One of the earliest aspects of the current wave of close Finnish-Swedish military cooperation has been that between the marine infantry in the two countries. This was formalised as the Swedish Finnish Amphibious Task Unit (SFATU), which originally was envisaged as a crisis management tool for the littorals. In later years the scope has been increased, as can be seen during the upcoming weeks when the unit will be training in Finnish waters. Parallel to the Navy’s main exercise Silja, the unit will perform a short pre-exercise which started 27 May, and on 3 June SFATU will switch over to the main exercise and take part in Silja together with the better part of the Finnish Navy (including the marines and coastal units). The Swedish marines are joining in the fun with a total force numbering around 400 personnel and around 40 boats.
As usually when the two forces operate next to each other the differences in equipment has raised some questions, especially in this case where both units are tailored to operate in the same niche environment that make up the Northern and Western coastline of the Baltic Sea. The most striking difference is the combat boats used, which don’t show much of a resemblance to each other. It should be noted here that in my line of work at Kongsberg Maritime Finland Oy, formerly Rolls-Royce Oy Ab, I have come into contact with both vessels. However, all information in this post is based purely on open sources (as is all my writing). In addition, I won’t discuss concepts of operations or similar details covered by OPSEC in this post, even in cases where such information is available in open sources.
The CB 90H is a truly iconic vessel. The development work took place in the late 80’s, and the first vessels entered operational service in late 1990 under the designation Stridsbåt 90. The Swedish designation literally means Combat Boat 90, and in the same way as Strf 90 thanks to it’s export success is universally known as CV 90 the boat quickly went from StrB 90 to CB 90 internationally. From the outset the vessel was known as CB 90H (‘H’ coming from its ability to transport half a platoon) to distinguish it from the somewhat similarly looking but smaller and simpler 90E (‘E’ standing for Enkel, the Swedish word for simple).
CB 90 was an almost instant success both domestically and on the export market. At a time when many navies still used open landing crafts powered by traditional propeller/rudder-arrangements or outboards it employed twin waterjets to give superior maneuverability and a very good acceleration and top speed. The vessel also came armed with heavy machine guns which could support the landing, and the possibility to lay mines or drop depth charges over the stern. But perhaps the most visually striking detail is the extremely low profile. This is made possible by moving the control station to the very front of the vessel, allowing the crew a good view over the bow despite being placed low inside the hull. The vessel scored a number of export deals, including to Norway, Mexico, Malaysia, and the US Navy (known locally as Riverine Command Boat, RCB). Both for the export market and for domestic use a number of different versions have been developed, including versions sporting ballistic protection. The latest version is the Stridsbåt 90HSM for the Swedish marines, which feature better protection, a new driveline, and provisions for a remote weapon station. The latest order means that Dockstavarvet, nowadays owned by Saab, will be able to celebrate 20 years of CB 90 production (though not continuously).
The general layout has been successful enough that it has been adopted by a number of foreign projects, none of which have enjoyed the same success of the original design. It isn’t completely without drawbacks though. The most important drawback is that the placement of the crew stations in front of the passenger compartment leads to a chokepoint when the marines exit between the navigator and the helmsman. Sitting close to the bow also means that the crew will experience heavier loads on their bodies when encountering waves (especially at speed in rougher conditions). Rearward vision also suffers, and in general keeping a low profile means that there are certain limitations once it comes to situational awareness and the ability to mount sensors and weapons high. Still, these are of secondary importance to a vessel whose main purpose is to get marines ashore, and fast.
At the same time as the Swedish Navy was busy driving around in combat boats, the Finnish marines had to make do with open and semi-open landing crafts. These weren’t necessarily bad landing crafts, but they offered little combat potential (no, a pintle-mounted 12.7 mm NSV doesn’t make a combat boat) and worse protection for both the crew and the embarked marines. On the positive side, their conventional layout meant that loading larger cargo was possible, and swiftly getting marines out of the passenger compartment was relatively easy. Having the crew at the rear also meant that slamming the bow in heavy weather doesn’t affect the crew in the same way, instead letting the unfortunate few marines closest to the bow take the beating. Especially the Jurmo-class was a very good ‘truck’ for the marines. But it was still a truck, and the Swedish marines were driving around in (light) APCs.
The answer to the demands of the Finnish marines came to be the Jehu-class, where much of the focus is placed on combat ability. The Jehu, or Watercat M18 AMC as it is known to its builder Marine Alutech, comes with both ballistic- and CBRN-protection, a roof-mounted RWS (Saab’s Trackfire RWS in Finnish service), and a serious communications suite. Following on the Finnish traditions, the passenger compartment is close to the bow, meaning that the control stations are in a raised deckhouse found midships. This means that the vessel in general will be higher (adding weight), but also offers more space for the crew working area. To compensate for being larger, the vessel has some serious power, with the twin engines being rated at 1,150 hp (compared to two times 625 hp on the original CB 90H and two times 900 hp in ‘operational‘ setting on the 90HSM).
Bigger isn’t always better, but the increased size of the Jehu compared to both CB 90H as well as earlier Finnish designs opens up new possibilities, such as the fitting of a 120 mm NEMO mortar turret (with a direct fire ability). This is a capability the Finnish Navy urgently needs, and something which almost gave the Swedish marines their SB 2010 a decade ago. In the end, SB 2010 remained a paper product, cancelled by overzealous politicians, but the concept had called for a larger combat boat, with a general layout not completely unlike that of the Jehu.
In the end, the CB 90H and Jehu are examples of the principle that the same operational environment can lead to rather different solutions, all depending on how you prioritise between the inevitable trade-offs.
A few weeks ago a blog post discussing Swedish artillery at the brigade level caught my eye. As I noted last year,Finland is looking at the retirement of a significant portion of our brigade level assets in the near future, and which system should replace these is far from obvious. The post by Öhman was also of the kind of outside the box thinking I like to bring forward, so I contacted him and asked for permission to run an English translation. The translation is my own, and all faults when it comes to jargon are my own work as well.
The author Peter Öhman is a Swedish officer with a solid knowledge of anything armour or artillery who currently works at the Swedish Defence Material Administration. You will find him on Twitter and on his blog.
In a future growing Army there are many who feel that Haubits 08 ‘Archer’ would be optimally used as a divisional asset. It is a sensible idea which has been discussed in many places, but which won’t be developed further here.
With Haubits 08 as a divisional asset there would appear a void on the brigade level, as we don’t have any towed Haubits 77 mothballed. What should then be the remedy?
If one looks at the different requirements for a brigade-level artillery system they could look something like this:
Instantaneous firepower that allows a unit of size X to fire a fire mission in under 10 seconds,
Accuracy that allows the fire mission to hit the target location,
The ability to maintain sustained fire for X amount of time,
Protection which allows the artillery unit to operate together with the rest of the brigade,
Mobility which allows the artillery unit to move with the brigade’s battle,
In practice this means that the artillery piece must have a certain rate of fire, especially initially. The ability to sustain fire over time is created by bringing lots of ammunition, having the ability to reload rapidly, having an efficient logistics chain, and sporting a high resistance to the barrel heating.
Protection means protection against shrapnel, but also signature reduction and the ability to rapidly move to a new position after firing. When discussing mobility it is easy to get dragged into a discussion about tracks or wheels, which is a balance between the ability to quickly transfer between battalions and cross-country mobility to reach suitable firing positions in the terrain. Very few today consider using towed pieces, due to the longer time to get them into position.
High availability may be technical reliability, but it may also be based on mobility, and perhaps most of all range.
As the requirements are broken down into details, sooner or later the question about what calibre should be used will become the topic of the day.
Of what calibre should a future system be?
155 mm is of course the NATO-standard and a calibre which has been working well since at least the Second World War. We can’t abandon a NATO-standard by ourselves, and we have old ammunition stocks which we need to be able to use. That’s how easy the analysis can be. Now is when I will be unreasonable and question this train of thought. Is 155 mm really an obvious choice for supporting the fighting formations of a brigade? The following text should be treated as something of a “military satire”.
If we look at the specifications for a number of common artillery systems in 152 and 155 mm we get the following table:
Ranges given are for standard rounds, i.e. not including base bleed or similar technologies.
When looking at even large calibers such as 203 mm the big benefit of 155 mm is that it is easier to handle both for humans and machines. A 155 mm shell weighs around 45 kg, compared to at least twice as much for a 203 mm one. The recoil forces are also about twice as big, leading to an unreasonably large gun. The range will also be short unless one want a barrel that is 2.5 m longer than the already long 155 mm L/52 barrels. Big and heavy ammunition also leads to a low rate of fire. The US M110 howitzer with an L/25 barrel has a range of 17 km with standard ammunition. Weighing 28 tons it only carry two rounds. This means a continuous supply of ammunition is required, and even in the best case scenario the rate of fire is around 1 shot/min.
The Russian 2S7 is bigger and weighs a staggering 46.5 ton, have a L/56.2 barrel which gives a V0 of 960 m/s and gives the 110 kg shell an impressive 37.5 km range. However, it only carries 8 rounds and can at best handle a rate of fire of 2.5 shots/min. 2S7 is 13 meters long and has a crew of seven.
These kinds of calibres are unreasonable for highly-mobile artillery that supports the combat units of a brigade, and are better suited to hammering fortifications.
Eastern countries also employ 122 mm. The most common vehicle is the 2S1 (122 PsH 74 in Finnish service) which fire a 21.7 kg shell out to 15.3 km from a L/36 barrel, it weighs 16 ton, has a crew of four, and carries 40 rounds.
A modernised version of the 2S1 is known as the 2S34 Khosta which sports a 120 mm gun/mortar with a range of 14 km. The same gun is found in the 2S31 Vena which carries 70 rounds and weighs 19.5 tons.
In Sweden we had the 12/80, a 120 mm version of Haubits 77. With a L/55 barrel it had the same range with load 2 that the L/38 Haubits 77 had as its maximum range.
Calibre 105 mm is something that usually has been found on the battalion level. An example of a modern system is Hawkeye which is based on the HMMWV. The weight is just 4.4 ton. With a L/27 barrel is has a range of 11.5 km with a 15 kg shell. According to one source 8 rounds are carried.
There are also long-ranged 105 mm systems. The Swedish turreted automatic 105/50 with L/54 barrel had a range of 20 km. It is especially interesting that a number of other countries still cling to and develop 120 mm-class guns. I will therefore make a comparison between 120 and 155 mm weapons when it comes to a few specifications I regard as critical for brigade artillery.
Range, less is more!
Upon a quick comparison 155 mm seems to have the edge when it comes to range. 15.3 km from a L/36 barrel compared to 24 km from an L/39 when comparing 2S1 and M109. However, 2S1 uses a rather modest 3.8 kg powder charge to reach a V0 of 680 m/s and 15.3 km. At the other end of the spectrum, Swedish 120 mm Tornautomatpjäs 9101 (12/70) uses a L/62 barrel to reach 27 km with a V0 of 880 m/s. The earlier mentioned 120 mm 9501 (12/80 Karin) can reach 21.1 km with charge no 2 with a V0 of 800 m/s. 155 mm guns with a 800 m/s V0 can reach around 22 km, meaning that the difference is rather small. 120 mm as a calibre has good ballistic properties. With a barrel length of around L/50 a 120 mm gun will use 5-6 kg and a 155 mm one 12-15 kg of powder to reach a V0 of 800 m/s. A 120 mm L/62 is also 60 cm shorter than a 155 mm L/52. In other words a rather small potential edge in range for the 155 mm is balanced against having a long barrel that’s still easily handled for the 120 mm.
Another aspect of the range question plays a major role in the discussion, and this is where less is more. The fact is that when the range approaches or pushes beyond 20 km, the shells will follow a trajectory that is so high, and spend such a long time airborne that the weather makes accuracy unacceptably poor. The reason is partly because it becomes hard to reach the desired effect without ranging shots and/or the need for additional rounds in target, and partly because the increased dispersion increases the danger for the friendly units one tries to support. Base bleed and rocket assisted projectiles (RAP) which are used to increase the ranges also further diminish accuracy and increase cost. To counter this increase in dispersion once the range is edging towards 40 km technical aids such as precision-guided rounds and course correcting fuzes are used. These are very expensive, and ill-suited to the massed fires required to support ground combat. Firing at ranges between 30 and 40 km also has other consequences. At least double the gas pressure and V0 close to 1,000 m/s leads to increased strain on the equipment and faster wear. My opinion is that if the laws of physics makes it a bad, or at the very least an expensive, idea to use supporting fires at ranges above 20 km, then we shouldn’t invest too much money and effort into such a capability for systems acquired to support ground combat. To reach 20+ km 120 mm is plenty enough.
Presume a fire mission of 24 155 mm rounds would be replaced by a single round with the same weight of just over 1,000 kg in the middle of the target area. It is obvious that the effect would be poor in the majority of the target area and unnecessary good close to the giant round. Ordinarily one strives to spread the effect evenly over the whole target area. Case in point being the use of submunitions. Before the Convention on Cluster Munitions there was even a project on introducing 120 mm mortar rounds with submunitions, and in Russia who doesn’t give a damn about the ban on submunitions their use is increasing. Against fortified targets heavier rounds do however maintain the edge.
In a comparison between a big bang and thousands of submunitions one can compare the weights of 24 rounds of 155 mm, 45 rounds of 120 mm, and 72 rounds of 105 mm. The superior effect would in this case come from 72 rounds of 105 mm. A good indication is that a Swedish fire mission of 24 120 mm mortar rounds is treated as the equal to 18 155 mm rounds. The weight of a mortar round is in fact more closely equal to that of a 105 mm howitzer round. The effect of a single 120 mm howitzer round matches very closely that of a 155 mm one. The issue is that one reaches further with a heavy round, but preferably would split it up in many smaller units when reaching the target area to get superior effect. As long as we uphold a ban on submunitions the importance of choosing a calibre that gives good effect in the target increases. Scientific advances also make it possible to fit a seeker in smaller rounds than before, though it would be difficult to get as good effect e.g. out of a 120 mm BONUS-round as out of a 155 mm one.
To compare the logistics footprint I make the assumption that 24 155 mm rounds equals 30 120 mm rounds when it comes to effect. A complete 155 mm round has a weight of around 60 kg, made up of a 45 kg shell and a 15 kg charge. Similarly, a complete 120 mm round weighs around 32 kg, of which 25 kg is the shell and 7 kg the charge. The fire mission of the 120 mm gun would then come in at two-thirds the total weight of the 155 mm fire mission. If you include a casing to allow for the automatic handling of the ammunition a complete 120 mm round comes in at approximately 40 kg, meaning the fire mission is just 83% of the weight of the 155 mm one. However, fixed ammunition require more space, and the 120 mm fire mission with fixed ammunition will take up approximately 20% more space. However, comparing against fixed 155 mm ammunition the latter will weigh 70% more and take up 40% more space. The benefit of fixed ammunition is that in the same way as with Bkan and 120/80 it is possible to have a higher degree of automation when firing and handling the rounds. This in turn leads to a higher rate of fire and better effect in target. The conclusion is that with fixed 120 mm ammunition you get a similar logistic footprint, but with a round that is more easy to handle and you will be able to get off more rounds which will give as good or better effect in target compared to 155 mm. In real terms, a full charge 120 mm round with a fixed casing will weigh less than 40 kg, and can easily be carried from vehicle to vehicle by a single soldier. A 155 mm round with a fixed casing will come in at 85 kg and will need two persons to carry it, not the least due to the uneven weight distribution. If an autoloader could use the kind of combustible casings that tank rounds use, it should be possible to shave a few additional kilograms of the 120 mm round.
Autoloading versus manual
To achieve good effect in target a high rate of fire is a good tool, and to reach a high rate of fire the ammunition and its handling plays a big role. 155 mm howitzers usually have a rate of fire that varies between 3 to 10 rounds per minute with separate loading ammunition. These are usually either completely manual or equipped with different kinds of automatic handling and loading aids. Some have the ability to fire off a few quick rounds, before settling in for a lower sustained rate of fire. E.g. Haubits 77A was able to fire three shots in less than ten seconds. This is possible as the charges are put in a casing, which allows for the use of a very quick vertically sliding breech block. The shell and the casing is then loaded with a hydraulic rammer. To fire really quickly fixed casings are needed. E.g. Bkan 1 has a technical rate of fire of 18 rounds/min. The 12/80 is another example albeit with 120 mm calibre. With an autoloader the 12/80 fires off 16 rounds/min. There are even faster Swedish guns. 120 mm anti-aircraft gun 4501 has a rate of fire of no less than 80 rounds/min. The 23 ton heavy gun carries 52 rounds.
Another Swedish rapid-firing gun, although in 105 mm, is the Strv 103. As far as I remember, the technical rate of fire is 26-27 rounds/min and the tank carries 50 rounds. To note is that the sole 155 mm field artillery piece amongst these was the Bkan 1. The reason behind this is, amongst other things, that the mechanism becomes large and heavy. It is also unable to bring along more than 14 rounds. This is likely one of the reasons why modern 155 mm guns almost universally have separate loading munitions. The second, and perhaps even more important issue, is that one wants to be able to set the charge size for each round, and not be limited to a pre-set number of each charge that is set already when the ammunition is manufactured. In 120 mm it should however be possible to benefit from the carefree handling of fixed ammunition and bring more rounds, without the rounds becoming overly large.
Autoloaders is however not an end in itself, except when it comes to the firing. As mentioned earlier, 120 mm is considerably easier to move by hand. This includes fixed case 120 mm ammunition, which thanks to its below 40 kg weight can be moved in the same way ammunition was replenished in Strv 103.
Will there be something else than 155 mm if we buy a new system?
I have a hard time believing that, 155 mm is in all essence even more standard than 7.62 mm. That is why I describe this as an unreasonable brigade artillery. If one would start from a clean sheet, it is however entirely possible that with the technological advances of today the conclusion would be that another calibre would be better suited for supporting the brigades. Perhaps based on some of the reasoning found above.
But we just have to accept that we do not begin with a blank sheet, instead there are several limiting factors that affect the outcome. At the same time, evident truths need to be questioned every now and then. E.g. the miniaturisation of electronics allow for ever smaller rounds to become “smart”. If the reasoning behind 155 mm was the need for precision guided munitions the choice of calibre could be reevaluated now. However, over time factors such as standardisation have become important and will lead to the continued use of 155 mm.
Are we in the West looking for the right capabilities?
As a short sidetrack to the discussion on calibre choice I would like to touch upon two topics that I believe are receiving too much attention: the race for range and extreme precision.
With each new gun there are new solutions to push the range out even further, from L/39 barrels to L/52 as the new standard, and now barrels out to L/58 are discussed even for guns such as the M777.
Base bleed, RAP, and ramjet projectiles are other ways of reaching further. It is easy to see the benefit of reaching longer, and easy to quantify range as a requirement or selling point, which is why it is often in the spotlight. But range threatens to become the “24 cm higher cabin” of the artillery, an extreme cost driver. Longer range also places indirect requirements on extreme accuracy, no longer is just “rather accurate” good enough. The technology behind the increased accuracy is and will continue to be expensive. This means that the ammunition used to fire far away and with high accuracy becomes too expensive to use for massed fires. The most extreme example is the 155 mm guns of the Zumwalt-class which were supposed to receive rounds capable of reaching 153 km. The price tag became close to 1,000,000 USD/round as opposed to the planned 35,000 USD. The contract was revoked and the destroyers now lack a suitable round for their guns.
There need to be an analysis regarding the missions of individual systems. For a multitool, which is the role one can say that the Haubits 08 has been forced into, long range is a must. If it is a battalion-level asset, the conclusion might be that the 8 km range of a mortar is enough. If the mission is to support the fighting battalions of a brigade, the requirements need to be in sync with those demands, and not necessarily with those of the multitool. Was the reasoning behind the 150 km range of the Zumwalt’s 155 mm guns really correct? Should one have opted for another system if 150 km range was demanded?
The quest for accuracy partly comes from the increased range, but also from some kind of engineering bewitchment for perfection. Accuracy is very nice when the enemy headquarters is located or when the enemy has put their fighting positions close to a hospital. But at the end of the day, artillery is an area effect weapon, and to achieve effect it is enough to hit the target area instead of aiming for the bullseye with every round. I am worried that we in the West is forgetting this. I don’t know how many times I’ve heard “Isn’t it jolly good to have better accuracy, that we can get the same effect with fewer rounds.” I have tried to explain that it is enough to be in the right area and that it is more important to be able to fire large volumes in many places, which increases the odds that the enemy will be suppressed in many different spots. Often the fire mission is based on an estimate on the enemy and the terrain, and not on an observation. If one can see the enemy both we and the enemy can use direct fire, and it is the losses that causes which we wish to avoid. Why then aim for a few expensive bullseyes and completely overlook massed fires? Making this case is often like talking to the wall. I will however persist, gutta cavat lapidem.
That is what the Swedish Navy strives to do. With the Baltic Sea becoming busier and busier, maintaining situational awareness require not only information sharing with partners and a solid chain of land-based sensors, but also a presence out in the thick of it. And this is tied to the biggest challenge the force faces today – out of an estimated need of 24 vessels, the fleet currently consist of 7 units. And while stealth and the ability to choose when to be visible is a force multiplier, it can only improve the situation so much. As such, increasing the number of vessels is described as “vital”.
But this leads to the next round of issues – “personnel, personnel, personnel.” On the whole recruitment is going “rather well”, but there are some difficulties. Still, if the Navy is to grow, having fully trained crews for the high-end platforms such as corvettes and submarines will take time. For the time being, no conscripts serve aboard the vessels, though this might change if the Navy starts growing rapidly.
But in the meantime cooperation with the Finnish Navy provide added capabilities. The point was raised that cooperation between the two navies are deeper compared to the Armies and the Air Forces. This stems from the fact that the first steps are relatively easy to take, as the ships can meet in the middle of the sea, avoiding high-profile invitations and vehicle convoys passing through the territory of the host nation. This in turn gave the two navies a head start, once the drive for deeper FISE-cooperation kicked off in earnest. In a region where incidents or mishaps could escalate and increase uncertainty, both navies view the FISE-cooperation as increasing stability and security in the region.
The introduction of new Russian vessels such as the Buyan-M and the Karakourt-class corvettes provide the Baltic Fleet with “quite good capabilities”, while at the same time the Russian exercises of 2018 have been held further out at sea and farther away from the Russian bases in Kaliningrad. This is something that the Swedish Navy keeps an eye on, to determine if this is the new normal or just an outlier. What is clear is that the famed Kaliningrad A2/AD-bubble will become “even more flexible” if it is sea-based compared to being restricted to Russian land territory. However, this brings us back to the original point: with the growing range of modern weapons, the demands placed on targeting data increases, which will require presence. But presence works both ways, and the Baltic Sea is a “good spot” for a maritime hybrid operation.
Will we know if it will be war before it start? I’m not so sure
So the Swedish Navy will have to grow, and the plan is clear: it will be an evolutionary growth. The best example of this method in practice is the currently ongoing MLU of the Gotland-class submarines, where sub-systems and lessons learned will be integrated into the upcoming A26-class. In the same way the Navy plans to use the MLU on the Visby-class of corvettes as a proof-of-concept for the projected Visby Gen 2.
Another hot topic is the creation of a second amphibious regiment, i.e. marines. While the current Amf 1 is something of a “and the kitchen sink” unit which include several support functions which belonged to earlier iterations of the Coastal Artillery/Amphibious Corps, the new unit will be a fighting unit, centered around marine infantry and aimed towards high-end combat. As such, it will also be smaller, numbering around 800 personnel compared to the 1,200 of Amf 1. This unit will be in place by 2025, and the Navy don’t expect any recruitment issues. “Marines are the easiest to recruit, any vacancies are filled within 72 hours.”
The post is based on a briefing held under Chatham House-rules at the Meripuolustuspäivä/Naval Defence Day in November 2018. General approval for the publishing of a post based on the briefing was received, but the final text has not been shown to anyone connected with the Swedish Navy (active or retired).
Prominent Swedish blogger Lars Wilderäng (Cornucopia?) made something of a splash amongst the Swedish defence community when he released his first novel Midvintermörker in 2011, widely hailed as the best Swedish techno-thriller since the Cold War. This was followed by the final part of the two-book series, before Wilderäng temporarily left near-future wars for other topics. Last year he finally returned to the battlefield with the book Höstsol (ISBN 9789176795439), which received it’s finale earlier this year with Höstregn (ISBN 9789176795842).
As with the earlier series, the books describe how an escalating crisis eventually evolves into war, and how the Swedish Defence Forces and general society respond to the challenge. In typical Clancyesque fashion the narrative follow a number of persons at different positions whose lives are affected by the war in one way or the other. The characters enter and exit the story throughout in varied fashions, and with the exception of a handful of the main cast most remain rather flat to the reader. The decision is understandable, this is a story about a major war, and to try and tell too many stories in-depth at once would quickly have made the books twice as thick as they are. Less well-developed side-characters feels like a fair trade-off to keep the number of pages manageable.
More disturbing is that especially in Höstsol a number of characters feel somewhat dumbed down. Yes Pjotr, you already mentioned that the whole of Gayropa is occupied by fascists, there’s no need to reiterate it at every turn. The portrayal of Swedish media is also a bit over the top in my personal view. These are largely the same issues that I disliked the most about Midvintermörker’s finale Midsommargryning, and they are especially tiresome as Wilderäng clearly is capable of writing interesting characters, Misja and major Bergäng being prime examples.
But to be honest these aren’t books read for the depths of the character gallery, but for the vivid portrayal of how a modern society copes with war, and for possible scenarios leading up to one. While not the first one to raise the topic, Midvintermörker was likely the single most important factor in popularising the ‘Gotland-scenario’, and in the same way Höstsol creates an interesting and plausible scenario for how a crisis involving Sweden could come about. Most fascinating here is the work performed to mask the beginning operations as something other than war, and while I won’t go into details to avoid spoilers, Höstsol’s strength lies largely in the questions raised around the politics and how ‘hybrid’ scenarios could be adopted to a Swedish context.
If much of Höstsol is a slow build-up to disaster, by Höstregn the reader is already in a full-blown shooting war. While the policy questions and study of international relations might not be as interesting, the quicker pace of Wilderäng’s war story makes the book the more enjoyable one from a thriller point of view. Still, there’s really no use in treating the books as two independent works, as the story is a direct continuation to the point that they need to be read together.
I am somewhat torn about my final verdict. I still feel that Midvintermörker is Wilderäng’s strongest foray into the techno-thriller genre, but Höstsol is (by now at least) considerably more thought-provoking from a national security point of view. There is a tendency in both Finland and Sweden to have a rather sharply defined view of what wars are and how they start, and Wilderäng’s latest works serve as (enjoyable) reminders that by now we should have learned to expect the unexpected when it comes to Russian military planning.
Following the ongoing debate over at the Royal Swedish Academy of War Science’s blog regarding what role infantry could have in fighting a mechanised attacker in Norrland, a Twitter-exchange erupted following a comment to the end of who the mechanised attacker would be? Surely the Russians would have better things to do with their mechanised units than to try and capture vast expanses of forests, fells, and bogs? The question deserves a closer look, as the answer by default holds significant importance to the defence planning of not only Sweden, but Finland and Norway as well. Norrland is not of interest to the Russians due to anything found there (no, not even the Kiruna iron ore), Russia has enough undisturbed wilderness of its own. But the region is very interesting due to the proximity to the Kola Peninsula.
The Kola Peninsula, and more generally the Murmansk-Arkhangelsk-Naryan-Mar area, are of immense strategic importance to Russian defence planning due to their role as the sole route from where to break out into the Atlantic to intercept the transatlantic supply lines of NATO, as well as providing the basing area for the majority of the Russian strategic nuclear forces. In particular the Russian second-strike capability is centered around the ballistic-missile submarines of the Northern Fleet (though a limited number is also found in the Pacific Fleet), and they would take up position in the Barents Sea from where they would fire their missiles in case of an all-out nuclear attack on the USA. In addition, the shortest airborne route between the US and Russia passes over the Arctic, meaning that the area plays a role in long-range aviation as well. This leads to the Cap of the North (or Sápmi) being the left flank of the Russian strategic deterrent and the frontline of any attempt at stopping the US from reinforcing Europe. Geopolitics plays an interesting role as well, as Norway is the sole NATO country in the region. While it is highly unlikely that Norway or other NATO forces would try and attack the northwestern corner of Russia due to the risk of escalating a conflict into full-scale nuclear war, Russia could conceivably want to push the frontline westward. As far as Russia is concerned, for the moment there is no real strategic depth to protect their bases. The Norwegian town of Kirkenes lies only 150 km from Severomorsk, the main base of the Northern Fleet. This is well within firing range of the MGM-140 ATACMS used by the US M270 MLRS and M142 HIMARS systems. And once the front is being pushed westwards, the question where to stop remains open. Capturing e.g. Narvik and Bodø would significantly hamper the ability of NATO to recapture Norwegian territory, while at the same time providing forward bases from which to operate against the transatlantic supply lines (compare German plans for submarine bases in Norway during WWII, rendered utterly insignificant by the fall of France).
But Norway is a tricky battlefield. The country is relatively narrow and heavily mountainous, handing a relative small defending force near-perfect conditions to defend against a more numerous attacker.
Which makes flanking tempting.
There are three possible ways to flank the Norwegian Army, either by amphibious and/or airborne landings, or by marching through Finnish Lappi and Swedish Norrland to reach (or threaten) the Norwegian coast. Now, cutting through Finland and Sweden to reach the Atlantic coast is no simple endeavour, the shortest way from Severomorsk to Narvik is a nice even 1,000 km, passing through Sodankylä, Pajala, and Kiruna, before following the Iron Ore Line to Narvik, the northernmost railway in western Europe. The roads are of varied quality, and getting any kind of a workable supply line through the region will be a challenge. The railroad networks are a chapter of their own, with the Finnish tracks not being connected to the Russian ones north of the Vartius-Kostamus crossing, and there being a gauge break between the Finnish and Swedish railroads. However, the most distinguishing feature of the region is the sheer amount of real estate. Combined with the fact that for none of the involved countries, with the possible exception of Norway, will the northern theatre be their main front. While a Russian offensive undoubtedly could allocate more forces than the opposition, it is still highly doubtful if they would be able to muster a large enough number that they could lay down a solid frontline and protect the rear areas and supply lines. As such a likely scenario is that the Russian spearheads would be able to make some impressive mileage while battling bigger and smaller skirmishes, while the real decisive fight will be a drawn-out one between security forces and smaller Finnish and Swedish units blowing bridges and targeting enemy supply units.
This is not without precedent as the fragmented battlefield is nothing new to northern Europe. In January 1942 two Finnish battalions (1,900 men in total) infiltrated 75 kilometer through enemy territory to May Guba, burned a major supply depot, and skied back to own lines with a total loss of 3 killed in actions and 10 wounded (in addition to scores of frostbitten soldiers). During the whole of the Continuation War large parts of the frontline north of Lake Onega were if not fragmented then leaking, and as it is likely that the main Finnish and Swedish units will be concentrated towards the population centras in the southern parts of their respective countries, a return to the same scenario would not be unlikely in case of an armed conflict.
Charly Salonius-Pasternak och Robin Häggblom, om att de svenska politikernas brist på ansvarstagande för försvaret riskerar samarbetet med Finland och äventyrar stabiliteten i Östersjöregionen (länk).
Sveriges försvarsförmåga har förbättrats genom konsekvent arbete i Försvarsmakten och genom att fördjupa internationella samarbeten. Förbättringen kommer dock (också enligt Högkvarterets egen bedömning) att raderas ut om politikerna inte avsevärt höjer försvarsanslaget i närtid.
Detta kommer i sådana fall att försämra Sveriges säkerhet, påverka samarbete med Finland negativt och på sikt öka de säkerhetspolitiska spänningar i Östersjöregionen.
I praktiken har detta förbigåtts i den svenska valdebatten. Från finländsk horisont är det svårt att förstå hur en central angelägenhet för staten så totalt kan hamna i skymundan i valet till den svenska Riksdagen.
Det svenska försvaret behöver enligt ÖB Micael Bydén ett minimum av 18 miljarder kronor i tillskott mellan 2018 och 2021. Därefter måste försvarsbudgeten mera än fördubblas för att Sverige (jmf utredningen Försvarsmaktens långsiktiga materielbehov och ÖB:s framtidsstudie Tillväxt för ett starkare försvar) ska kunna erhålla en försvarskapacitet som möjliggör försvaret av riket – och då tillsammans med andra.
Men om försvarsförmågan minskar gör det Sverige å ena sidan till ett mer intressant objekt att utsätta för militära påtryckningsmedel och, å andra sidan, till en mindre intressant samarbetspartner.
När det gäller den regionala stabiliteten är rädslan för ett återskapande av försvarsvakuum runt Sverige det enskilt största problemet. Knutet till detta är oron för att även när Sverige ökar sin försvarsförmåga, såsom det har skett de senaste tre åren, är försvarspolitiken och dess finansiering så oförutsägbar att samarbetspartners inte kan förutse hur hållbar försvarsförmågan egentligen är.
Om den förstärkta försvarsförmågan sjunker igen hägrar en ond cirkel som börjar med för låga försvarsanslag. Detta ökar i sin tur behovet av internationellt samarbete (dock med Sverige som en klart “mer lättviktig partner”) och särskilt med fokus på internationella övningar som ger utrikes- och försvarspolitiskt kapital, men där Sverige inte har råd att delta med mer än symboliska resurser.
Samtidigt minskar dessa kostsamma internationella övningar ytterligare tillgängliga medel för daglig verksamhet, något som på sikt ytterligare minskar försvarsförmågan.
Ett axplock som tyder på att denna onda cirkel redan gör sig gällande, finns i Officerstidningen nr 5 2018. För att spara pengar har Markstridsskolan som bland annat står för simulatorträning, valt att inte delta i arméns stabs- och sambandövning (Assö).
I något skede måste då Nato – garanten för militär stabilitet i regionen – omvärdera vilken relation försvarsalliansen ska ha till Sverige. En möjlighet är att Sverige ansöker om medlemskap i Nato, något som dock skulle innebära krav på en markant ökad försvarsbudget.
De svenska politikerna kan också offentligt, eller i skymundan, komma överens om att erbjuda ökad tillgänglighet för Nato (och sannolikt USA) när det gäller svenskt territorium och resurser (till exempel underrättelseinformation). I gengäld skulle Nato:s medlemmar fylla vakuumet – det vill säga ge de facto försvarsgarantier. Detta skulle också öka Sveriges beroende av USA, något som i nuläget med Trump för en mindre förutsägbar säkerhetspolitik än förr.
Kravet på att Sverige deltar ännu mer i Nato:s försvarsövningar skulle sannolikt öka, och möjligen skulle Sverige avkrävas ett klargörande av den ensidiga svenska solidaritetsdeklarationen, så att Sverige förbinder sig att stödja Nato:s försvar av alliansens medlemmar i Östersjöregionen (främst Baltikum). Det skulle innebära att Sveriges de factosuveränitet och utrikespolitiska manöverutrymme minskar.
Om den svenska försvarsmakten inte tillförs mer resurser kan man i Finland börja ifrågasätta värdet av finländsk-svenskt försvarssamarbete. Detta är ju något som står och faller med tillit och genuin ökad samförsvarsförmåga. Tillit byggs genom skapande av täta informella nätverk mellan alla nivåer av respektive försvarsmakt och ökad kunskap om hur krigstida förband på kompaninivå och uppåt kan uppträda tillsammans. Det är en tröskelhöjande samförsvarsförmågan som byggs igenom offentliga och stora bilaterala övningar som till exempel respektive flygvapens övningar under 2017.
Båda delarna kan äventyras om den svenska försvarsmakten inte har råd att delta i kvalificerad övning med finländska soldater.
Även om det svensk-finländska försvarssamarbetet inte har byggts eller borde byggas på gemensamma anskaffningar av materiel, går det att slå fast att om den svenska försvarsförmåga raseras kommer det att påverka sannolikheten för att Gripen väljs som nästa jaktplan för Finland.
Ur totalförsvarssynvinkel är en viktig faktor att Finlands försörjningslinjer hotas om Sverige inte klarar att skydda svenskt territorialvatten från Öresund till Skärgårdshavet. Om inte betydande budgetmedel anslås kommer dock nödvändiga nyinvesteringar i svenska flottan att skjutas på framtiden – och detta i ett läge när ett antal av ytfartygen och ubåtarna håller på att falla för åldersstrecket.
Flottans (och flygvapnets) nyinvesteringar säkerställs dock troligen av politikerna på grund av industripolitiken, något som dock sannolikt lämnar försvaret med för få användare av dessa system.
Extern säkerhet (nationellt försvar) är en grunduppgift för en stat, och något som bara staten kan organisera. Oviljan hos svenska politiker under en lång rad regeringar att “betala för vad de har beställt”, ger en signal om att Sverige inte tar försvaret av det egna land seriöst; man talar gärna om framtiden, men när det gäller svenska försvarsförmågans långtidsåteruppbyggnad – speciellt arméns – är de närmaste åren kritiska.
Tyvärr implicerar det att politikerna antingen inte bryr sig om eller alternativt inte litar på den militära ledningens bedömning. Ingendera utgör ett bra utgångsläge i en krissituation.
Om inte den nu hotande nedgången i försvarsförmågan åtgärdas, finns en allvarlig risk att Sverige kommer att förlora utrikespolitiskt manöverutrymme samtidigt som Försvarsmakten blir tvungen att än en gång anpassa sig till att endast ha en begränsad roll i försvaret av svenskt territorium. Uppkomsten av ett försvarsvakuum skulle också ha allvarliga konsekvenser för stabiliteten i Östersjöregionen.
Det krävs raska och meningsfulla beslut gällande det svenska försvaret, om Moder Svea inte vill svika sina grannar och sin identitet som ett solidariskt land.
CHARLY SALONIUS-PASTERNAK är äldre forskare vid Utrikespolitiska institutet i Helsingfors.
ROBIN HÄGGBLOM är analytiker i försvars- och säkerhetspolitik och driver försvarsbloggen Corporal Frisk.
The Swedish Army is probably as poorly understood as the Finnish one. Having been a large conscription/reserve-based force during much of the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War period, it then suffered from a strategic timeout and shrunk to a shadow of its former size and capability due to a focus on expeditionary missions. Today it is back in its former role, with homeland defence as the core mission. The order of battle is however markedly different from what it used to.
A few words about geography and doctrine (especially for our Finnish readers). For an enemy coming from the east there are two ways of getting into Sweden: either through crossing the Finnish-Swedish border at the very northern parts of the country, and the slowly fighting your way down to the southern parts of the country where the majority of the population lives, in the process crossing through heavily forested terrain and bridging a number of rivers, some of rather significant size. The other option is through an amphibious and/or airborne assault directly at the Swedish heartland. While the threat has diminished following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, this option promises quick gains at the risk of having vulnerable supply lines stretching over the Baltic Sea. As such having rapidly deployable forces which at short notice can get to a landing zone before the enemy is able to consolidate his gains is a core focus.
This has led to the adoption of a largely professional force, though it should be noted that well over a third of all personnel serve part-time (GSS/T), and as such will require mobilisation in wartime. Issues with recruitment have meant that conscription has again been activated, though this is a far cry from the general conscription of old, with only a few thousand entering service annualy. In short, a case can be made that both the fully professional nature of the force as well as the change that the reintroduction of conscription has brought are often overstated.
The requirements of the Defence Forces have been operationalized in the perspective study to military strategic objectives. These are:
Deny an opponent opportunities to achieve his goals with actions below the threshold of an armed attack,
Break the offensive power of an attacker in an armed attack,
Regardless of the conflict level, promote regional stability.
The main striking power comes from two armoured (or heavy mechanised) brigades, simply designated 1. Brigaden and 2. Brigaden (though confusingly the headquarters when treated as independent units are numbered 3. and 2. brigade headquarters respectively). It is important to note that these are highly modular, and while in practice the main fighting elements are taking part in exercises according to a rather stable OOB which is described on the official Swedish Defence Forces homepage, the lack of any tactical headquarters at the level above brigade places additional responsibility upon the brigade headquarters. As the official line is that the Swedish Defence Forces should be able to meet simultaneous enemy offensives in two different areas, in practice this would mean that a single brigade headquarter could bear responsibility of coordinating and leading the combined effort to meet and defeat an enemy offensive. This means that a single brigade headquarters is designed to able to command up to ten battalions, a force well above that of any traditional brigade combat team.
In normal operations, 1. Brigaden is made up of a headquarters and the 191. and 192. armoured battalions from I 19 Norrbotten regiment in Boden together with the 72. armoured battalion and 71. motorised battalion from P 7 Södra Skånska regiment at Revingehed. The motorised battalion operate the Patria AMV as Patgb 360. For indirect fire support one of the two artillery battalions, either the 91. or the 92., also operates with the unit. It should be noted that this causes something of a logistical headache upon mobilisation, as Revingehed and Boden are at opposite ends of the Swedish map, with the trip (by road) measuring just over 1,500 km.
Similarly, 2. Brigaden include the two armoured battalions 41. and 42. and the 2. brigade headquarters from P4 Skaraborg regiment. For a motorised unit, the 12. motorised rifle battalion from the Livgardet (Life Guard) regiment is available. These are organised along the same lines as the 71. with the AMV, but being based close to the Swedish capital of Stockholm they have a special focus on urban combat and the defence of the capital. As such, the ultimate use of the 12. is likely depending upon the nature of the battle, and the modular structure of the forces makes it likely that if the situation would so require the 12. would be kept as a detached unit in Stockholm and the 71. would be used by the brigade having the greater need for motorised infantry.
The armoured battalions each have two armoured companies with Strv 122, a Swedish modification of the Leopard 2A5 featuring additional armour protection and local combat systems. When entering service in the late 90’s it was the most advanced Leopard variant in service (some would go as far as the most advanced main battle tank in service at the time), but a lack of upgrades have reduced their effectiveness somewhat. An unspecified upgrade program updating 88 vehicles was finally launched in 2016, with this blog detailing some of the expected changes. The 41., 42., 72., 191., and 192 are officially designated as mechanised battalions due to historical reasons, though in practice most officers will refer to them as armoured battalions.
The CV 9040 (locally designated Strf 9040) is an interesting variant of the well-known CV 90-family. Sweden being the home of the vehicle, their vehicles are of the first generation (Mk I). The outstanding feature is the 40 mm L/70 main gun, which makes them the heaviest armed western IFV, with all export customers having opted for either 30 or 35 mm main armaments. All battalions sport two mechanised companies of CV 9040 with infantry. A number of specialised vehicles based on the chassis are also available, including dedicated recovery and artillery observers variants, as well as a SPAAG variant in the form of the Lvkv 90 sporting the same 40 mm Bofors gun but with a radar and associated fire control systems for anti-aircraft work.
The sole organic indirect fire support in the battalions are towed 120 mm mortars. To get added mobility and protection the battalions are set to receive BAE Mjölner twin-barreled self-propelled 120 mm mortars on CV 90 chassis starting next year.
The brigade level 91. and 92. artillery battalions each have 12 wheeled Archer 155 mm SPG. This is a very modern system, which sports excellent operational mobility thanks to being truck-mounted, and comes with all the expected goodies such as CBRN protection and a 52-calibre long barrel. Both are trained and mobilised by the A 9 Artilleri Regiment in Boden.
These 24 Archers are the sole non-mortar artillery currently active in the Swedish Defence Forces. However, an additional 12 Archers are mothballed in the strategic reserve (sv. Förbandsreserven), and a further 12 are owned by the Swedish Defence Material Administration FMV who is trying to find an export customer for these. These 24 are from the cancelled Norwegian order, and are being upgraded to the same standard as the operational ones.
However, to say that the Swedish Army is two brigades strong would be a serious misnomer. A number of detached units are available which add serious capabilities. One of these is the Army Ranger Battalion (193. Ranger Battalion in wartime), discussed in an earlier post, which is used against the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities deep behind their lines.
A key unit is K 3 Livregementets Hussarer (the Hussars of the Life Regiment), the last Swedish unit to use the ‘K for Cavalry’ designation (and in line with this a company in the unit is designated as a squadron). The unit consists of two battalions, one of which is the airborne 31. battalion with the other one being the 32. Underrättelsebataljonen (Intelligence battalion).
The 31. is the airborne unit of the Swedish Army, and is usually seen in close cooperation with the UH-60M Blackhawks of the 2. Helicopter squadron of the Air Force’s Helicopter Wing. The unit is a rapid reaction force, being able to quickly deploy to take and hold terrain. In supporting roles it also operates a number of ATV’s, which can be air transported with the unit and provide an added measure of mobility for supporting functions such as transport of heavy goods or wounded soldiers.
The 32. is a high-level intelligence gathering unit, which include diverse capabilities such as the paratrooper squadron/company, UAV-units, and traditional jaeger units which can be inserted either overland, by helicopter, or parachuted. The common denominator is that they all operate in small units, often squad-strength, to gather intelligence at the high-tactical or operational level. As a secondary capability they can also direct fire support, either from ground based or airborne systems.
The Swedish special forces unit SOG is also based at K 3 in Karlsborg.
Edit 11 June 2018 1900 GMT+2:
A number of readers pointed out a few glaring omissions when it came to detached units (security, support, and MP units had been left out due to space restrictions):
The sister unit to the 12. motorised is the Livbataljonen (The Life Guard Battalion). While it handles ceremonial duties in peacetime, in wartime it would function as an infantry battalion dedicated to the defence of key sites in the greater Stockholm region. As such much of the focus in the peacetime training is dedicated to urban warfare.
A few years ago the Swedish Defence Forces suddenly reestablished itself on the island of Gotland (with regular forces, HV had been there all along). To begin with this so called Stridsgrupp 18 (Battlegroup 18) has been handled by rotating in mechanised units from the regiments on the mainland (at the time of writing it is P 4 which handles this), and my impression was that even with the reestablishment of P 18 Gotlands Regiment this was set to continue for the time being. However, the currently 17 soldiers strong regiment will in the immediate future start recruiting their own personnel, with the aim of establishing half an armoured battalion (one tank and one mechanised company) of contracted soldiers. When this is done, P 18 will also take over the responsibility of creating the wartime SG 18 from their own forces instead of borrowing them from the mainland.
The marine regiment Amf 1 is another unit that in wartime would mobilise infantry-style units outside of the regular brigade structure as part of its 2. battalion. In this case, the unit consists of three infantry companies (204., 205., 206.,) which are light infantry able to use both trucks and CB 90 assault craft for transports, and which operate the manportable version of the HELLFIRE missile in an anti-shipping role (local designation Rb 17). Compared to their Finnish colleagues, the anti-shipping role has greater importance, as the archipelago is the first line of defence and not the right flank when meeting an attacker coming from the east.
The elite unit of Amf 1 is the 202. Kustjägarkompaniet, the coastal jaeger company, which is the intelligence gathering unit of the battalion. The unit should not be confused with the similarly named Kustjägarkompaniet (or the wartime coastal jaeger battlegroup) of the Finnish Navy, which is a marine infantry unit more closely related to the 204., 205., and 206. companies.
The size of the Swedish Army is the most often maligned feature of the current force structure. Even with the activation of a second brigade post-Crimea, the lack of manpower and area coverage is often seen as lacking. The argument however overlooks the fact that there are 40 infantry battalions of the Hemvärnet, the Home Guard.
• Guard an area or object
• Protect an area or object
• Protect a transportation (on land, and for some battalions, at sea)
• Harass (auxiliary task, which can be solved after allocation of resources and extended training activities)
• Delay (auxiliary task, which can be solved after allocation of resources and
extended training activities).
HV units should be able to operate in all types of terrain, including urban environment and under all visibility and weather conditions. The unit should be able to solve tasks throughout the day. This refers primarily to the region in which the unit has its own main operating area.
It should be mentioned that HV is completely interoperable with the regular Army units, employing the same command and communication equipment and principles, as well as adhering to Army-standard working methods at all levels. Upon mobilisation, the first sub-units should be operational within hours and the main parts of a unit should be operational within 24 hours. The majority of the units are best described as light infantry equipped for basic defensive operations. However, several specialised units are either regional or national resources, such as those tasked with CBRN-protection, reconnaissance, or engineering missions.
The equipment level varies. Much of the equipment was made available for HV when it becomes surplus to the regular force. However, due to the post-Cold War drawdown some high-end systems have been transferred to HV-use. In the most extreme cases, this includes capabilities such as coastal mining with HV’s CB 90 light assault crafts. In peacetime the force is regularly used in assisting other authorities when they need manpower, e.g. when fighting forest fires, but they have also been called up during the Red October submarine hunt when foreign underwater activity took place in Swedish waters.
From a Finnish point of view, the most eye-catching omission is the extremely low levels of indirect fire support. Only after 2015 has HV gotten their first 120 mm heavy mortars, and the total force amounts to four mortar platoons spread out over the country. The low quantity of indirect fire units is however in line with the general Swedish force composition.
All in all, the rumour of the Swedish forces quantitative demise are vastly overstated. With five and a half armoured battalions, two motorised battalion, an airborne battalion, an infantry battalion, a marine infantry battalion, an army ranger battalion, and no less than forty home guard battalions it might not be the force of the Cold War, but it certainly is a force to be reckoned with.
That does not mean that the Army doesn’t face a number of issues, almost all of which boil down to either problems with manpower shortages and lack of funds. The manpower shortage include both recruitment and retention issues, and is having an effect at all levels from soldiers to officers. The lack of funds have been getting worse, with a number of important upgrades or acquisition programs having been postponed or cancelled, leading to a situation where many of these now are becoming urgent. At the same time, many of the recent high-profile moves such as the acquisition of the Patriot air defence system and the reestablishment of the P 18 Gotland regiment have been taking place without further funding having been provided to cover for these. The lack of modern medium-range air defences (until the Patriot is operational) and low number of indirect fire units stand out, but in the immediate future the bigger problem is how the lack of funding will negatively affect the everyday work of the units. Many officers have voiced grave concerns that next year their units will face serious cuts in training if the budget isn’t increased significantly from the sub-1% of GDP where it is currently at.