Guest Post: A Picture in Moscow

The following post was originally posted by Swedish blogger Jägarchefen on his excellent blog. As the topic is highly relevant for but rarely discussed here in Finland, I asked for and got permission to translate it. The below translation is not a word for word one, but instead I have included some explanatory comments on issues which are assumed to be known to Swedish readers but which might not be immediately obvious to foreigners, as well as diving deeper into how this all affects Finland.

Valery Gerasimov, the Russian Chief of the General Staff, held a speech at the annual security conference in Moscow 26 to 27 April. The speech included how the actions and preparations of NATO aimed at providing the basis for a rapid surge of reinforcements to NATO’s eastern flank would affect Russian security. In one of the pictures he showed both Swedish and Finnish territory were marked as part of NATO’s preparatory actions. This indicates that Russia sees Finnish and Swedish territory as an extension of NATO territory, though whether they are seen as an integrated part is better left unsaid. What is clear is that in the Russian strategic military doctrine from 2014 and in the national security strategy from 2015 NATO is described as a threat to Russian security.

Regarding Sweden this isn’t news. Based on a number of books published during the last two decades it is clear that the Soviet Union during the better part of the Cold War regarded Sweden as an unofficial NATO member, making the current Russian view of Sweden as a part of NATO less than surprising. In addition to the historical case, this is also based on Sweden being one of five states with the possibility of deeper cooperation (the famous ‘Gold Card’) and the recently signed Host Nation Support Agreement.

More surprising is the view that Finland would constitute an extension of NATO. Granted, Finland, like Sweden, has signed the HNS agreement and received the ‘Gold Card’, but Finland and Russia still make occasional statement about the special relationship that prevail between the countries. From that point of view, the statement by the Russian Chief of Staff is somewhat out of sync, as it indirectly labels Finland as a threat. It is also interesting to see the raging debate about the nature of Finnish support in case of a conflict in the region in context with Gerasimov’s picture.

What then did the picture show? It showed four geographical areas, as well as a possible continuous  support or staging area. On Swedish territory, it appeared to show Varberg or Halmstad port as a possible staging ground for naval assets. On the Swedish east coast it appeared to show the port of Gävle as a staging ground for naval assets. It also seemed to indicate Sundsvall as a supporting area for air operations (in other words Midlanda airport). Finally, on Finnish territory it seemed to show Vasa as a supporting area for naval assets and Kauhava as a supporting area for air operations. The continuous supporting/staging area seemingly consisting of Gävle – Sundsvall – Vasa – Kauhava.

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Map courtesy of Jägarchefen

To some extent this is strategic signalling. The Russian leadership is showing their unhappiness with the current Swedish and Finnish defence cooperation with NATO, and this could be a way of trying to pressure Finland and Sweden diminish or even stop the cooperation. Another alternative is that Russia is trying to send a message: “We know what you are preparing and we want you to know that”. The aim then would be to make preparations and/or cooperation more difficult.

Starting with the Swedish west coast, it is clear that it is vital for Sweden in peace as well as in war. This comes both from its role in the influx of crucial goods, as well as from its use as the gateway for any reinforcements brought in from the west. The main focus has been on the port of Gothenburg, which in peacetime handles almost 30% of Swedish imports, is ice-free year-round, and has a significant rail network enabling efficient distribution of goods to other parts of Sweden. One possibility is obviously that the location of the marker is wrong, and that the real intention was to highlight Gothenburg and not Varberg or Halmstad. However, the other possibility is that the military units would stay out of the crowded port, and instead choose a less busy civilian port for bringing in reinforcements and basing naval vessels.

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Sundsvall/Midlanda airport. Source: Wikimedia Commons/Felix Wikström

Even more interesting is Gävle and the Sundsvall – Vasa – Kauhava area. The reasoning behind Gävle might be its use as the port of departure for the forward-deployed US Marine Corps Brigade that is currently found in the caves of Trøndelag, in central Norway. From Gävle, the unit could then be shipped out to the Baltic states in case of a grave security crises. Gävle could also be used as a base for naval units from Finland and/or NATO countries for operations in the northern Baltic Sea. The use of Midlanda (Sundsvall) airport likely refers to its use as a base for fighter and strike aircraft. In case of transport of personnel the US forces would likely directly use the airports in Trøndelag instead. Another possibility is that the base would be used to provide strategic depth for Finnish fighters.

The most curious aspect is Vasa as a naval base or staging area, as well as Kauhava as a base for airborne assets. It is possible that Vasa would be part of a protected staging area for naval vessels operating in the northern parts of the Baltic Sea as well as in the Gulf of Finland. Notably however, no airports in southern or central parts of Sweden, nor the naval base in Karlskrona, are included in the picture. In the by now rather well-known RAND study of how a Russian attack on the Baltics could look, the use of air bases in central Sweden is highlighted as being of crucial importance to NATO.

It could be that Russia feels it has the ability to interfere with operations in southern and central Sweden to the extent that the area is not seen as a threat in case NATO would base forces there. In this case Gerasimov’s picture would indicate that the marked areas would not be as affected by the Russian actions, and as such would be more of a threat.

This makes the transfer of two Buyan-M class corvettes from the Black Sea Fleet to the Baltic Fleet during the autumn of 2016 especially interesting, as it provides the opportunity for Russia to target the Swedish west coast with Kalibr long-range cruise missiles without these overflying the territory of other nations, which would have been the case if the missiles would have been fired from the North Fleet.

 

Added to this the Swedish broadcasting corporation’s radio earlier this year reported that some unknown entity seems to try and map out people working for the regional council in Jämtland, including those that play a role in upholding comprehensive security in the region. There are no information on the situation in Västernorrland county, but it can be assumed to be similar, as these two constitute a continuous geographical area of operations due to the forward-deployed storages in Trøndelag.

These two counties, together making up the region of Mellersta Norrland (literally ‘Middle Norrland’), seems to be an area of great military strategic interest for Russia, indirectly making them an area of strategic military interest for Sweden as well. This is in addition to the five areas identified earlier, which include:

  • Southern Scania, which controls the waterways between the Baltic Sea and the North Sea
  • Gotland, which could be employed as a basing area for long-range weapon systems
  • Gothenburg/the west coast, discussed above
  • Stockholm, the national capital
  • Northern Norrland, as a transit area for flanking operations during any battle between Norwegian and Russian forces

With a sixth area added to these, it is clear that the Swedish Defence Forces lacks the quantity needed to defend all of these at the same time.

It should be noted that the highlighting of Mellersta Norrland is in line with earlier posts on Jägarchefen’s blog, where during the last two year several indications have been reported which point to Mellersta Norrland being strategically more important that generally assumed. This can now be seen as confirmed by the Russian general staff.

Own comments:

For Finland, the situation is somewhat similar. Traditionally, the main strategic areas have been identified as the southern parts of the country, where the capital of Helsinki and the major cities of Turku and Tampere are found, as well as the northern parts of the country which would be important in case of a major conflict where Finnish territory could be used for flanking maneuvers in the battles for Murmansk and northern Norway. A third possible axis of attack would be the Kajaani – Oulu axis, which was attempted in the Winter War as a way of cutting Finland in half.

Southern Ostrobothnia has traditionally not been seen as a primary target. Kauhava has a long history as an air force base, and would likely be used for dispersed basing in case of war. From a NATO point of view, its value is more limited, as bases in northern Sweden would likely be a better choice for basing fighters due to the strategic depth they offer, while for air transport several other civilian airports hold similar facilities and at least equal road and rail connections (and in some cases local ports can be used as a complement).

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Swedish corvette HSwMS Sundsvall (K24) entering the civilian port of Kokkola during a joint exercise in 2010. Source: Own picture

 

One possibility is that the designation of Vasa as a port of interest does portray a more general concept of using civilian ports as naval bases. Finland has a notoriously high number of ports along the coast, and the Ostrobothnian shore is no exception. While no ‘true’ naval bases are found in the area, there are a number of differently sized ports which could be used for refuelling and replenishment, in effect a dispersed basing concept for naval vessels. From the relative protection of the Gulf of Bothnia the vessels could then sortie out to strike against enemy movements in the northern Baltic Sea, before again withdrawing back to safety.

The conclusions drawn by Jägarchefen are the following:

  1. As Russia sees NATO as a threat to their national security, and as they see Finnish and Swedish territory as being potential areas supporting NATO operations, Russia does see Finland and Sweden as well as threats to their security. This has (or rather, should have) a significant impact on the discussions on Finland’s role in case of war in the Baltics.
  2. This has now been clearly communicated at the highest military level, making it also a political signal as well to Finland and Sweden.
  3. Mellersta Norrland must be seen as an area of strategic military importance. In Finland, this goes for Southern Ostrobothnia as well.
  4. This must lead to a discussion at the political level about the importance of this area. Currently, the area feature more or less the same security vacuum Gotland enjoyed before the island became home for permanently stationed troops again. While Finland stresses that peacetime garrisons should not be seen as indicative of where any given unit would fight, it is very much open (as it should be) if current defence planning recognises the importance of this area, and how e.g. the Local Voluntary Units (Maakuntajoukot) tasked with defending the area has been briefed and equipped to meet this increased threat level.

Have a good one! // Jägarchefen

Under Scottish Skies – Air Superiority

While the Typhoon so far has seen combat solely in the air-to-ground role, there is no mistaking in that the primary role of RAF Lossiemouth lies elsewhere. The base is the northern of RAF’s two quick-reaction alert bases, abbreviated as QRA(N). As such, a pair of armed Typhoons stand guard around the clock, year round. These are airborne within ten minutes of the scramble, often with time to spare. While the usual ‘bogey’ for QRA(S) down at RAF Coningsby is an airliner gone silent (usually due to having the wrong radio frequency), RAF Lossiemouth handles the classic North Sea intercept of any Russian bombers coming down round Norway. This includes “Bears in different versions”, presumably meaning that both the Tu-95 bomber version and the Tu-142 maritime patrol versions has been sighted, as well as the Tu-160 Blackjack. The latter is something of a newcomer in the area, starting to make appearances only post-Crimea. By the time any bomber approaches the British isles, they are always escorted by Norwegian F-16s, which hand over the mission to the Typhoons. Notably, the Typhoons has been on station and escorted the Tu-160 during the strikes in Syria which have been flown along the western route, circumnavigating the UK.

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“Deliver QRA(I)N and prepare for global operations”
RAF Lossiemouth mission statement

All QRA flights are armed with a mix of four ASRAAM short-range IR-missiles and four AMRAAM medium-range missiles, of which two ASRAAM would be traded for another two AMRAAM in case of a ‘wartime load’. In addition, the aircraft are sporting two supersonic drop tanks and a full load of 27 mm ammunition for the internal Mauser gun. While RAF’s QRA flights haven’t had to open fire upon intercepted aircrafts in modern times, the risk is always there. And nowhere is this more evident than in the Baltics, where the Typhoon face the most modern fighters that Russia has to offer.

Wing Commander Billy Cooper is the officer commanding 6 Squadron, and an experienced fighter pilot who has logged over 1,300 hours on the Typhoon after transitioning to it from the Tornado F.3, RAF’s earlier QRA jet. Before joining the Lossiemouth based squadron, he took part in a Baltic Air Policing tour with the Coningsby based 3(F) Squadron, being deployed to Šiauliai in Lithuania. The detachment brought some interesting challenges to the RAF, as the facilities of the old Soviet base were overcrowded. A number of portable cabins were shipped out for the personnel to live in, while the Typhoons were allocated unheated soft-skin hangars throughout the stay. While these did offer a measure of protection from the wind and precipitation, this still meant that all maintenance work on the planes were performed in whatever the outside temperature happened to be. While the detachment had “relatively small issues with the climate”, as Cooper put it, a more unexpected issue appeared. Soon after arrival, the British airmen spotted a “large, elk-like creature” towards the far end of the base. Large mammals was not something that RAF was used to operating around, but with the proper procedures in place, air operations could continue.

If the QRA(N) gets scrambled once every few months, BAP is another issue completely. The latest tour by 2(AC) Squadron to Ämari air base in Estonia resulted in 42 intercepted aircraft during their 4 month long stay. In addition to the normal weaponry a targeting pod was often carried, being particularly useful in the identification of ships. Some targets are trickier than others, with Cooper mentioning one of his personal highlights being the intercept of a Kamov Ka-27 helicopter launched from a Russian frigate. After he had intercepted the helicopter, the Finnish Air Force also appeared and closed in to take a look on it.

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“We were briefed quite closely to not interact with them too much”
WING COMMANDER BILLY COOPER, OFFICER COMMANDING 6 SQUADRON

The behavior of the Russian pilots varied widely, and while the British pilots where briefed to maintain their cool, Cooper was under the impression that their Russian colleagues were more free to engage their adversaries as they saw fit. This included aggressively turning against any intercepting fighters trying to take pictures of them, and while no-one tries to cause a mid-air collision, the short distances between the aircrafts (Typhoons often closing to within 65 meters of their targets) meant that the risk certainly was there. This kind of behavior was more common if the Russian fighters were flying escort for transport or attack/bomber aircraft, and apparently also depended on the personal style of the pilots. “Sometimes you closed in and thought for yourself ‘isn’t that the one from last week’, and sure enough he starts doing the same kind of things this time around as well,” Cooper explained. When asked whether he had experienced the kind of aggressive flare dumping described by the Swedish Air Force, he commented that he hadn’t personally seen it, “but it wouldn’t surprise me”. Both sides carry flares on a regular basis, and in addition to being defensive countermeasures, their purpose does include (stern) signalling. Some Russian pilots did use other means of less-than-friendly communication, while RAF’s pilots stuck to smiles and occasional waves.

Cooperation with the Finnish Air Force is not uncommon for the BAP, with Finnish Air Force and BAP sharing a common recognised air picture and sharing data over Link 16. During intercepts over the Gulf of Finland, it was not uncommon to have a pair of BAP fighters shadowing a Russian target from the south, with a pair of Finnish F/A-18C Hornets doing the same from the north. Operating together in this manner is no problem, as both the RAF and Finnish Air Force share the same doctrine and has the ability to use the same data link. “It is the same as operating with a NATO-country”, Cooper sums up. In addition to chance encounters on intercepts, the two air forces regularly do schedule joint training missions.

Cooper and media

“You need something that can fight long-range and dominate short-range”
WING COMMANDER BILLY COOPER, OFFICER COMMANDING 6 SQUADRON

The nature of aerial combat also was also something which came up. With the advent of a new generation of long-range missiles and sensors, many have concluded that the classic within-visual-range dogfight is (finally) dead. Cooper wasn’t as sure, noting that he could see quite a few scenarios where a fighter would find itself uncomfortably close to its target before being able to open fire. The main question was to what extent the rules of engagement would allow for firing at targets beyond visual range, or if a visual confirmation will be required first. In any case, RAF has taken their Typhoons on exercises against both Indian Sukhoi Su-30MKI and Malaysian Su-30MKM, and contrary to some Indian reports, the “Typhoon did extremely well” against the Su-30MKI at close range, while long range engagements were a matter of “clubbing seals” (an expression BAE was quick to explain is fighter pilot jargon for easy air-to-air kills, in case someone would have misunderstood its use…). In the end, “the Indians weren’t happy”, despite their pilots spending much of their time practicing within visual range combat according to Cooper.

It is no secret that while the Finnish Air Force is looking for a fighter able to handle a range of missions in a full-scale conventional war, the main mission during peacetime is QRA and air policing in the crowded airspace over the Baltic Sea. This is also a point which BAE likes to push, and certainly one of the better selling points of the Typhoon. That isn’t to say that BAE is trying to sell the fighter with its peacetime mission as the argument (arguably not a great idea…), as they are clear with that they think the Typhoon is a great multirole fighter all around. It just happens to be very good at what the Finnish Air Force does in their everyday line of work. At least according to the sales pitch.

The speed is well-known, with the Eurofighter being able to supercruise (though the exact prestanda in supercruise mode is somewhat controversial, with anything between Mach 1.1 to 1.5 being quoted depending on the source and load conditions), but Cooper was also keen to point out the range of the aircraft. Operating alongside the Polish MiG-29’s in BAP, the importance of endurance quickly became evident. While Cooper noted that the Polish Air Force pilots were professional and eager to do a good job, at the same time they did suffer problems due to the notorious short range of their aircraft. At the time these were early production MiG-29 9.12 from ex-DDR stocks, while the Polish detachment which took up the BAP-mission this week is flying F-16’s instead of MiG-29’s. The Typhoon, usually operating with twin supersonic drop tanks, were able to stay on target, despite what appeared to be efforts to shake them off. “Sometimes when the Russian flight came to Kaliningrad, instead of landing they just turned around and headed back north, probably thinking we would have to break off,” Cooper remembered. “We didn’t.”

Review: Ryska elitförband och specialvapen

Unless you have stumbled upon this blog by pure coincidence, chances are you have an idea about what spetsnaz is. But how much do you really know about their history and current status, not to mention the different units which at one time or another have been described by the word? A Swedish book by historians Joakim von Braun and Lars Gyllenhaal clear up the picture, and tell the story of Russian (and Soviet) elite units from the birth of the Soviet Union to the present day.

Ryska elitförband och specialvapen (Russian elite units and special weapons) first came out a few years ago, but was rather quickly followed by a significantly revised and expanded second edition which was published by Fischer & Co in 2016. It is this edition which is the subject of this review.

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J v. Braun & L Gyllenhaal: “Ryska elitförband och specialvapen”. Second edition published in 2016, 231 pages in hardcover. Swedish.

As the name implies, the book covers the whole spectrum of Russian military and paramilitary forces, stretching from the naval OMRP combat divers and the Vityaz of the MVD, to larger specialised forces such as the airborne VDV and naval infantry.

The book follows a roughly chronological order, starting with two pages dedicated to pre-1917 units such as oprichnina and the korvolant, before moving on to the main focus of the book with a chapter on the earliest Soviet special units. To cover the bewildering array of different units that has passed through the ranks during the last hundred years, the book mixes big and small stories, featuring smaller anecdotes and case studies in between the major developments. In part this is also due to the secretive nature of the topic, there are cases where there simply aren’t much information available!

One example of the latter is the spetsnaz units operating on the republican side in the Spanish Civil War. However, this chapter also provide an example of the unique nature of the book: by combining the sparse Russian and German sources available with interviews made with the relatively large number of Swedish volunteers who served in the units, a picture can be made of a largely forgotten part of the Spanish conflict. The sabotage missions behind enemy lines are also interesting in that they provide insight into the way communist sabotage rings were expected to operate in other countries as well, an example being the rather large operation that was active in Sweden during WWII.

As can be expected from a Swedish book, much attention is given to Swedish individuals serving in Soviet units, as well as to Soviet (and DDR!) units operating in Sweden. While these at times fail to spike my interest as a non-Swede, the use of Swedish sources does add significant value especially to the chapters dealing with developments around the Baltic Sea and the aforementioned Spanish Civil War chapter. Underwater incursions into Swedish waters and their role in Soviet military planning also gets covered in depth, and reading the chapters on these raises interesting questions with regards to Finnish Cold War history.

But back to the book. As VDV and different special forces were the preferred tools of trade in any interventions abroad, the book also deals with the Soviet foreign adventures of the Cold War. Some of these are largely forgotten today, like the Soviet-led Ethiopian operation that turned the tide of the Ogaden War by airlanding large amounts of light armour behind Somali lines. Others are well-known operations, but the role played by elite units in these might be overlooked. This is the case with Operation Danube, the invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968. The case-study of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is especially interesting, showing that little-green men is far from a new phenomenon.

Speaking of little green men, the book goes right up til early 2016 in Ukraine and Syria. Though to be fair, if your interest is the use of Russian special forces in these two conflicts in particular, you are better served elsewhere.

Where this book does shine then, is by providing a bird’s-eye view of more or less all Russian and Soviet elite units post-1917. Without getting caught up in minute details, you get a good overview of not only what kind of units have been created over the years, but also their use, equipment, and further developments. In some cases I wish there were more details given, but considering the sheer number of units raised by the armed forces, intelligence services, borders guards, and ministry of internal affairs, covering everything in depth in a 200-page book is simply impossible. In general I think the amount of time spent on each topic is fairly well balanced, though this naturally varies with taste. While the book can be read cover-to-cover, something I enjoyed doing as part of this review, this really is one of those books you want to have in your bookshelf to be able to pull out and use as a reference when encountering yet another Russian acronymed unit. The chapters are clearly defined and structured in a way that if you want to know the difference between the different combat divers of the navy or get an overview of the presidential guard, you can quickly skip to that chapter and get the answers you need. Some of the more interesting units presented include not only the brief history of the sole Soviet unit to feature jaegers (created by two Finns), but also a close look at the secretive deep-water research agency GUGI and its hydronauts. From a Finnish point of view, the fact that GUGI (like other underwater spetsnaz) extensively trains and performs evaluations and developments projects in the Baltic Sea and Lake Ladoga is of special interest.

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The shifted signature. Unfortunate, but not bad enough that I personally would consider it a deal-breaker.

Edit: Having heard of my issue with the binding, the publisher contacted me and expressed their surprise at the issue. According to them, this was very rare, and they offered to ship a replacement at no cost. The new book has now come, and I am happy to report that as far as I can tell there are no issues whatsoever with the quality of this one.

One unfortunate issue I had was that the quality of the binding left to be desired, and already during the first reading I noticed that one of the signatures had started to shift. It still holds together, and doesn’t seem about to loosen further. Naturally, I can’t say if this is representative of the edition as a whole, or if I was just unlucky (or if one of my kids somehow managed to have a stab at it without me noticing…).

What else is there to say? The book is well illustrated, largely in colour, and features both a timeline and an extensive source list (though, as always, I would have loved to see end-notes). As the title indicates, the special weaponry used is also covered, including some exotic pieces of gear like underwater grenade launchers. I dare say that some of the info included, especially those parts that are based on Swedish and/or untranslated Russian sources, is previously unpublished material not only in Swedish, but in the west as a whole. If you are able to read Swedish and interested in Russian (or Soviet) armed forces, this is the book for you.

Highly recommended.

Starting now I will be posting reviews every first Friday of the month. The book in this case was kindly provided for review by Fischer & Co. And Lars, wouldn’t a revised and expanded edition of Elitförband i Norden be an excellent companion to this one?

Hussars heading east

In an earlier post, I argued that the Suwałki gap was in fact ill-suited for a full-scale Russian armoured offensive with the goal of linking up Kaliningrad and Belarus, as the terrain and road network did not favour that kind of manoeuvres. This naturally leads to the next question, namely what the alternative would be?

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Major roads in Northeastern Poland (including planned expansions). Source: Wikimedia Commons/Sliwers

Going south from the gap, the first opportunity is Białystok. The city is the main hub of northeastern Poland, and features a significant amount of both roads and railroads, and has the benefit of being approachable from Belarus along two major road, Grodno-Białystok from the northeast and Baranovichi-Białystok from the East. From there it is possible to either turn north towards Suwałki (along E67, not visible on map) or southwest towards Warsaw. However, the areas east of the city  are heavily forested, and it represents a significant detour if the aim is to reach Suwałki from Grodno.

However, the route that promises a decisive victory fast, as well as dragging away Polish reinforcements from the Kaliningrad/Suwałki-region, is the E30/A2 road from Minsk via Brest and on to Warsaw. Brest is located directly on the eastern bank of the river Bug, which in this area marks the border between Poland and Belarus. Striking out from Brest would make it possible to potentially take the border bridges over Bug in a coup, or at the very least prepare the crossings on allied territory. Here, the E30 as well as the twin-rail railroad would provide a crucial lifeline for the advancing forces, and the right flank would be protected by the Bug.

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The Vistula basin covering the eastern parts of Poland would play a major role in influencing any operations in the area. Source: Wikimedia Commons/Kmusser

This is not a new idea. In the summer of 1944, the Soviet Operation Bagration included a major offensive in the Lublin-Brest area, where the Soviet forces (including the Polish 1st Army that was transfered from the Lviv sector halfway through the operation) captured bridgeheads over Vistula at Magnuszew and Puławy (approximately 60 and 100 km south of Warszaw) and over Narew at Serock (40 km north of the capital). However, the Polish capital did not change hands until the launching of the Vistula-Oder offensive in January the following year, a controversial fact from a Polish point view.

 The Vistula opposite Magnuszew, site of the bridgehead in 1944

As noted, this would be a major treat towards the Polish capital, and it is very likely that Poland would direct at least two of its three main divisions to meet this. In practice, the 16th ‘Pomorska‘ Mechanised Division would be left to deal with Kaliningrad, creating a situation where both sides would be roughly comparable, and causing a stalemate around the exclave. This would likely be in the interest of Russia, compared to an offensive closer to the Suwałki gap which would make it easier for Poland to shift troops from one front to the other, thereby negating part of Russia’s quantitative superiority.

The downside to these military upsides is that while a ‘disturbance’ in the Baltic region could perhaps be caused to look like a Ukraine-scenario, thereby delaying a NATO-reaction during the critical first days, an armoured corps moving west along the E30 would be a sure way of launching WWIII, especially as Germany would be far more likely to intervene if the advancing Russians where on the (literal) highway to Berlin than if they occupied Vilnius.

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PT-91 Twardy of the 1st Brigade. Source: Wikimedia Commons/Polish MoD

This is obviously not something that hasn’t crossed the minds of the Polish general staff, and the above-mentioned 16th Division actually has an additional armoured brigade in the form of the 1st ‘Warszawska‘ Armoured Brigade equipped with PT-91 Twardy (modernised T-72), BWP-1 (local-designation for BMP-1), and 2S1 Gvozdika. The brigade is headquartered in the Wesoła district on the eastern outskirts of Warsaw. In other words, it is located on the ‘right side’ of both the Bug and the Vistula, and as such is well-placed to meet any offensive along the Brest-Warsaw axis. However, the equipment is rather old, and while the Twardy is a significant step up from the T-72, it is still far from the latest generation of tanks.

As such, it is a noteworthy move when the Polish Defence Forces announce that a tank battalion from the 11th ‘Lubuska‘ Armoured Cavalry Division in the southwestern parts of Poland is set to transfer to Wesoła. This is to make room for the US Army units coming to Żagań, currently home to the division’s 34th Armoured Cavalry Brigade. The 34th sport two battalion equipped with the Leopard 2A5, currently Poland’s most modern main-battle tank. Moving one of these battalions East of the Vistula radically alters the number of units available to the Polish in this key area during the first day or so after mobilisation. It does seem like the Polish Army has recognised the need to be able to concentrate more high-quality units in defence of the capital at shorter notice, and comes as part of a trend in which the West tries to shorten response times in general, and with a focus on heavier units in particular. This is also evident from a Finnish perspective, and both the recent transfer of older Leopard 2A4’s to ‘new’ units and the creation of fast response units in the Army can be seen as part of this very same trend.

AAR – Operation Gudrun

For some Friday night off-topic, I’ve played a game of Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations. The game is best described as Harpoon on steroids, though the developer doesn’t think that catches the huge improvements found under the hood (“Only in the sense that each new FPS is a new version of Wolfenstein3D”). Anyhow, if it’s good enough for RAeS to blog about, it’s good enough for me.

The scenario in question is the later two-thirds of Swedish author/blogger Lars Wilderängs techno-thriller “Midvintermörker“, a Swedish “Red Storm Rising” set in Gotland during the last shivering days of 2012. This post will certainly contain spoilers, so if you are a Swedish-speaker who hasn’t read the book, go do so before reading any further.

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“Midvintermörker” was Wilderäng’s debut novel, and while the grand story might not be that innovative, it is still a very enjoyable battlefield description. The sequel “Midsommargryning” features a more complex and interesting story set in a ’round two’-scenario a few years after the first book, and the only real downside of the book is that the storytelling suffer a bit from the author taking the opportunity to sneak in a few political visions (those who have read Clancy’s later works knows what I’m talking about), such as an updated model for how conscription could work. On the whole, I personally find Wilderäng’s style of writing enjoyable, though I wouldn’t be surprised if some are irritated by his continued use of irony.

Still, the novel’s greatest achievement isn’t its literary merits, but the fact it played an important part in lifting the Gotland-question out of the #säkpol-blogosphere, and into the everyday political discussion in Sweden.

Operation Gudrun

(Gudrun was a storm that caused widespread destruction in Sweden during the early days of 2005, let’s hope that this time around the destruction is amongst the Russians and not the Swedish forces)

When we roll in, the Russians have landed in Slite, a small town on the eastern shores of Gotland, and are starting to unload their heavy equipment from a 18,000 DWT ro-ro ship. Our main objective is to sink this vessel, which should seriously delay the invasion. As the invasion took us completely by surprise, our radar networks are down, and the air force has suffered considerable losses. Our main forces are as followings:

We have a mechanised force (including Leopard 2A5’s and CV 9040’s) on Visby airport, which also holds two JAS 39C Gripen which was the islands QRA detachment before the outbreak of the hostilities. A number of infantry recon platoons are found on the island, as well as four mortar platoons, equipped with heavy mortars and STRIX anti-tank mortar rounds. On a wartime base (with practically no reloads) we have a number of Gripen’s armed with AIM-120B AMRAAM’s and IRIS-T missiles, and the main Gripen force is found north of Stockholm. Here we also have three Gripen’s armed with RB 15F anti-ship missiles, which will be my best bet in taking out the ro-ro. Outside of Slite one of our submarines lurk. I also have two C-130 Hercules transports loaded with special forces for an air drop, and some CB 90 H fast assault craft with Hellfire-armed marines aboard.

The enemy currently has air superiority (or to be precise, we have no idea what is found in the skies above the Baltic Sea, as our radar network is down), and two batteries of Tor (SA-15) SAM’s are in the area. In addition, they have superior ground forces, so we can’t just throw them out by racing headlong into Slite. This leads to a complex plan, given by the in-game objectives:

Objectives:

  1. Secure Tingstäde with ground units in order to stop any Russian ground forces from passing this point.
  2. Secure the airspace on and around Gotland enough to for a safe air drop. The drop may have to be done even if the airspace is not 100% in our hands.
  3. Bring the Tp 84’s* over the designated landing zone to the west of Slite.
  4. Find SA-15’s and have them destroyed using STRIX mortars or other weapons available.
  5. Destroy the RoRo ship before it is able to unload the majority of the landing force.

*Tp 84 is the Swedish designation for the Hercules.

While the plan is complex, it probably represents my best shot at getting things done, so I start by sending all mechanised units securing the airport towards Tingstäde. My forces are so small, I decide that keeping some units at the airport probably means spreading them too thin. Two of my three infantry recon platoons starts to head for the LZ, to check that the area is clear and, hopefully, get the location of the SAM’s even before we bring in the lumbering Hercules. My submarine meanwhile gets orders to patrol outside of Slite, and the CB 90’s start moving to take up position west of Fårö. If the sea outside of Slite is cleared, we might be able to sneak them close enough to get to a landing zone just north of the harbour, from where they can target the landing force with their Hellfires.

AAR first moves.JPG

The sub quickly locate three contacts outside the port, and identifies the southernmost (SKUNK #61) as a light frigate. Since we are talking about a non-Swedish naval ship just outside of an occupied Swedish port, I decide to manually mark it as hostile. Shortly thereafter, my northernmost recon infantry spots the other two contacts, and can confirm that SKUNK #62 and #67 are Parchim-II class light frigates. These have some ASW capability, with suitable sensors as well as weapons (torpedoes and RBU-6000). It seems the Russians have set up a picket chain of light frigates to protect the beachhead from unwanted visitors. Still, if there are no further surprises awaiting closer to shore, we should be able to handle them.

AAR Parchim.JPG

Our Norwegian friends decides to supply us with AWACS-data from the NATO-network over Link 16. Mange takk!

The infantry also makes another sighting, a single Su-25SM and two attack helicopters, a Mi-28N and a Mi-24V respectively, are airborne. As I completely lack any kind of ground based air defences, these could potentially make short work of my troops and plans. I decide to launch Gator #1 and #2, the two Gripen’s I have based in Gotland.

The plan is simple: get airborne, fire of all of my eight AMRAAM’s, and then land as fast as possible before enemy fighters or SAM’s wake up.

AAR anti-CAS.JPG

The result is a disaster. The aircrafts can’t get a single shot to connect, and while trying to get back to base, Gator #2 is brought down by a Tor, followed by Gator #1 by a R-27R launched by a Su-27 circling over the southern parts of the island (how did AWACS miss that one!?!). In the meantime, the Mi-24’s and Su-25’s target the mortars with missiles and bombs, wiping out one platoon completely and causing losses to another. The only positive thing with the sortie was that the aircraft identified the approximate location of the Tor-M1K’s, as well as the ships in Slite harbour. We also got confirmation that there are in fact two each of the helicopters, and a total of three Su-25’s over Gotland.

A four-ship JAS 39C’s from Aquila flight on the warbase is dispatched to take up the anti-CAS mission while I still have some mortars left…

The Mi-24’s then go for the Leopard’s, and knocks out one while another is hit but survives. The Mi-28’s in turn engages the remaining mortars with rockets but misses, and I send the mortars east into the LZ to get within firing range of the SAM’s approximate locations. Having expended all their munitions, the helicopters return to Slite and the Sukhoi’s depart for Kaliningrad.

In the meantime, our submarine has fired on FFL #61, the southernmost of the frigates, but misses. This causes the other Parchim’s to move north, away from Slite, but into the path the CB 90’s have to take if they are to attack the harbour.

However, while Gator flight was ultimately unsuccessful, surprisingly few enemy fighters are in the area. I decide that now is as good a time as any to dispatch my special forces. The Hercules pair depart for Gotland, ordered to fly as fast and as low as possible to the landing zone just west of the SAM sites.

AAR Aquila.JPG

One of the few Su-27S airborne over southern Gotland has turned towards the approaching Aquila flight, and come in over the Swedish mainland. The first AMRAAM salvo misses, but second finally brings it down.

The submarine takes a max-range shot at the north-eastern Parchim, while the northernmost recon infantry manages to report on ships in Slite. Seems it is a single ro-ro surrounded by four Ropucha LST. A pair of Su-24MP ELINT planes that have been flying west of the island are intercepted, with the first being brought down by an AMRAAM. The second turns east and tries to escape out over the sea.

The Parchim outruns the two torpedoes. Ought for four shots so far.

Two ground units are spotted to the southeast of the mortars. If these turn out to be anything more serious than light infantry, they will crush my mortars if they start moving north. One of the mortar batteries is sent further northwards to avoid having my whole stock of STRIX-grenades knocked out in one go, and a tank platoon supported by a mechanized infantry platoon are dispatched from Tingstäde to intercept the enemy forces. I keep most of my forces at Tingstäde, as I have a gap between the mortar units and my recon unit on the northern flank, and I don’t want some unspotted enemy platoons to sneak through there and take Tingstäde in my rear.

The second Su-24MP is finally brought down by an IRIS-T after having evaded several AMRAAM’s. In the chase one of the JAS 39C’s actually overflies the Tor-batteries (despite my effort to try and route them further south), but the radars are silent. Out of missiles?

AAR CAP.JPG

Turning south, a minor air battle evolves between two Su-27S and all four Gripen’s currently operating over Gotland. The Sukhoi’s make a clean sweep, including in one instance dodging an IRIS-T, and then downing the JAS 39C at close range with a R-27R…

AAR ground battle.JPG

In the meantime, the advancing tank platoon locates the position of the two SAM batteries, and identifies the two mobile contacts as two armour platoons (T-90A).  STRIX are called in on both batteries (knocking out one and damaging the other) and one armour platoon (damaged). The Leo’s then get permission to fire, and make quick work of the T-90’s, with the mortars finishing off the last SAM battery with traditional HE-rounds.

More CAP aircraft are slowly inbound, which hopefully should get to Gotland in time before the Herc’s do, and I decide to finally authorise the anti-ship mission. Three Gripen with Rb 15F anti-ship missiles will target the ro-ro, while three Gripen with Mjölner stand-off munitions dispenser will target the four Ropuchas. I have no idea what kind of damage the Mjölners will do to the ships, but it is worth a try.

A mechanised infantry unit is spotted on the outskirts of Slite, followed by two more units closer to the city.

AAR Parchim

The submarine has finally started to line up some shots, and bags two of the Parchim II’s.

In the next air encounter, a Su-27S dodges eight AMRAAM’s, and while another Su-24MP is brought down by an IRIS-T, a Su-25SM manages to bag Aquila #8 with an R-60T. There seems to be something wrong with our missiles today.

AAR Endgame

However, the first two RB 15F hits the ro-ro vessels, and the ships is a total loss.

Conclusion

With the ro-ro ship destroyed, the primary invasion force has been significantly reduced, and the scenario ended.

I have somewhat mixed feelings about the scenario. It was great fun to play the storyline from the book, but there was a few issues with the implementation. The main problem was that the Russian ground units didn’t fire upon my forces. I don’t know if this was caused by limitations to the game, it is called ‘modern air/naval combat’ for a reason, or if the scenario designer had forgot to mark a checkbox somewhere. The Russian naval force was also markedly weaker than in the book, and I believe it might even have been possible to just launch the air attack without first taking out the SAM’s. I also couldn’t get the ‘Hercules over the LZ’-trigger to fire, but this might have been due to the Tor’s already having been taken out, and when starting the mission some Russian mission areas were set up wrongly. Other than that, and ‘Romeo’ being misspelled ‘Romio’ in all instances, it worked out rather nicely.

On my part, my single largest mistake was sending Gator straight for the enemy, which lead them to having to overfly the SAM’s on their way home. A better idea would have been to send them out west over the sea, turn around and fire, and then land on the airport without actually overflying the battlefield at any point. I also was unable to take advantage of the fact that I had local numerical superiority in almost all dogfights, as well as having active medium-range missiles against an enemy equipped only with semi-active ones. In a perfect world, I should have been able to use my AMRAAM’s to force the Sukhoi’s to turn away before the R-27R’s could impact. For those wanting to try out the scenario, it is found here

For the game itself, it is a blast to play! Granted, the learning curve is quite steep, and such seemingly simple things as setting up a patrol zone can be daunting if you have many border points. The execution is however good for the scale, and small touches like actually showing the probability of hit, modifiers, and RNG roll for each weapon engagement makes a surprisingly big difference for accepting outcomes that goes against what one feels should be the case (such as AMRAAM’s consistently missing ~50-75 % PH shots). There are some (minor) issues, especially with the ground units. The Leopards were able to identify boogies as fighters at longer ranges than the Gripen, which doesn’t feel right. Also, as the player sees everything his or her forces see, this gives too much information to certain units, and the possibility to game the system. Note however that while this helps with tactics, all platforms have their individual sensors modelled, so for the most part platforms still need to get the proper sensor lock (which can be anything from Eyeball Mk.1 to a specific radar) before they can target hostile units within range. For recommendations regarding what scenario to play, I recommend this one, where the player gets to command the Finnish Navy and Air Force in defense of the Åland Islands against the approaching Baltic Fleet. 

Admittedly, watching blue and red symbols move over a map isn’t everyone’s idea of a nice pastime, but for the readers of the blog, this might be one game simulator to look into!

Final score card

SIDE: Sweden

===========================================================

LOSSES:

——————————-

5x 120mm Mortar [STRIX]

7x JAS 39C Gripen

1x Leopard 2A5 Main Battle Tank

EXPENDITURES:

——————

8x Tp 613

9x RB 98 IRIS-T [AIM-2000A]

40x RB 99 AMRAAM [AIM-120B]

4x Generic Flare Salvo [2x Cartridges, Single Spectral]

4x Generic Flare Salvo [4x Cartridges, Single Spectral]

15x Generic Chaff Salvo [8x Cartridges]

120x 120mm STRIX Mortar HE

16x 120mm Rheinmetall APFSDS-T

180x 120mm Mortar HE

2x RB 15F Mk2

 

SIDE: Russia

===========================================================

LOSSES:

——————————-

1x Su-25SM Frogfoot A

2x Su-27S Flanker B

4x Su-24MP Fencer F

3x SA-15b Gauntlet [9A331] TELAR

8x T-90A Main Battle Tank

2x SKR Parchim II [Pr.1331]

1x Commercial RO/RO Vessel [18,000t DWT]

EXPENDITURES:

——————

16x AA-10 Alamo A [R-27R, MR SARH]

5x Generic Flare Salvo [4x Cartridges, Single Spectral]

37x Generic Chaff Salvo [4x Cartridges]

384x S-5K 57mm Rocket

8x AT-6 Spiral [9M114 Sturm-V]

3x AA-8 Aphid [R-60TM]

10x SA-15b Gauntlet [9M331]

8x RBK-250-PTAB CB [30 x PTAB-2.5 Anti-Tank Bomblets]

8x AA-10 Alamo C [R-27RE, LR SARH]

Exercises and (a lack of) confidence building measures

The only thing differentiating war from maneuvers is the last stage on the last day. The concentration of forces and the logistics is the same for both.”

– Lt.Col. Ben-Porat, AMAN, on the lessons drawn from the Soviet repression of the Prague Spring (as quoted in Abraham Rabinovich’s ‘The Yom Kippur War’)

There is a major problem with Russia’s continued large-scale military maneuvers, in that they could easily be used as a cloak for invading a neighbouring country.

There is nothing wrong with letting the defence forces train. In fact, it is a crucial part of maintaining a functioning armed force. Exercises not only let soldiers on all levels practice their skills and get used to life in the field, but it is also the best tool available (short of actual war) for evaluating the standards of the force exercised and identifying possible shortcomings.

However, as noted by Ben-Porat above, putting your forces in the field with equipment and logistical backup makes them ready to go to war. Especially if you include mobilising other supporting functions in the society and include live firings, as has frequently been the case with the large Russian exercise held during the recent years.

Due to this, non-aggressive countries usually employ a number of different measures to build confidence amongst other countries that they in fact do not plan to go to war. These include e.g. pre-announcing the exercises, including key information such as scope, location, and stated aim of the exercise in the communique. Inviting foreign observers will also ease the tension. Placing major exercises far from potential flashpoints also helps. Certain elements needed, e.g. bridging equipment, can also at times be left out of the major exercises, and instead be practiced in smaller scenarios (though this is not always advisable, as there is a great benefit in practicing all parts of the machinery at the same time).

Russia does none of these things. Instead, Russia has chosen to leave the CFE treaty. They have held a significant number of large and very large exercises, often in the western parts of the country, and sometimes very close to the border. In addition, the exercises are usually not pre-announced, but snap drills. These are exactly the kind of exercises that rapidly could turn into an invasion, and the fact that they take place with regular intervals also mean that a real build-up to an invasion would be hard to spot amongst the string of similar snap exercises. All of this wouldn’t be that much of a problem, if not for the continued aggressive behavior by the Kremlin, including invading and occupying part of two neighboring countries during the past eight years.

The latest round of exercises is in effect nothing short of a mobilisation of a number of units in a composition that would allow for a swift transition into combat operations, and Russia doesn’t really seem interested in trying to disprove this notion. This resembles the build-up to the invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, as well as the above mentioned intervention in Czechoslovakia, where a seemingly normal series of exercises in a number of Warsaw Pact countries suddenly turned into a full-blown invasion featuring over a quarter of a million soldiers from four countries. However, perhaps even more spectacular was the success of the Egyptian-orchestrated deception leading up to the Yom Kippur War.

A Case Study: Exercise Tahrir-41 becomes Operation Badr

In the spring of 1973 the Egyptian army massed a significant force on the west bank of the Suez Canal. This included not only combat-ready troops, tanks, and artillery, but bridging equipment as well. Amongst the Egyptians were found contingents from other Arab nations, including fighter squadrons from the Libyan and Iraqi air forces.

For Israel, standing on the opposite bank of the ‘best anti-tank ditch in the world’, this presented a problem. The Israeli army was made up largely of reservists, and mobilising would mean a significant disruption in the everyday life of the Israeli society. The Israeli intelligence community was also split, with the leader of AMAN, the military intelligence directorate, judging the risk of war as ‘very low’. The general staff of the IDF and the leadership of the foreign intelligence department Mossad disagreed. It was not that they felt that war was a certainty, but due to the consequences if war was to break out they argued for raising the level of preparedness.

Mod IMG_3034

War did not break out in May, and the whole situation would probably have slipped into obscurity, if not for the fact that half a year later, the same situation repeated itself. On October 1, Egypt launched a large scale exercise codenamed Tahrir-41. This had been preceded by a general movement of troops towards the canal and a raising of the alert level in all three branches of the Egyptian defence forces. The development was closely monitored by the Israeli intelligence community, who actually got wind of the exercise already on the night between 24 and 25 September, when a division was spotted being moved towards the canal. They then continued to follow the build-up, which included mobilisation of reserves, cancelling leaves, and works on fortifications. In the same way, a build-up by Syrian forces across the ceasefire line in the Golan Heights was monitored, but dismissed as simply a defensive move following fears of an Israeli response following an air battle held earlier in September.

Mod IMG_3033

A few dissenting voices were present in the higher echelons of the Israeli intelligence and defence communities. Notably, deputy chief of staff, and armoured corps legend, General Israel Tal, who insisted that Syria was preparing to launch an imminent attack, and that if the air force was neutralised due to weather or enemy air defences, the balance of forces was such that the Syrians would sweep through the Israeli defences in Golan and down into the Galilee. Inside AMAN, Lieutenant Colonel Keniezer, the officer responsible for Jordan, had got into an actual shouting match over the war threat with General Shalev, head of AMAN research sector, after Jordan’s king Hussein secretly visited Tel Aviv and warned Israeli prime minister Meir that Syria was preparing to go to war. Lieutenant Colonel Ya’ar, the officer in charge of Syria, also believed war was imminent, and bypassed the chain of command to warn IDF’s Northern Command directly. Colonel Ben-Porat, chief of AMAN’s SIGINT department, was also questioning the official line. He had been the one who studied the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on location the year after it took place, and now asked for permission to call up 200 intelligence reservists and to activate the most secret listening equipment available to the department. However, General Zeira, the commander of AMAN, was not impressed, and, pointing to the similarities to the exercise held in May, got the final word.

Mod IMG_3027

On the sixth of October five Egyptian divisions crossed the Suez Canal at the same time as three Syrian divisions launched an assault on the Israeli lines in the Golan Heights. The Yom Kippur War had begun.

All pictures taken by author at Emek Ha’Bakha (‘Valley of Tears’) in Golan, site of one of the hardest-fought battles of the war.

Milk, Market failures, and an MP

Growing food in northern Europe is the perfect example of a market failure.

The weather is cold and unpredictable, the labour costs high, and few of the areas here are known for being particularly fertile. In strict economic terms, we would be better of letting someone in a warmer place produce the food, which we then could trade for something else.

However, food is amongst the most basic needs of human beings, and maintaining a certain degree of self-sufficiency is a strategic interest. Enter the need for the government to step in and subsidize the farming sector.

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Interestingly enough, while the Finnish agricultural sector is very limited in the scope of people employed by it, the former Agrarian party is still a dominant force within the current Finnish political landscape. Exactly how this has come to be is an interesting question, but for now it is enough to note that the Centre Party currently is the largest party and holds the Prime Minister’s seat, and apart from including a strong agricultural wing, the party also has a history of leading the Finlandisation process during the Cold War.

With this in mind, it came as no surprise when Jari Leppä, member of parliament and chairman of the Parliamentary Committe for Agriculture and Forestry, now joined a number of MP’s calling for an end to the EU imposed sanctions on Russia, so that the “market would get moving again”. While the EU has not imposed any sanctions regarding food products, Finnish farmers, and especially the dairy farmers, have been hit hard by the Russian counter sanctions. The alternative, according to Leppänen, is that EU would compensate the farmers “fully” for the downturn in exports to avoid “a single segment of the population paying for great power politics”, as he describes the current situation.

This was rapidly shot down by both leading Centre politicians and the minister in charge of foreign trade (coming from the National Coalition Party). The government stands firmly behind the common EU-line, was the message, and minister Mykkänen also pointed out that with the Ruble being roughly half of what it was before the invasion of Crimea, the exports would unlikely be at the same level anyhow.

While I greatly sympathize with the hardship endured by the Finnish farmers in general and due the Russian sanctions in particular, I still feel that Leppä’s move is purely populist in nature. Russia, Finland’s authoritarian neighbour, has invaded and forcefully annexed a part of another sovereign country two and a half years ago, as well as continuing to wage a low-intensity war there. Discussing ending the sanctions in the hope of getting Russia to end their sanctions, because we have to remember that it is a Russian and not a EU’s decision that stops Finnish dairy exports, is the completely wrong signal for militarily non-aligned Finland to send. Saying that that agriculture is the single sector affected by the sanctions/counter sanctions is also plain wrong. Several different manufacturing and service branches have been affected, either directly or indirectly by the downturn in Russian economy. The difference is that companies in other sectors have to bear their geopolitical risks themselves, which they also factor in when making export pushes in potentially unstable markets, a description which was apt for the Russian market long before Crimea.

For the agricultural sector, the situation has been different, as the primary producers sell their wares to one of a very limited number of buyers, who then makes the decision where to sell the goods to the consumer. This means that the individual farmers can’t take part in deciding where to push their exports, while still, unlike workers in other sectors, they share in the economic risks due to often being small-scale entrepreneurs. This is in many ways the core of the problem for the Finnish agricultural sector, and has nothing to do with Russia in particular. Rather, it is a case of a poor negotiating position and a high economic risk leading to a very small room to maneuver when it comes to sudden shifts in the market. It is in many ways imperative that the government aids in trying to solve this puzzle, but if further compensation is to be paid, it should be done due to the disastrous rainfall this summer, and not because Russia has decided to invade their neighbours and implement sanctions on Finnish milk.