel capable of operating in oceanic conditions […] For us in the Navy, more important than the orthodox definition of the ship class is the military capabilities of the vessels […] And finally, the Pohjanmaa-class is part of our defense system, meaning that evaluating the performance of an individual vessel does not give the whole picture of the vessel, nor the significance and impact of the acquired package.
Journalist Jarmo Huhtanen of Finnish daily Helsingin Sanomat stirred up a little controversy yesterday, by publishing an article where he lays out the case that the Pohjanmaa-class corvettes in the form they were ordered in are not corvettes at all, but frigates.
Now, at the outset it has to be noted that Huhtanen is probably the single most experienced and knowledgeable defence journalist employed by any Finnish non-specialised media, and he has been covering the Pohjanmaa-class from its humble beginning as the MTA 2020. As such he is well-placed to raise the question, and he certainly has some points.
It is certainly true that the vessels have grown throughout the project. The original size was given as about 90 meters back in 2015. This now currently stands at 114 meters, a sizeable increase. It is also true that the size makes it questionable whether the vessels really are “the most capable corvettes in the world”, as commodore Harju stated, or more accurately “decently sized frigates”. Huhtanen also notes that internationally the classification of surface warships is imprecise and partly overlapping when it comes to tonnage.
Let’s address the first part first. While it is impossible for an outsider to know exactly what has been going on behind the scenes, as the Navy has been notoriously tight-lipped about the details of the project. In general terms, having seen and been part of a few vessel design projects I can note that it isn’t rare for a vessel to grow between design iterations. The reasons are many, but in general it is better to start small, as smaller generally means cheaper, and then to add space once it is clear it really is needed. Considering the lifespan of the Pohjanmaa-class, room for growth is also a serious considerations, and something which often in hindsight hasn’t been emphasised enough on military vessels (see Hamina-class going from 57 mm to 40 mm deck guns to save weight during MLU). Bad planning on the part of the Navy? Not necessarily, it might just be the correct decision once the detailed design has matured.
At the same time the fixed budget has grown by 8 %. As I noted in my last post, the total still seems very low, although direct comparisons with other similarly sized ships are difficult to make. MoD Kaikkonen attributed the increase to an increase in the budget for the building of the ship, something that naturally correlates with an increase in vessel size. This obviously again raises questions about the quality of the information available upon project launch and what happened between 2015 and today, but in the grand scheme of things (remember that the oft-quoted 1.2 Bn Eur isn’t the full project cost, but rather only the additional funds allocated outside of the normal FDF budget) I find it difficult to be overtly excited if the budget overruns stay at this.
Huhtanen’s article include a few rhetorical leaps I don’t quite follow or agree with. One thing is the comparison to the Swedish Visby-class, and noting that they are 40 meter shorter than the Finnish vessels and significantly lighter (Visby being rated at 640 tons). The comparison is about as useful as comparing the specifications of our new K9 self-propelled howitzers to those of the Swedish Strv 122 tanks. Yes, both vessels are grey, sail the seas, and are called corvettes, but the design concepts (and the doctrines behind these design concepts) are different enough that a direct comparison is of little use. I have earlier written about the topic over at the blog of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, but in short compared to Pohjanmaa the Visby trades ice-going capabilities, air-defence missiles, mining capability, a helicopter hangar, and economics for stealth and speed. Neither approach is wrong, but they are very different and stems from the different concepts of operations the Swedish and Finnish Navies employ. However, it can be noted that the Swedish plan is that the next series of surface vessels will grow, even if they will still remain significantly lighter than the Pohjanmaa-class.
Mentioning that the Pohjanmaa-class are of the same displacement as the Freedom-class LCS is to be considered a red herring, and Huhtanen himself notes that this is likely a coincidence. An old article from 2016 by Olli Ainola is also linked, and while Ainola was no mean writer when it came to defence topics, that particular article was frankly little more than a hit piece, which I discussed in detail shortly after its publication.
I still hold it likely that if the Pohjanmaa-class eventually join the Navy in the shape currently envisioned and under the adjusted budget, the Finnish Navy will not only operate the strongest single warships currently based in the Baltic Sea, but they will do so at a bargain. I do fear that there is a risk that the budget is still too tight, and that some key systems will be ‘fitted for but not with’. However, the Navy has so far shown to be able to focus on the important, and make the cuts where they will least impact the effectiveness of the vessels. The Finnish concept of operations is also clearly visible in these compromises, such as the small calibre of the main gun (the vessels aren’t expected to provide naval gunfire support) and the decision to go with a medium-range air defence system as opposed to trying to fit a long-range bluewater system. Importing the combat systems and having an internationally established defence supplier provide integration will also significantly reduce the risks associated with the project, as the combat systems package is almost certain to be the weakest part of RMC’s know-how. In the end, the Pohjanmaa-class is clearly intended as a fighting weapon, and not as a fleet in being as Huhtanen suggests. They will play an important part in deterring hostile aggression throughout the spectrum from peace to war, and in doing so provide a flexibility found in few other systems. Their main issue is the low number, which causes redundancy issues and makes them vulnerable to losses.
But are they really corvettes?
During the age of sail warships were simply rated by how many guns they had. Granted some where faster than others, and some had longer endurance, but in the end you could simply count the number of guns and tell if something was a frigate. Both the corvette and frigate designations date to these times, with the dividing line between the corvette and the frigate usually being drawn somewhere between 20 and 30 guns.
Then came the steamships and a requirement for more specialised roles. The advent of submarines and aircraft created the modern three-dimensional naval battlefield. The first modern corvettes were the British Flower-class, which were light ships intended to escort convoys and fight German U-boats on the Atlantic, and not much else. The frigate designation also saw a renaissance during WWII, as the Royal Navy started calling their slightly larger subhunting convoy escorts for frigates. Confusingly enough, the same kind of vessels were designated destroyer escorts by the US Navy, and the Royal Navy also operated sloops which were roughly of the same size and capability.
After the war things got still more confusing. Generally vessel sizes grew, and suddenly there were cruiser-sized ships hunting submarines. But since cruisers don’t hunt submarines, these were clearly just very large destroyers (except in the Soviet Union, where they were “large anti-submarine warfare ship”). At the same time more and more navies started to move away from single-purpose ships to multipurpose ones. Developments such as increased range for aircraft and the lower number of available hulls meant that ships expected to operate in narrow seas such as the Baltic Sea no longer could count on being able to choose which kinds of enemies they could encounter (for armoured people, this is pretty much the same kind of development pattern that eventually brought us the main battle tank to replace different armoured fighting vehicles tailored for different roles).
Long story short, today multipurpose vessels start with corvettes being the smallest, then moving up in size through frigates and on to destroyers. Where exactly the lines are drawn is an open question, and also varies with country. In US nomenclature, FFL (the abbreviation coming from “frigate, light”, in itself an interesting statement) designates a corvette, which is between 1,000 and 1,500 tons full load displacement. In Europe, any warship larger than a patrol craft but smaller than a frigate can be called a corvette, if the navy in question is so inclined. Frigates are between 1,500 to over 6,000 tons full load displacement according to USNI, who also note that due to “internal political reasons”, some navies mislabel their frigates as destroyers, or vice versa. This is often based on budgetary considerations and/or naval traditions. Here it could be noted that if one has received budgetary funds for a corvette, and is from a country that traditionally only operate lighter surface combatants, any vessel straddling the corvette/frigate-line would likely be designated a corvette for political reasons. Conversely, the British Type 31e, the low-end frigate in their high-low frigate mix, at times during the tendering process looked closer to a high-sea corvette than a frigate. But since it was designed to compensate for a shortfall in the number of frigates, and since the visuals of having cut the funding of the Royal Navy to the extent that they were buying corvettes instead of frigates didn’t fit British politics, they have never officially been described as anything but “affordable” frigates.
In the end, Navies can usually get away with calling their vessels more or less what they want, and generally these designations have been accepted by the outside world. The British Type 45 are destroyers, but their cousins in the Horizon-class in French and Italian service are frigates.
However, simply discussing displacement doesn’t give the whole picture, as much is related to the capabilities of a vessel. Yet another factor is that some countries have doctrines differing from established western thinking to the extent that the vessels these result in aren’t possible to fit in any of the given designations. You can get entertainment for a whole evening if you can get two naval historians with opposite views arguing over whether the German WWII-era Scharnhorst-class are battlecruisers or battleships, an issue that stems from the battlecruiser and battleship division being based on British vessels. The Soviet large anti-submarine warfare ship has been mentioned already, but the Soviet and Russian Baltic Fleet has also seen e.g. the Project 1234 Ovod (Nanuchka-class in NATO-parlance), which is a “small missile ship” if you ask the Russians, and either a fast attack craft or a corvette if you ask the West. A key issue here is the size and endurance which makes it corvette-like, but the lack of any serious armament except a heavy anti-ship missile battery is generally seen as a defining feature of a FAC. Another interesting case from the Baltic Sea is the Swedish Navy, which used to operate 400-ton vessels with significant capabilities in all three dimensions, but sacrificed endurance and seakeeping capabilities in doing so. These used the Swedish designation kustkorvett, or coastal corvette, but since the late 90’s the surviving vessels are simply called corvettes. The 250-ton Hamina-class will provide something along the same lines post-MLU, being able to fight subsurface, surface, and air threats, but being too small to be classed as a corvette.
So what about the Pohjanmaa? The displacement is on the larger side for a corvette, the capabilities are at the very high end for being a corvette, and are in fact higher than many relatively modern frigates. Is there anything then that stops them from being frigates?
The one thing so far absent from the discussion is their shallow draught, which likely will lead to less than ideal seakeeping when operating in bluewater conditions. This is a compromise, and one which has been a hallmark for large Finnish-designed vessels for decades. Frigates are often associated with the open waters of the oceans, or at the very least the North Sea, and while Pohjanmaa certainly could hunt submarines in the GIUK-gap, that’s not where she will be able to play to her strengths. Instead, that would be in the narrow waters close to the shores of the Baltic Sea, waters more often associated with, well, corvettes. However, living in a stable does not make one a horse, at least not in and by itself.
Is she then a frigate? I personally would have to answer with “Yes, but not that kind of a frigate.” Designating her a corvette isn’t necessarily wrong either, but that would also have to be accompanied by the same asterisk. Ironically, it does seem that today’s Pohjanmaa-class will inherit not only the name but also a difficulty in straightforward classification from the original Pojama-class of the late 18th century. I guess we’ll simply have to resurrect the phrase “archipelago frigate”.
Shortly before half past two this afternoon, two ministers, a general, and commodore marched out to meet the gathered press to announce that the Finnish government had discussed the complete Pohjanmaa-class package, and that they had approved the signing of the contracts. The three key contracts will be signed next week in Turku, with the prime contractor Rauma Marine Construction, Saab for the combat system and integration, and with Aker Arctic Technology for the propellers and shafting,
While Minister of Defence Antti Kaikkonen certainly was correct when he at the start of the conference announced that he had “good news to tell”, today’s press conference was actually rather short on actual news. RMC has long been the sole contender for the shipbuilding contract, and shortly after the the Finnish government dissolved last spring it was announced that Saab had been downselected as the sole contender for the combat system and integration contract.
A convincing combination
That was the words used by Kaikkonen to describe the combination of 9LV CMS, ESSM medium-range SAM, TP 47 ASW-torpedoes, and Gabriel anti-ship missiles. The decisions on key systems have been trickling in over the years, and together with the occasionally updated renders released these have made it possible to paint a rather good picture of the coming vessels even before today’s release of the key specifications. Still, it’s always nice to get confirmation.
The key measurements of the vessel is approximately 114 meter LoA, 16 m BoA, and a draught of approximately 5 meters. The last part is a key design feature as the class need to be able to operate in the shallow Finnish archipelago, using currently existing infrastructure designed for the slightly smaller minelayers which it will replace. At 3,900 tons, it is heavier than most corvettes and frigates of a similar length. The propulsion is by twin ice-capable propellers, being specially designed for the project in cooperation between Aker and the Finnish Defence Forces since 2015. The key issue with the propeller design was the conflicting requirements of small diameter due to limited draught, slow turning speed due to the sound signature, and high vessel speed because, well, it’s a warship. Apparently the development work has been a success, because the top speed is given as 26+ knots. This is a respectable number for a vessel of its size, and only a few knots behind the slightly lighter but longer Valour-class frigates (MEKO 200) of the South African Navy, which sport a full CODAG-arrangement with twin shafts and a booster jet. This is well in line with the message from Minister of Economic Affairs, Katri Kulmuni, who described the pillars of the Finnish maritime sector as “specialisation and renewal”, mentioning low emissions and digitalisations as examples of the later. Buzzwords for sure, but not without the facts to back them up.
The decision to have RMC as the sole bidder was made based on the yard’s (predecessor’s) experience with naval vessels and most importantly to ensure domestic security of supply of maintenance and overhauls in times of crisis. The small size of the yard has been seen as a potential issue, with many open questions regarding risk sharing between the yard and the state, as well as ensuring that the yard can make a profit on the vessels without the state simply pouring excessive funds into the project. Based on the official lines from today’s press conference, everyone is happy and the yard has been able to confidently prove that they are able to handle both the technical side of the project as well as the financial aspects. It is seldom discussed, but in long and challenging projects such as shipbuilding terms of payment and company cash flow will be of significant importance, and it is no surprise that these apparently proved to be some of the most difficult parts of the contract negotiations. The end result is based on fixed prices (with index adjustments), with the payments to the yard being made at a quicker pace than usually. Major general (eng.) Kari Renko, deputy director of the FDF Logistics Command, was happy with the end result:
It is a good contract which safeguard the interests of the state.
The one cloud on the sky was that the shipbuilding cost was somewhat higher than anticipated, leading to an increase in the budget of the project from 1.2 to 1.3 Bn Euros (with the main weapon systems not being included in that sum). Still, the sticker cost of 325 MEur per corvette is low compared to many international projects, and if the Pohjanmaa-class will be delivered within the new budget it will be an impressive feat.
The one visible feature that has been cut from the vessel compared to earlier renders was the CIWS-weapon on the aft part of the superstructure, likely a 35 mm Rheinmetall Oerlikon Millennium Gun. It has now been replaced by twin Saab Trackfire RWS, a system that has turned out to be a favourite of the Finnish Navy. Depending on which weapon is mounted it can provide a nice increase in firepower against targets such as light craft, but is likely not quite up to the CIWS task against incoming missiles. Four MASS decoy launchers are also found, each covering one of the ship’s four quadrants. These might well come in handy, as while the signatures of the vessels are heavily reduced, they are not stealthy if compared to e.g. the Swedish Visby-class. This is as expected, and much in line with the FDF doctrine that a 85 % solution at half the cost is always worth more than a 100 % solution at twice the cost.
The renders include a few interesting details. A VERTREP-area is designated in front of the deck gun for helicopters to drop of their cargo. The number of VLS-launchers is up to 16 on the renders, which is double the number I personally was expecting. This could potentially be a case of fitted for but not with, with one eight cell-launcher being installed, and space reserved for a second to be dropped in at a later date. The Navy won’t tell what length they are, but suffice to say is that the vessels will be amongst the most heavily armed corvettes around (cue the ‘corvette vs frigate’-debate). And, no, we likely won’t be able to fire nuclear TLAMs any time soon (seriously, read the linked Twitter-thread if the question ‘but why…?’ comes to your mind right now). Two AUVs are found on the minedeck, one yellow and one orange. Presumably these are generic representations of the Saab Double Eagle Mk II and the Kongsberg HUGIN 1000, both of which are used in the minehunting role aboard the Finnish Katanpää-class. It would be to go a step too far to suggest that these will be a standard loadout on the class, but it is an interesting reminder about the fact that unmanned systems will likely play an important role in the service of the vessel class. In the helicopter hangar an UAS can be seen. It is a generic (?) quadcopter, but it can be pointed out that a Schiebel S-100 was recently tested by the Finnish Border Guard from their flagship Turva. As the Finnish Border Guard in many ways fill the role of Finnish naval aviation, and considering the proven track record of Siebel for, ahem, growing navies, I would not be surprised if the trials would result in S-100s being acquired for both Turva and the Pohjanmaa-class. Of particular importance would be if the UAS can be used for cueing the PTO 2020 (Gabriel) missiles, as they have a range significantly longer than the ship’s sensor horizon.
Check out a few impressions from our successful #CAMCOPTER S-100 flight trials for the Finnish Border Guard. We were selected because of our outstanding reputation as a proven and reliable #UAS for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. pic.twitter.com/BlnIKlSA5C
Cdre Harju in his speech pointed out that the Pohjanmaa-class corvettes are “replacing vessels, but most importantly capabilities”. Besides the obvious ASW-, anti-ship, and air defence missions, the vessels will play important roles in territorial surveillance, ISR, mining, and as flagships. An interesting detail was that the operating costs and personnel needs will closely match the outgoing vessels, i.e. three large mining vessels and four FAC. Of the 70 persons in the crew, half will be professionals and half will be conscripts or reservists, another very Finnish solution. The full operational capability of all four vessels will be achieved by 2028, after which the Rauma- and Hämeenmaa-classes will be retired.
The final words of the day really ought to go to MoD Kaikkonen:
‘Multipurpose’ always mean compromises, but in this case these are good ones
The face of amphibious operations are changing, while at the same time remaining as difficult as ever. Both of these facts were evident at the inaugural Amphibious Live Exhibit, or AMBLE Baltic for short, held this week in Wilhelmshaven, Germany. The country might not have a strong tradition of naval infantry, but the relatively young Seebatallion (Sea Battalion) has quickly proved itself as a provider of a wide range of different capabilities to not only the German Navy, but the German Defence Forces as a whole (more on that in a later post). At the same time it is still in continuous development, and with military technology moving swiftly, the Freundeskreis Seebatallion (the guild of the friends of the Sea Battalion) decided that a marine infantry specific event modelled after the annual KSK Symposium was required. This led to a host of different defence and security company ranging from small niche suppliers to international giants such as KMW all turning up at Wilhelmshaven’s Nordhafen last Thursday, bringing along an amphibious APC (more on that in a later post), a modified BV 206 (more on that as well in a later post), three boats, and a jetski whose main mission was to be stopped by Diehl’s HPEM boatStop electronic pulse system.
The underlying issue is that while amphibious units are in high demand, their missions and capabilities aren’t always understood by those outside the military. Bernhard Saß-Möbus, 1st chairman of the Freundeskreis noted this discrepancy at the opening of the exhibit:
People hear ‘amphibious operations’ and immediately think of Omaha Beach and Saving Private Ryan. It’s not. Today they’re often in urban areas.
The general rise of the urban battlefield naturally is as prominent along the coast as it is inland, but in addition the role played by ports as the crucial logistical nodes of today’s modern society further increases the strategic importance of coastal urban centres. The importance of the ports are evident both in peacetime for society as a whole as well for any military operations conducted in times of war. And all ports aren’t created equal. “A port cannot be substituted one-to-one for another port”, as Mathias Lüdicke of Niedersachsen Ports GmbH & Co. KG explained in his introductionary speech, comparing the particularities of Wilhelmshaven to nearby ports such as Bremerhaven and Hamburg. The pressure is also coming from the navy, for whom the littoral environment is becoming increasingly interesting. This also creates a demand for uniquely maritime missions, such as visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) and naval force protection. Combined these trends are what makes countries such as Germany look at units that not only can fight in these kinds of varied mission sets, but who can get there (or away) over the water. “Vom Land zum Meer – Vom Meer zum Land“, as the official motto of the Seebatallion puts it. Even for non-expeditionary forces such as the Finnish Defence Forces, it isn’t hard to envisage a scenario along the Finnish southern flank where the coastal jaeger battle group might find itself in a decidedly urban environment.
Some of the defining features of the amphibious units are then that they need to be familiar with the particularities of sea transport, including by small craft, and that their equipment need to be suitable for maritime environment. The latter part can obviously be solved in different ways, if a rifle corrode too fast you can simply issue more oil and cleaning rags instead of using chrome parts for manufacturing. However, at some point the maritime environment and the special tasks only found in and around the maritime domain will require unique equipment, and this is where AMBLE comes into the picture. The exhibition featured maritime specific items such as boarding ladders and personal flotation devices, but also systems that would interest any light infantry unit, such as man-portable fire support and anti-tank weapons. Perhaps most importantly it provided a natural meeting place for the industry and the armed forces, with the invitation-only format ensuring that everyone was focused on the particularities of the amphibious fight.
A major system present was the Marine Alutech Jehu, or Watercat M18 AMC, combat boat*, making it’s first public apperance in Germany. The vessel also made demo rides throughout the day. The Jehu in question was there on behalf of the manufacturer, but was a fully operational vessel normally used by the Finnish Navy’s marines at the Nyland Brigade. At the exhibit it was crewed by two senior NCO’s from the NYLBR.
I have been discussing the vessel on the blog earlier, so without going into details one can note that the naval infantry and naval special units in several countries still mainly use open fast craft for their fast transport needs. The ability to transport troops under cover and in relatively cosy conditions significantly improve the combat efficiency of the troops once the actual mission starts, and the larger hulls of vessels such as Jehu and CB 90 provide better seakeeping and longer time on station, allowing more equipment to be brought along and providing for more rested passengers. The use of modern remote weapon stations with heavy machine guns and 40 mm automatic grenade launchers also adds missions such as fire support and patrol to the repertoire. As such they certainly would fit the “Multitool”-moniker of the Seebatallion. Time will tell if a modern combat boat will become a common sight in German ports.
A big thank you to Freundeskreis Seebatallion for inviting me along and getting me to and from the airport!
*Full disclosure, Kongsberg Maritime Finland whom I work for provide the waterjets for both the Jehu and the CB 90
A small note in the Finnish government programme hot off the press is the first official schedule for a small but interesting aircraft procurement programme.
The capability of the Border Guard in a changing environment is ensured. The Border Guard technical surveillance systems and two aircraft are being replaced by 2022.
The two aircraft in question are two Dornier Do 228-212 built in 1995 and in Finnish Border Guard service as maritime surveillance platforms ever since. At the heart of their capabilities are the Swedish MSS 6000 system, which integrate sensors, communication equipment, and two operator consoles. Following a mid-life update in 2009-2013 and further upgrades back in 2017, the main sensors are two radars (a 360° search radar in the front underfuselage bulb as well as a side-looking radar, SLAR, on the fuselage side), electro-optical sensors (with a laser illuminator), AIS, and a radio direction finder. Handheld cameras are also integrated into the system.
The aircraft are completely unarmed, and as the rest of the Border Guard organisation they sort under the Ministry of Interior in peacetime, but are transferred to the Finnish Defence Forces in times of war. Much of their peacetime duties are centred around peaceful missions such as looking for oil spill, fisheries protection, counting seals, and border surveillance. More high-profile missions the aircraft have been part of are deployments at the EU’s southern border as part of FRONTEX, and a showing by OH-MVO during the raid on Airiston Helmi last year.
The Finnish Navy unsurprisingly lack a naval aviation branch, and neither does the Air Force have much in the way of maritime surveillance capabilities. The three Learjets operated are sometimes seen with a 360° search radar, but are few in numbers and also heavily tasked with numerous other missions. As such the Dorniers are a vital source of information whenever the Navy wants to know what’s on the other side of the horizon.
Especially in the grey zone of heightened tension but below the threshold of war, maintaining an accurate situational picture of the movements in the northern Baltic Sea and Gulf of Finland would be crucial, and here the cooperation between the flying units of the Border Guard and the Navy would come into play. Note that these kinds of periods potentially could last months.
So what could replace the Dorniers? To begin with we need to kill the idea that HX could do it. The HX winner will undoubtedly feature vastly superior sensors compared to the current Hornet-fleet, including when it comes to the maritime domain. However, loitering time is low compared to dedicated platforms, and having a nose-mounted radar means you need to be flying roughly in the direction of the target to keep your most important all-weather sensors on it. The lack of a dedicated mission crew, though possible to handle with a backseater in some HX-candidates, is also a drawback. As such, a dedicated platform is going to offer superior intelligence gathering capabilities, especially if you want to stand back from the action. Using unarmed platforms also lessen the provocative aspect.
The same can be given as the reason why the two GlobalEye included in Saab’s HX-package won’t replace the need for Border Guard fixed-wing aviation. The service has been clear that they want civilian unarmed aircraft, as these will significantly ease international cooperation. Also, while the GlobalEye has significant maritime surveillance capabilities, in the same way as with the Learjets their main use would be something else, in this case assisting the Air Force in the battle for air superiority. All in all, while they would assist in maintaining the maritime picture, in wartime the need for a Dornier-replacement would still present itself. The whole GlobalEye-package is enough of a bombshell to warrant a post of it’s own.
The most prolific maritime patrol aircraft today is the Boeing P-8 Poseidon, coming in at well over ten times the maximum take-off weight of the 6.5 ton Do 228. Needless to say, it is way too large and complex for the Rajavartiolaitos. The ATR 42MP is a tried and tested design, and is found in configurations close to what we need. However, it is still almost three times the size of the Do 228. The C295 Persuader is another surveillance version of an aircraft of the same size as the ATR 42, however it has the benefit of commonality with the transport fleet of the Finnish Air Force. This could potentially be a winning factor, promising fewer surprises and maintenance synergies. Yes, there’s a C-27J based MPA as well, but in Finnish service that offers the drawbacks of the Persuader without it’s benefits.
A really interesting contender is the light twin-engined Diamond DA62-MSA. This was recently unveiled, and although smaller than the Do 228, still offer a four person crew and an impressive sensor and mission suite. A yet more radical choice would be the Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton, which is a large maritime surveillance drone, based on the more widely used RQ-4 Global Hawk. Is the Border Guard prepared to go unmanned for their most important maritime surveillance platform? Probably not, but it remain a possibility. Granted, there are also some other, some rather stylish, alternatives, but I would be surprised if the eventual winner isn’t found amongst those above.
One of the earliest aspects of the current wave of close Finnish-Swedish military cooperation has been that between the marine infantry in the two countries. This was formalised as the Swedish Finnish Amphibious Task Unit (SFATU), which originally was envisaged as a crisis management tool for the littorals. In later years the scope has been increased, as can be seen during the upcoming weeks when the unit will be training in Finnish waters. Parallel to the Navy’s main exercise Silja, the unit will perform a short pre-exercise which started 27 May, and on 3 June SFATU will switch over to the main exercise and take part in Silja together with the better part of the Finnish Navy (including the marines and coastal units). The Swedish marines are joining in the fun with a total force numbering around 400 personnel and around 40 boats.
As usually when the two forces operate next to each other the differences in equipment has raised some questions, especially in this case where both units are tailored to operate in the same niche environment that make up the Northern and Western coastline of the Baltic Sea. The most striking difference is the combat boats used, which don’t show much of a resemblance to each other. It should be noted here that in my line of work at Kongsberg Maritime Finland Oy, formerly Rolls-Royce Oy Ab, I have come into contact with both vessels. However, all information in this post is based purely on open sources (as is all my writing). In addition, I won’t discuss concepts of operations or similar details covered by OPSEC in this post, even in cases where such information is available in open sources.
The CB 90H is a truly iconic vessel. The development work took place in the late 80’s, and the first vessels entered operational service in late 1990 under the designation Stridsbåt 90. The Swedish designation literally means Combat Boat 90, and in the same way as Strf 90 thanks to it’s export success is universally known as CV 90 the boat quickly went from StrB 90 to CB 90 internationally. From the outset the vessel was known as CB 90H (‘H’ coming from its ability to transport half a platoon) to distinguish it from the somewhat similarly looking but smaller and simpler 90E (‘E’ standing for Enkel, the Swedish word for simple).
CB 90 was an almost instant success both domestically and on the export market. At a time when many navies still used open landing crafts powered by traditional propeller/rudder-arrangements or outboards it employed twin waterjets to give superior maneuverability and a very good acceleration and top speed. The vessel also came armed with heavy machine guns which could support the landing, and the possibility to lay mines or drop depth charges over the stern. But perhaps the most visually striking detail is the extremely low profile. This is made possible by moving the control station to the very front of the vessel, allowing the crew a good view over the bow despite being placed low inside the hull. The vessel scored a number of export deals, including to Norway, Mexico, Malaysia, and the US Navy (known locally as Riverine Command Boat, RCB). Both for the export market and for domestic use a number of different versions have been developed, including versions sporting ballistic protection. The latest version is the Stridsbåt 90HSM for the Swedish marines, which feature better protection, a new driveline, and provisions for a remote weapon station. The latest order means that Dockstavarvet, nowadays owned by Saab, will be able to celebrate 20 years of CB 90 production (though not continuously).
The general layout has been successful enough that it has been adopted by a number of foreign projects, none of which have enjoyed the same success of the original design. It isn’t completely without drawbacks though. The most important drawback is that the placement of the crew stations in front of the passenger compartment leads to a chokepoint when the marines exit between the navigator and the helmsman. Sitting close to the bow also means that the crew will experience heavier loads on their bodies when encountering waves (especially at speed in rougher conditions). Rearward vision also suffers, and in general keeping a low profile means that there are certain limitations once it comes to situational awareness and the ability to mount sensors and weapons high. Still, these are of secondary importance to a vessel whose main purpose is to get marines ashore, and fast.
At the same time as the Swedish Navy was busy driving around in combat boats, the Finnish marines had to make do with open and semi-open landing crafts. These weren’t necessarily bad landing crafts, but they offered little combat potential (no, a pintle-mounted 12.7 mm NSV doesn’t make a combat boat) and worse protection for both the crew and the embarked marines. On the positive side, their conventional layout meant that loading larger cargo was possible, and swiftly getting marines out of the passenger compartment was relatively easy. Having the crew at the rear also meant that slamming the bow in heavy weather doesn’t affect the crew in the same way, instead letting the unfortunate few marines closest to the bow take the beating. Especially the Jurmo-class was a very good ‘truck’ for the marines. But it was still a truck, and the Swedish marines were driving around in (light) APCs.
The answer to the demands of the Finnish marines came to be the Jehu-class, where much of the focus is placed on combat ability. The Jehu, or Watercat M18 AMC as it is known to its builder Marine Alutech, comes with both ballistic- and CBRN-protection, a roof-mounted RWS (Saab’s Trackfire RWS in Finnish service), and a serious communications suite. Following on the Finnish traditions, the passenger compartment is close to the bow, meaning that the control stations are in a raised deckhouse found midships. This means that the vessel in general will be higher (adding weight), but also offers more space for the crew working area. To compensate for being larger, the vessel has some serious power, with the twin engines being rated at 1,150 hp (compared to two times 625 hp on the original CB 90H and two times 900 hp in ‘operational‘ setting on the 90HSM).
Bigger isn’t always better, but the increased size of the Jehu compared to both CB 90H as well as earlier Finnish designs opens up new possibilities, such as the fitting of a 120 mm NEMO mortar turret (with a direct fire ability). This is a capability the Finnish Navy urgently needs, and something which almost gave the Swedish marines their SB 2010 a decade ago. In the end, SB 2010 remained a paper product, cancelled by overzealous politicians, but the concept had called for a larger combat boat, with a general layout not completely unlike that of the Jehu.
In the end, the CB 90H and Jehu are examples of the principle that the same operational environment can lead to rather different solutions, all depending on how you prioritise between the inevitable trade-offs.