As the headline says, yesterday’s big news from the naval sector is not that Finland has ordered the Harpoon and/or the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM). In fact, what has happened is that the US offers for two major Finnish naval programs have become open knowledge. This happened as the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency has requested clearance for the sale of 112 RGM-84Q-4 Harpoon Block II+ ER anti-ship missiles (of which twelve are of the older RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II version which will be upgraded) and 68 ESSM missiles. These kinds of pre-clearances are not uncommon, and allow for a rapid deal following a (potential) procurement decision by a foreign customer (thanks to Aaron Mehta for providing insights about US export).
The background is two ongoing Finnish projects: the Pohjanmaa-class multirole corvettes and the PTO 2020 heavy surface-to-surface missile. The PTO 2020 will be found aboard the Pohjanmaa-class as well as replacing the current MTO 85M (roughly a RBS 15 Mk II) on the Hamina-class as part of their MLU as well as in truck-mounted batteries. As the MLU for the Hamina is very much underway already, the winner of the PTO 2020 will be announced during the first half of this year. I am still standing by my opinion that the RBS 15 Mk 3+ and the NSM are the two frontrunners, and would be somewhat surprised if Harpoon won the trophy (and even more so if the Exocet MM40 Block 3 did, though everything is possible).
The Pohjanmaa-class is still in the design stage, with the main contract(s) to be signed this year, and the building phase to start next year. The armament shown on renders include two quadruple mounts of PTO 2020 amidships, the new lightweight torpedo from Saab, the BAE/Bofors 57 mm Mk II deck-gun, and a battery of vertical launch system-cells (VLS). The two main VLS-systems on the market are the French Sylver and the US Mk 41 (a modernized version called Mk 57 is also available, and mounted on the Zumwalt-class). Both are available in different lengths, with the shortest Sylver, the A43 (an earlier A35 concept seems to have been dropped), being around 4.3 m long (or rather, high), and the shortest Mk 41 being 5.2 m long. The 8-cell module of the Sylver is also smaller and lighter than the corresponding 8-cell Mk 41 module, in part because the silos themselves are a few centimeters smaller. For a full run-through of the differences, see this post by the UK Armed Forces Commentary-blog, where the differences are discussed with a keen eye to the pros and cons for the British Type 26 Frigate.
Now, while some vessels, such as the current Finnish Hamina-class and the upcoming British Type 26, feature dedicated cells to their main air-defence assets, the VLS on the Pohjanmaa will likely be home to the ships main air defence weapons. This becomes evident as the ESSM offer is for the weapon quad-packed in Mk 25 modules, designed to fit the Mk 41-system. If the ESSM would be chosen, the Pohjanmaa-class would be by far the smallest vessel to feature the system. The decision to offer the Mk 41 is interesting, as there is a dedicated Mk 56 ESSM VLS-system if the sole use would be for the ESSM.
The ESSM is certainly a competent weapon, and shows what the Navy is aiming for. 8-16 cells with quad packs would provide for 32-64 medium-ranged missiles, a huge boost compared to the current 8 short-range Umkhontos found on the Hamina. While the Mk 41 is too big for the Hamina, the Mk 56 mean that half a dozen ESSM’s could potentially be fitted as part of the MLU if the Navy choose to go down that (unlikely) route. More interesting is that the ESSM could be fired from the Army’s NASAMS surface-to-air batteries, letting the Navy and Army use the same missile stock. The upcoming ESSM Block 2 will feature an active seeker based on that of the AMRAAM, and is potentially the version offered to the Pohjanmaa.
Interestingly, the AMRAAM-ER is a AMRAAM married to the engine of the ESSM, and no, I don’t know what exactly is the difference between an AMRAAM seeker married to an ESSM engine and an ESSM engine married to an AMRAAM seeker.
I am still inclined to believe that the Sylver might be the Navy’s preferred VLS due to the smaller footprint. However, as with the PTO 2020, we will just have to wait and see.
The question of the upcoming deck-gun for the refurbished Hamina-class FAC was cleared up today, as BAE announced a deal for four Bofors 40 mm Mk. 4 to equip the vessels of the class. This is in line with the original reports, and means that the vessels will retain an amount of gun-fighting capability post-MLU, an especially important feature considering the small magazine sizes of both the heavy anti-ship missiles as well as the Umkhonto surface-to-air missiles.
I’ll admit that the headline above is slightly misleading, as while the words “40 mm” and “Bofors” certainly are a classic combo, the Mk. 4 share little except the calibre with the classic Bofors L/60 of WWII-fame. In between the two, the Rauma-class FAC and importantly the Kataanpää-class MCMV (poised to stay in service alongside the Hamina) are both equipped with the Bofors 40 mm Mk. 2. This is based on the L/70 long version which is more or less a completely new weapon using a longer round (40 x 364 mm vs 40 x 311 mm) when compared to the original L/60. The L/70 first entered service in 1948, but has proven to be a solid design which is found in a large number of single- and twin-mounts in navies throughout the world.
The new Mk. 4 turret still rely on the same L/70 weapon, but apart from looking like a ball (or rather something like a slightly distorted truncated hexagonal trapezohedron, but let’s stick to ball for now), the nice thing is that it is able to switch between different kinds of round on the fly (up to 100 rounds can be stored in a ready to fire mode). Further improving the flexibility its ability to use programmable 3P rounds, which allows e.g. for precise air burst or armour penetration capability from the same round, the exact mode being set the instant before the firing takes place. Finland is now the third country to acquire the Mk.4 after Sweden (a single patrol vessel that underwent MLU, since retired) and Brazil.
In the meantime, work on the first vessel to undergo MLU, FNS Tornio (’81’), started right away after the deal with Patria was announced, and already by the 16 January Finnish public broadcasting company YLE was able to show pictures from Western Shipyards in Teijo which showed that the earlier 57 mm gun and most sensors and antennas had been stripped from the vessel. Interestingly enough, the CEO of Western Shipyards states that they secured the contract in close competition with Uudenkaupungin Työvene and RMC, the shipyard which is set to build the new Pohjanmaa-class (Squadron 2020). While the work would without doubt have provided valuable experience to RMC, it might very well have been hard pressed to finnish all four vessels before the first Pohjanmaa start to require full focus.
In the shadow of the HX-fighter competition, the state of the ground based air defences in Finland has again appeared in the headlines. The short story is that in the mid-90’s Finland acquired the Russian Buk-M1 air defence system as part of Russia paying off the Soviet balance of the clearing accounts. However, while the system certainly is competent, questions soon arose if it was wise to operate a high-tech system which the main adversary had built? Especially as knowing the exact capabilities of the radar and missile is of crucial importance when it comes to defeating radar-guided missiles.
By the mid-00’s training new conscripts on the Buk stopped, and the system was phased out (never trust a Finn who says something is retired, the last conscripts who trained on the system most likely had another ten years in the reserve, during which they were assigned to a wartime unit operating the missiles, giving a ‘real’ retirement date around 2015) and replaced by the NASAMS II.
The NASAMS is a controversial system in Finnish service. Not because it is bad, it is very much amongst the most modern ones available, but because it is of significantly shorter range than the Buk it replaced. Most crucially it has a ceiling of around 10,000 meters, meaning that most modern fighter aircraft can simply operate above this. This isn’t necessarily as big a drawback as it is often portrayed to be. Operating above 10,000 meters place high demands on sensors and weapons if you are to hit anything, and it means that you are easily spotted by air surveillance radars, meaning that the advantage of surprise is long gone by the time the target is overflown.
Still, this has left Finland without a long-range surface-to-air missile for the first time since the late 70’s, and talk about the need for something heavier has been going since the decision to procure NASAMS instead of Aster. The big question is what?
One issue which has been raised is the defence against ballistic missiles, i.e. missiles which are fired at a high angle, fly up to significant heights, and then ‘fall’ down at extreme speeds to hit a target. The Russian 9K270 Iskander-M is the embodiment of this threat, and comes equipped with either a conventional warhead (usually quoted at around 500 kg, but possibly with an option for a heavy penetrating warhead above 1,000 kg) or a nuclear one. The big improvement of the Iskander compared to the 9K79 Tochka U it replaced is the significant improvement of accuracy, which for the Iskander is quoted at a circular error probability of below 10 meters (i.e. half of the Iskanders will land within 10 meters of the intended target), meaning that it can reliably be assumed to hit individual buildings or bridges. As such, many has voiced the opinion that Finland need a system capable of shooting down ballistic missiles.
…and it is in the crossroad of these ideas that we find some of the most common misconceptions, which warrant a slight detour before looking at the latest developments.
To begin with, the ballistic missile threat is not new to Finland, nor is the associated A2/AD-problem, but these have been a part of the Soviet/Russian arsenal for decades. Even with the improved accuracy of the Iskander, it is not a war-winning weapon, as the limited number of missiles available and the rather limited damage caused by a single hit makes it impossible to take out dispersed targets. In other words, while it is possible to hit the command centre of a unit, it is not possible to wipe out the unit itself. The Iskander also needs target information before launch, meaning that it is best used against stationary targets.
Another issue often overlooked is how hard it is to shoot down a ballistic missile. Crucially, while a modern long-range air defence system can sport ranges of over 100 km against air targets (at high altitude, at lower altitude the earth’s curvature creates shadows), the corresponding ranges when trying to intercept a ballistic missile approaching at very high speed and steep angle are significantly shorter. While the exact performance is secret, some sources state that the maximum range is a few tens of kilometers, creating a significant problem with regards to how to base air defence batteries to be able to protect a certain target. The implications of this is that a single battery might have a hard time defending both the Upinniemi naval base and central Helsinki, depending on the parameters of the intercept.
As such, it is no surprise that Finnish officers are focusing on dispersion and hardening strategic targets instead of acquiring anti-ballistic missile capabilities. This is in marked contrast to Sweden’s decision to acquire the Patriot. Here, while the decision is not yet finalised, the ability to field the PAC-3 missile (or potentially the upcoming PAAC-4/Stunner/SkyCeptor) to take down ballistic missiles has played a key role. However, the capability doesn’t come cheap, as the total price tag of approximately 1 to 1.2 billion Euro will buy three to four batteries, each with a single radar and three to four launchers. However, the amount and types of missiles acquired will also play a huge role when it comes to cost, and the preliminary request, described as being “generous in size”, lists 200 PAC-3 (for anti-ballistic missile use) and 100 PAC-2 for use against aircraft, for an additional 1.5 billion Euro. The exact kind of combat management system involved will also play a role, as it seen in the case of the 8.6 billion Euro Polish deal for a comparable number of firing units (four batteries with four launchers each, with 208 PAC-3 missiles) as the Swedish order.
All things considered, any kind of anti-ballistic missile coverage is probably outside of the scope of the Finnish Army’s wishlist, with the focus being solely on the ability to shoot down aircraft at longer and higher ranges than what the current equipment is capable of. However, even within these bounds, there are still a significant number of different options available on the market. With this in mind the Logistics Command has now issued a Request for Information to “around ten” companies. Interestingly enough, the interview with brigadier general Renko, deputy chief of the Logistics Command, says that he would like the new missile to be part of the current NASAMS systems. At the same time, he notes that this is not purely about introducing a new missile to old launchers, but that there needs to be more batteries out in the field to improve coverage.
The obvious choice which has figured in reporting is the AMRAAM-ER. Where the basic NASAMS uses the same AMRAAM missile as found on e.g. the Finnish F/A-18 Hornets, the AMRAAM-ER marries the basic AMRAAM seeker (with improved steering code) to the engine of the ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missile), giving a significant increase in both range and ceiling (50 and 70% respectively according to Raytheon). This means that both goals of the RFI could be met by buying more NASAMS batteries, and having both baseline and ER-versions of the AMRAAM in service. The big problem for the AIM-120 AMRAAM is that it is something of a victim of its own success. It is operated by a stunning 37 countries, meaning that no small amount of Russian research is likely going into how to defeat it. Especially if the AMRAAM will continue to be a key part of the Finnish airborne air defences as well, which is likely to be the case unless Rafale takes home the HX-competition, it might be good to ask whether all air defence eggs should be placed in the same basket?
At this point it should be remembered that one of the key points of the NASAMS is its modularity. It is unclear exactly which parts are integrated into the Finnish NASAMS systems, e.g if our ITO 05 (RBS 70 BOLIDE) are able to plug into the NASAMS’s Fire Distribution Center (FDC), something which Kongsberg claim is possible. However, if the Army really likes the current AN/MPQ-64F1 Improved Sentinel radar and associated systems, another missile could potentially be integrated into it. It is hard to see the reasoning behind this, and I am tempted to believe that the journalist misunderstood the general, who instead expressed a wish for the new system to be part of the current Finnish integrated air defences, i.e. sharing the same air picture as well as command and control structures.
If we assume this is what the Logistics Command means, it opens up a vast number of possibilities. One is the very same SAMP/T-system which competed (and lost) against the NASAMS ten years ago. The SAMP/T, also known as ASTER, is the closest competitor to the Patriot, and is also available both with “normal” and anti-ballistic missile missiles. As was the case last time around, both it and Patriot will probably be judged to be too expensive (although the Swedish deal is controversial at it turned out the SAMP/T offer was 150 million Euro cheaper than the Patriot one).
However, below the high-end Patriot and SAMP/T there are still plenty to choose from. MBDA, the company behind SAMP/T, offers the CAMM-ER and ASPIDE 2000, and while information is somewhat scarce, both are likely superior when it comes to range and height compared to the baseline AMRAAM. Saab has the SRSAM BAMSE, which offer an altitude coverage of 15,000 meters, and the benefit of operating on a different wavelength, Ka-band as opposed to X-band, than the NASAMS, making it harder to jam both at the same time. Israeli company Rafael offer the SPYDER-MR featuring their Derby-missile with a range of 50 km and a ceiling of 16,000 meters. A more exotic (and highly unlikely) option is the Japanese Type 11 missile system built by Toshiba, of which very limited information is available. Still, it does look like it could potentially fit the bill, and during the last years Japan has opened up for potential arms exports. South African Denel Systems has a number of different versions of the Umkhonto, the basic IR-version of which is currently in service with the Finnish Navy. Some of the more advanced concepts might be able to compete with the baseline AMRAAM, though it is doubtful if they will have enough reach to satisfy the demands of the current RFI. Still, Denel does offer a ground-based launcher, and is probably included amongst the companies receiving the RFI.
The winner of the eventual RFQ which is to follow the current RFI is likely found amongst those mentioned above. The defence forces would like to sign a deal in 2020, and notes that this is tied to HX and Squadron 2020, as all three programs play significant roles in the overall air defence of Finland. If e.g. the CAMM in its sea-going version is adopted for SQ2020, it might increase the chances for CAMM-ER being adopted as the ground-based solution. In the meantime, it does feel like the AMRAAM-ER is the favourite, with the big question being whether relying too much on a single missile seeker for both air and ground-based is too high a risk compared to the synergies it would give?
And as it happens, Kongsberg and Patria a week ago announced that they will open a Missile Competence Centre in Tampere, specifically mentioning their work NASAMS in the press release. Funny how these things come together sometimes.
As the modernisation of the Finnish Navy’s surface fleet continues, Saab has managed to secure two key contracts. Earlier, it was announced that Saab would provide the new anti-submarine torpedoes set to be fielded by both the modernised Hamina-class FAC as well as the new Pohjanmaa-class corvettes (Squadron 2020). In many ways this was the low hanging fruit for Saab. Not only is development of their new torpedo well underway with Sweden as the launch customer, it is also based on proved technology in the form of the earlier Torped 45, making it possible to operate the older version from the installed tubes until the new Torped 47 is ready. Perhaps crucially, it is one of few weapons of its class designed with an eye to use in littoral and brackish waters, key features of the operating environment of the Finnish Navy.
This week Saab landed a bigger fish, as it was announced that they will provide the combat management system, fire-control system, integrated communication systems, as well as optronic sensors for the Hamina MLU. The odd bird out is the fact that the order include the CEROS 200 optronic sensor, which is already fitted to the vessels. Either these are worn out to the extent that buying newer is cheaper from a maintenance point of view, or there have been internal upgrades of the CEROS 200 since the original deliveries almost twenty years ago that have not been reflected in the name of the product, but are extensive enough to warrant buying complete units and not simply giving the CEROS its own MLU.
Another interesting inclusion is the Trackfire remote weapon station, with the Hamina now being the third class in the Finnish Navy to receive the RWS. The use of the Trackfire on the Hamina isn’t specified, but the wording in the press release does seem to indicate a single system per ship. As such, while it is possible that two stations per vessel will replace the port and starboard manually operated 12.7 mm NSV heavy machine guns mounted amidships, the likelier scenario is that they will take the place of the main armament. There has been talk (so far unconfirmed?) that the main 57 mm guns (Bofors Mk 3) of the Hamina vessels will be removed as weight saving measures and transferred to the four Pohjanmaa-class vessels, and this would fit right in. While the Trackfire is usually seen fitted with a heavy machine gun as the main armament, it is capable of holding “lightweight medium calibre cannons”, i.e. weapons up to and including low-pressure 30 mm ones. This is not an unheard of solution, with e.g. the Israeli Typhoon RWS being used with a number of the different Bushmaster-series of cannons as the main or secondary gun on a number of different naval vessels out there. A 30 mm Bushmaster, the Mk 44, is already found in Finnish service on the CV 9030 IFV, but before anyone gets too enthusiastic it should be noted that this uses a longer high-pressure round, so there is no synergy to be had. Instead, something like the M230LF, based on the chain gun found on the Apache helicopter, is the more likely candidate.
Dropping down in calibre from 57 to 30 mm is not necessarily a bad thing, as the main use of the weapon will likely be air defence and intercepting light craft. Modern 30 mm rounds will do quite some damage against soft targets such as warships as well, though naturally you won’t win a gun fight against a large vessel sporting a 3 or 5 inch gun anytime soon (to be fair, if you find your FAC up against a destroyer at gun range something has likely gone very wrong already at an earlier stage of the battle).
At the heart of the Hamina order is the 9LV, an open architecture system which allows integration of different sub-systems, sensors, and weapons into a single integrated package. As such, different building blocks can be integrated into CMS systems from other manufacturers, or other manufacturers’ subsystems can be integrated into the 9LV CMS. That Saab gets this kind of a complete deal including both the CMS, FCS, integrated communication systems, and part of the weaponry is significant, especially when looking towards the soon to be decided contract for a main systems integrator for the Pohjanmaa-class, a job which will likely be of significantly higher value than the Hamina MLU.
The main implications is that this makes Saab the front-runner for the Pohjanmaa-class CMS. Earlier the Rauma-class FAC received the 9LV during its MLU, and now on the Hamina 9LV is replacing Atlas Elektronik’s ANCS 2000-system. While the requirements for the CMS of the Hamina and the Pohjanmaa are not completely identical, there certainly is something to be said when the former replaces one of the shortlisted CMS’s with the another one, instead of simply upgrading it. It should also be remembered that several subsystems, including most weapons, will be the same for both vessels.
Yet another noteworthy development is that Saab recently announced a new fixed face version of their Sea Giraffe, in the form of the Sea Giraffe 4A FF. I have earlier questioned whether Saab’s twin rotating mast solution would satisfy the requirements of the Navy, and it seems clear that the 4A FF is a possible solution for the Pohjanmaa’s main long-distance sensor. As Saab is also well positioned to secure the order for the new PTO2020 surface-to-surface missile, they just might be on track to secure all major Finnish naval contracts they are bidding for.
‘Tis the season, and as such everyone gets some Christmas presents. Such as a new 6×6 armoured personnel carrier.
The Finnish Army has a large number of Patria (ex-Sisu) XA-180/200 series of armoured personnel carriers. The PASI has become something of a trademark for Finnish forces, both in-country and on peacekeeping missions abroad. These have been supplemented by the modern and heavier AMV, which have been acquired in limited numbers. In addition, the mechanised units rely on CV 9030’s and the older BMP-2, which are about to get an upgrade. The rest of the infantry will have to make do without armoured protection, travelling by trucks.
The PASI are currently undergoing a limited MLU-program, with the latest order for more vehicles coming this week. The MLU is largely about keeping the vehicles running rather than improving their value on (the roads leading up to) the battlefield. As such, the end of the line is slowly approaching, especially for the older vehicles in the series, with those now being upgraded set to serve “into the 2030s”. The PASI MLU is part of a larger program aimed at improving the mobility of the Army, and in particular the first rate “operational forces” (also labelled manoeuvre forces). The likely home of the PASI amongst the operational forces is the three wartime readiness brigades. These are motorised infantry units that are to be the ‘fire brigades’ of the Army, using their operational mobility to quickly move to the key areas of the front. There, they will throw their weight and firepower behind the regional forces already present to create the centre of gravity and win the decisive battles. However, how they will do this in practice after the retirement of the PASI has been an open question.
Naturally, introducing the AMV as a wholesale replacement to the XA would be the easy solution. The AMV is battle-proven, enjoys a very good reputation, and retains both operational and tactical mobility without sacrificing protection. The downside: it costs an arm and a leg. For an infantry-heavy army such as the Finnish one, the costs quickly becomes prohibitively high.
Enter the Protolab PMPV, known as MISU amongst friends. The PMPV is 6×6 MRAP, built with cost and ‘good-enough’ rather than ‘best’ as the guiding principles. The first prototype was built a few years ago, but aside from showings in a number of Finnish vehicle magazines and TV-shows little was heard of it until it was again brought to the headlines by the MoD announcing that four pre-production vehicles of a slightly modified design will be bought by the army for trials in field conditions during 2018 to 2020.
The stated aim is to evaluate whether the MISU can fulfill “future needs” of the Finnish Army. In practice, this refers to the abovementioned withdrawal of the PASI. While the MISU might not live up to the AMV, it still does offer some interesting features compared to the PASI. While the standard load is ten soldiers in the rear compartment and two crew members in the front, it is also able to be configured to take up to 10 tons of cargo, in essence doubling as a protected truck. When doing work as an APC, the soldiers sit high enough that they are not in contact with the floor, enhancing survivability in case of mines or IED’s. Another protective feature is that the front wheels are situated under the extended nose, meaning that any traditional mines will detonate well in front of both the driver cabin and the crew compartment. Traditional MRAP design features such as a heavy V-shaped bottom is also fitted, and while not primarily aimed at combat duty a RWS with a heavy machine gun can be fitted to the roof. The vehicle is also airportable by a C-130 Hercules, and there are ready mounting spots for appliqué armour in case the basic outfit isn’t enough. The vehicle is designed with a “structural top speed” of 110 km/h, though to be fair I am not quite sure if it actually can do this in current engine configuration with any meaningful payload.
Will the MISU eventually replace the PASI? It is not impossible, there has been something of a resurge in interest internationally with regards to cheaper 6×6 designs compared to the 8×8’s which reigned supreme for a while. There might also be an interest in broadening the domestic manufacturing base by not directing the order to Patria and their associates. I wouldn’t be surprised if a successful field trial was followed by an order for a battalion or so of MISU’s to replace the oldest PASI’s. If that proves successful, a follow-up order to replace the PASI is certainly within the realm of possibilities, possibly together with another batch of AMV’s.
This morning Finland’s (and the Nordic countries’) largest daily Helsingin Sanomat published what they claim is the first of a series of articles dealing with Finnish military intelligence. This is not in itself strange or unheard of, as Finland is set to receive new legislature regarding intelligence gathering aimed at both foreign and internal targets. The issue which has caused significant waves is that it is based on an “extensive material” including Secret and Top Secret documents, the two highest classifications in the Finnish four-stage classification system.
No, there’s not a link to the article. That’s an editorial decision on my part.
This has naturally caused quite an outrage, including comments from both major-general Ohra-Aho (chief of military intelligence), minister of defence Jussi Niinistö, and president Sauli Niinistö. The National Bureau of Investigation (Fi. Keskusrikospoliisi) has also started two investigations, regarding both the leak itself as well as against Helsingin Sanomat regarding if classified information that may damage Finnish national defence and security have been illegally published or shared with the general public.
Esitutkintaa tullaan suorittamaan myös sen osalta, onko sellaisia turvallisuussalaisuuksia, joiden paljastuminen on omiaan aiheuttamaan mm. vakavaa vahinkoa Suomen maanpuolustukselle ja turvallisuudelle, oikeudettomasti julkistettu tai ilmaistu julkisuudessa. (2/2)
My understanding is that both are prosecuted according to Finnish criminal law’s chapter 12 ‘Crimes related to treason’, 7§ ‘Disclosure of State Secret’, which cover both publishing and transferring such information that is classified or “of the nature that its disclosure is likely to cause serious damage to Finland’s national defense, security, foreign affairs, or the national economy”.
The article itself is surprisingly thin on new information. While technically everything about the Signals Research Center (Fi. Viestikoekeskus) is indeed secret, as confirmed by the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court a number of years back, in practice it is usually identified as the Finnish Defence Forces main SIGINT/ELINT unit. The other major pieces of ‘news’ in the piece, such as that of Russia being seen as the main possible adversary, is not new either. Neither is it news that the Finnish intelligence community would like the new legislation to include allowing interception of computer traffic under certain circumstances.
It should be remembered that Finland lacks any kind of clear-cut legislation regarding what the military intelligence is allowed to do, and as far back as 2013 when the work on the new legislation was started, then-chief of defence general Puheloinen expressed a wish for a law regarding military intelligence, as it would provide parliamentary oversight and rules for what the service could and couldn’t do, and thus provide increased transparency. This push from within the service to get away from the current case of “we figure it out ourselves” to a proper legal framework is completely overlooked in the article, which instead wants to focus on the fact that the law would likely give broader intelligence gathering authority to the service.
Helsingin Sanomat naturally defends the publication with calls for added transparency, and that the Finnish public should be allowed to know “at least as much” as foreign intelligence services about Finnish intelligence gathering (though the citizens right to know comes with a price tag, as the article is paywalled).
The managing editor Mäkinen also claims that the documents have been treated with the proper care, a statement which falls on the simple fact that the handling of Secret/Top Secret papers require every event to be logged, copies need to be traced, and they can’t be transferred outside the networks set up by the authorities, just to mention a few of the requirements (the short way to look at this is that it is illegal to run around with confidential material unless you are entrusted with them).
Another defence brought up by the paper is that the details given are of such a mundane nature that they won’t damage Finnish security. Indeed, much of the use made of the material is just namedropping memos and dates to dramatic effect without any proper analysis, and much of the acquire material seems to be rather old. However, while I am inclined to reluctantly agree when it comes to the information itself, Mäkinen doesn’t seem to realise the bizarre Catch-22 this throws their decision to print the article into. If the information gathered from the classified material is of such little value, why then break the law to publish it?
It certainly is possible to make a good, proper, article on Finnish military intelligence based on open sources and interviews. It might even be called for in light of the current debate on what by now is likely one of the most thoroughly prepared pieces of legislation in Finnish history. However, the feeling one gets from the current attempt by HS is largely one of cheap tabloid stories, trying to sell a story thin on anything substantial by sprinkling it with the allure of Top Secret-information.
I’ll leave the last word to Helsinki mayor and legal professional Jan Vapaavuori: ”
I learned as a young assistant in the 90’s that leaking confidential papers may get you fired, but leaking secret papers will get you to the courtroom.”
Opin nuorena avustajana 90-luvulla, että luottamuksellisten papereiden vuotamisesta voi saada potkut mutta salaisten papereiden vuotamisesta pääsee käräjille
The Patria AMV continues its run as the greatest Finnish defence export success since, well, the Sisu/Patria XA-series it replaced. Latest in the run is an agreement with Slovakia, which aims to procure 81 vehicles based on the latest AMVXP version equipped with a locally-manufactured unmanned turret, the Turra 30. The Turra isn’t new to the AMV, as a joint Slovak-Polish project in the form of the Scipio concept married the Turra 30 to a Polish Rosomak back in 2015.
The agreement now signed covers a “testing phase in Slovakia, and after the Slovakian test period the vehicle will be tested in Finland during this winter”, following which the eventual procurement decision will be made. However, the interesting part is that Patria’s land business unit’s president Mika Kari stated that the aim is “a new version of an amphibious AMVXP integrated with Turra weapon system fulfilling requirements of both Slovakian and Finnish Defence Forces”.
The proper armament of modern wheeled armoured personnel carriers is an evergreen debate, which has been up here on the blog as well. One school argues for equipping them with heavy weaponry, which allows them to become infantry fighting vehicles in the vein of tracked compatriots such as the classic BMP-2 or more modern M2 Bradley and CV90. Others see this as a waste of money and added weight (i.e. loss of mobility), and argue for keeping them as “battle taxis” instead, allowing the infantry to reach the battlefield at speed while staying protected from shrapnel and light weapons. So far the Finnish Defence Forces has stuck with not arming wheeled platforms with anything heavier than heavy machine guns, while the tracked BMP-2 and CV9030 are able to stay in the fight and support their dismounted infantry with 30 mm rounds.
Slovakia apparently wants to go another route, and the Turra is able to bring a 30 mm gun backed up by a 7.62 mm machine gun and anti-tank missiles, either of western or Russian design (the combinations being Mk 44 Bushmaster II/FN Minimi/Spike or 2A42/PKT/9M113 Konkurs respectively). There is nothing out of the ordinary with this, but what is interesting is the reference to the “Finnish requirement”.
So far there has been no official requirement from the Finnish Defence Forces to get an upgunned AMV, nor have any money been allocated for such a deal, and frankly one would believe there are more pressing demands/better returns on investment (aka more bang for buck). As such, the promised winter testing and vague talk about fulfilling Finnish requirements does feel like marketing talk.
The big question is if Finland eventually would decide to buy an upgunned AMV, either for homeland defence or in small numbers for international operations, would the Turra 30 be the right choice? On paper it is a nice piece of kit, but it is hard not notice the fact that it is entering a very crowded market. For heavy firepower, the AMV has so far been fielded operationally with the Leonardo HITFIST turret in Polish service, the Denel MCT-30 in South African service, the Slovenians use the Elbit UT30 on their AMV’s, and it is currently being evaluated for the Australian Land 400 program with the BAE E35 mounting a 35 mm gun. There is also the more exotic marriage of a BMP-3 turret to a lengthened AMV-hull, which provide coaxially mounted 100 mm and 30 mm guns, a light machine gun, and the ability to fire ATGM’s. In short, everyone wants to integrate their own solution to their autocannon requirements, really putting the ‘M’ in ‘AMV’ to the test.
Of these, the obvious choice for a Finnish requirement would be the BAE-Hägglunds E-series turret, which is in essence the one fitted to all export CV90’s, and then in the slightly lighter E30-form with the 30 mm Bushmaster and not the heavier 35 mm favoured by a handful of countries. This would allow for significant commonality with the Finnish CV9030-vehicles, and while the AMV and CV9030 aren’t expected to serve in the same unit, spares commonality has never hurt.
The Turra 30 might certainly be a very capable system, but in the case we suddenly end up with it in Finnish service, it is hard to see it as anything but a poorly veiled case of industrial offset commitments.