An interesting piece caught my eye this morning, describing how the US Navy is putting JDAM-ER kits on their Quickstrike series of mines. These are in effect naval mines based on the Mk 80-series of general-purpose bombs, and the combination of a modular warhead with a modular guidance and glide kit makes so much sense that the first reaction is why no-one has put the together earlier?
The linked story gives a good primer for the concept, but the too long, didn’t read version is that the Quickstrike mine is dropped by an aircraft, glides tens of kilometres (depending on release altitude) to a pre-set target location, where it sinks to the bottom of the sea and becomes a ‘smart’ bottom mine.
For HX this suddenly opens up interesting possibilities. Mining is traditionally a key interest of the Finnish Navy, as our waters are shallow and the number of usable sea lanes to reach any given port is severely limited by the cluttered archipelago. However, if the enemy enters the area and manages to sweep a sea lane, going in to mine it again is usually not to be recommended. Mining is also a time-consuming task, putting the vessels performing it in danger.
The Quickstrike/JDAM-ER combination offers a solution as it makes it possible to mine from a stand-off distance and to release the whole minefield more or less simultaneously, and with the exact location of the mines already logged. A pair of fighters could easily and in a very short time span shut down a key chokepoint or scatter their load over a more general area to force the enemy to conduct time-consuming sweeping operations.
The obvious platform here is the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. It is already using the JDAM-ER in Australian service, and chances are that the USN will focus any effort to integrate the Quickstrike on it much sooner than they will get around to the F-35C (not to mention how long it would take before the F-35A picks up the load). The ‘Rhino’ has flown impressive JDAM sans suffix loads in Syria, including slugging it out with two 2,000 lbs (900 kg) GBU-31 JDAMs under each wing, or eight of the lighter 1,000 lbs GBU-32. A pair of Super Hornets could likely drop eight heavy or sixteen lighter sea mines in a single mission, and could do so deep behind enemy lines. In fact, this is something of an unique selling point for the ‘Rhino’.
This opens up completely new tactical possibilities, including quickly shutting down a strategic sea lane if an enemy task force seems to be able to avoid Finnish surface units or coastal defences (a scenario becoming increasingly likely as the number of ships decrease). Another possibility is cutting off an enemy amphibious landing by mining the sea lanes used to supply the bridgehead, or even offensively dropping mines in or in the very vicinity of enemy ports and bases.
The best part is the cost. This is largely an off-the-shelf system, with (relatively) cheap components and requiring little specialised training on the part of the flight crews to operate. While I find it unlikely that we will see a true maritime strike capability on the HX anytime soon, this would allow the air force to support the navy and shape the maritime battlefield in a cost effective way. The JDAM-ER guidance kits, mines, and regular Mk 80s could even be bought separately, and combined as appropriate during wartime depending on if the mines are needed or if the weapons are better used in a land-strike role. This does seem to be low-hanging fruit for an interesting and unique joint capability at a low price.
In the midst of the strategic acquisitions it is easy to get locked in on the choice of platform, whether it is the HX fighter or the Pohjanmaa-class corvettes. But someone has to supply the teeths to make them able to bite, and this is where companies such as MBDA come in to the picture.
MBDA is yet another of the numerous joint ventures created in Europe in a time when not even the major regional powers can muster enough of a demand to warrant developing their own high-performance weaponry. However, the company is something of an outlier in that several of the products they have on their shelf have a good reputation both when it comes to project management and the cost/capability ratio of the final product.
Our basic philosphy is that we are platform agnostic, we serve everybody
MBDA has a product integrated or somewhere down the propsed upgrade paths on most HX-candidates. The flagship is without doubt the very-long range Meteor, largely held to be the most capable weapon in beyond-visual range engagments against fighter-sized targets currently operational. The introduction in service aboard the JAS 39C Gripen as part of the MS20 upgrade “changed the behaviour over the Baltic Sea”, both on the part of the Swedish fighters carrying them as well as for the Russian aircrafts they meet there. Courtesy of the ramjet engine and the 100+ km range, it provide “at least three times the no-escape zone” of current medium range missile (read: AIM-120C AMRAAM). The missile will find itself under the wings and fuselages of the Rafale and Typhoon within the next few years in addition to Gripen (both Charlie and Echo), creating an interesting dilemma for a manufacturer supplying highly complex equipment which is to be integrated into competing platforms. MBDA’s solution is to assign each aircraft and country it’s own manager, making sure that there are watertight bulkheads between any platform specific information entering the company.
For Gripen in HX, that man is Peter Bäckström, MBDA’s director exports for the Nordic region. An engineer by trade, he worked on a number of subsystems for the Meteor and TAURUS KEPD 350 before moving into sales. He has a clear view about what made the Meteor different from so many other projects. “It was born out of a requirement, a need for a 100+ km capable missile”, he notes, before continuing. “Game changer is a worn-out term, but this really is. It establishes a new set of rules.”
For the Gripen E, the Meteor and the increased number of hardpoints changes what has often been decried as a light fighter into a serious BVR-force, with a maximum load of seven Meteor and two short-range IRIS-T on the wingtips. While the maximum load might not be suitable for everyday carriage (if nothing else then due to budgetary constraints), it still places the air-to-air weapons load more or less on par with e.g. the Rafale.
But Meteor is far from the only thing MBDA has to offer for HX. ASRAAM is also found in their arsenal, a rather unique missile in being designed for ranges which are usually the realm of radar-guided ones. Given this, I have to ask Bäckström if there is any truth to the rumours that it can outrange the AIM-120 AMRAAM. Bäckström just smiles, and simply quips “It’s a very good missile”. In roughly the same class, the MICA-family (with both IR- and radar-guided versions) is set to be upgraded within the next decade. Unlike the Meteor, from the viewpoint of HX MICA is tied to Rafale. If Finland buys Rafale, we will likely get the MICA as well, but if any other aircraft takes home HX the MICA likely won’t make it’s way into the Finnish inventory (though it isn’t ruled out).
For heavy cruise-missiles, there’s not one but two options. The best known is likely the combat-proven SCALP/Storm Shadow, sporting inertial/GPS/terrain reference guidance and an IIR-seeker for terminal guidance. The different parameters which can be set include fusing (air burst, impact, or penetration) and dive angle. The missile is designed to feature a very high level of automation on the part of the pilot, meaning that it is suitable for single-seat fighters as well as twin-seaters.
The Taurus KEPD 350E is the other alternative, being built to a different requirement for the German and Swedish Air Forces (though Sweden is yet to acquire and put the weapon into operational use). The ‘350’ in the name comes from the requirement of 350 km range in all conditions at all drop heights. In practice, this means that the range when dropped from height is well above 500 km. It can be dropped from as low as 100 meters, which often is little more than a gimmick for stand-off weapons. However, for Finland this might actually be a useful feature, as there is value in staying below the radar horizon of the Russian ground based air surveillance radars. The 480 kg MEPHISTO penetrating warhead with pre-charge is also described in grand terms.
This is a real penetrator, not a ‘put down it down in a hole and blow it up’-warhead
TAURUS actually did compete for the contract which was won by the JASSM regarding integration into the Finnish Air Force F/A-18C Hornets. It is hard to tell what made the TAURUS come in second back then, whether there were particular political considerations or ease of integration (US fighter – US missile, though ROKAF has opted for the TAURUS for their F-15K Strike Eagles and Spain is integrating it on the Hornet) which played into the decision, or whether it was purely based on performance of the missile in question. In any case, the TAURUS is set to be integrated on Typhoons and not completely unlikely to appear on the 39E Gripen, so it wouldn’t be altogether surprising for it to fill that JASSM-shaped void after the retirement of the Hornet.
While the airborne systems grabs all the attention, the question of air defence system for the Pohjanmaa-class (Squadron 2020) is still unresolved. The last of the major weapon systems open, it will pit ESSM against the CAMM-ER (Barak 8 has been mentioned in the speculations, but is likely too large. I-Derby might be on offer instead). CAMM and CAMM-ER shares some of the same ancestry as the ASRAAM, but has developed into a rather different beast. The weapon feature a newly developed radar seeker, and is able to be quad-packed into a Mk 41 (or the smaller and lighter ExLS) just as the ESSM. From there the CAMM+family is soft-launched, and sports ranges in the 25 to 45 km class, depending on exact version and target. Interestingly enough, packed into the launcher it is completely maintenance free for a decade. This also ensures that once Finland has gotten the missiles, it is possible to operate them completely independently from the supplier. Or as Bäckström describes it:
A sovereign supply solution.
The weapon is already operational with the Royal Navy (and has been sold to other nations), but perhaps even more interesting is that the British Army performed their first firings of the Land Ceptor (known as EMADS in mainland Europe) earlier this year. If MBDA manages to get the CAMM-ER chosen as the main air defence weapon for the Finnish Navy, MBDA could suddenly claim synergy effects in the race for a longer-ranged ground-based air defence system for the Finnish Army. So far the ability of the NASAMS systems (already in Finnish service as the ITO12) to fire the longer-ranged AMRAAM-ER has made it a favourite, but questions has also been raised if that would mean putting too many eggs in the same basket. Notably the CAMM-ER would also provided the altitude coverage the Finnish Army is looking for following the retirement of the Buk-M1. A Land Ceptor solution able to use a joint missile stock with the Navy’s corvettes might suddenly be a very interesting proposition.
Another interesting thing to note is that MBDA is quick to point out that the missile would fit nicely into the Swedish organisation as well, as an all-weather mid-tier missile between the Patriot and the IRIS-T. While currently all light is on the Patriot-deal, it is clear that two understrength air defence battalions won’t provide the air defence coverage needed by the Swedish Army, and MBDA raising the benefits of a joint Finnish-Swedish buy (either of whole systems or missiles) might be worth keeping an eye on. Normal caveat about companies liking to market that they are in negotiations/close to a deal applies…
The draft text has been read through by MBDA, to make certain that it only contain non-classified information and general comments. Minor changes followed as part of the feedback received from them.
The field of advanced weaponry such as anti-ship missiles is rarely a transparent one. Still, the new PTO 2020 is turning out to be quite something, being about as opaque as your favourite Ostrobothnian river following heavy spring rains.
The ANAM / Gabriel 5
The best source on the ANAM that is currently available is likely the single cutaway found on IAI’s homepage. This can then be compared to the dimensions of the Harpoon, which are well-known. Under the assumption that the diameter of the ANAM and Harpoon are similar(ish), which seems reasonable considering their very similar layout, a closer comparison can be made.
My original impression which I voiced in the last blog was that ANAM is longer and with a slightly different arrangement of the fins. Having compared the cutaway of the ANAM with that of the Harpoon (see e.g. Think Defence’s piece on the Harpoon), it does seem clear that this was a mistake, and the ANAM is in fact almost impossible to externally differentiate from the Harpoon. It should be noted that this conclusion rests on the assumption that A) the ANAM cutaway supplied by IAI is at least remotely correct, and B) that the diameter of the missiles are indeed the same. On the first account there does exist a possibility that the supplier isn’t completely honest when it comes to marketing material, but it is an OSINT-risk I am prepared to live with for the time being. On the second account, there seems to be little reason to produce a new weapon so closely modeled after the layout of the Harpoon, unless it is designed to fit the current logistics chain, including storage containers and possibly the launchers themselves. This is as I see it the only possible explanation why the Israelis chose the exact same layout and size of fins to the exact same external body. Small caveat here that the inlet might differ, as it is shrouded by the fins in the cutaway, and a retractable scoop a’la BGM-109G GLCM is a possibility. Something like this is visible in the Skimmer-video referenced in the last post, though it is unclear if that is the ANAM or a generic anti-ship missile (it does look somewhat like IMI’s Delilah HL, but the configuration of the fins is different).
One interesting point that stands out in the cutaway, however, is the internal component layout compared to the non-ER versions of the Harpoon. Crucially, the warhead occupies more or less exactly the same space as the 500 lbs (227 kg) warhead of the Harpoon. If the cutaway is correct, this would indicate that Finland has decided against downsizing the warhead compared to the current MTO 85M. The size of the fuel tank would also likely indicate a range in the 150 km class rather than the 200+ km ranges of the RBS 15 Gungnir, NSM, and Harpoon Block II+ ER. Crucially, as 150 km is more than “about 100 km“, this does not contradict that the PTO 2020 has longer range than the MTO 85M, one of the few capability details revealed by the Finnish authorities (this being confirmed by captain Valkamo).
For the sensors available to the Finnish Navy and for the relatively limited firing ranges of the Baltic Sea, blast size for range isn’t an unexpected trade-off. However, in a field where only the RBS 15 and Gabriel had a 500 lbs warhead, this might certainly have been one of the deciding factors. Notably, the traditionally conservative Finnish Defence Forces seems to continue favouring radar-seeking missiles with large warheads, operating at high-subsonic speeds.
All in all, it does seem likely that at some point after the introduction of the RGM-84D into Israeli service, the Israelis were not happy by the continued development path of the Harpoon, and decided to make a better version on their own (note that “better” might be in the narrow sense of better suiting Israeli requirements). This is not unheard of when it comes to Israeli weapons development (see e.g. Magach contra M60 Patton, or Kfir compared to Mirage V), and would make Gabriel 5 something of a cousin to the Harpoon Block II+ ER.
The Harpoon DSCA-request was discussed when it arrived, and while the Harpoon wasn’t picked, it does give some interesting pointers regarding the scope of the Gabriel-deal. It covered 112 live missiles and eight exercise ones, for a total sum of 622 million USD (532 million Euro). This is likely the absolute maximum, and corresponds to the Gabriel order including options. The quoted sum for the latter was 162 million Euros for the firm order and options for an additional 193 million Euros, for a total of 355 millions. In other words, the Israeli offer including options was 40% cheaper than the DSCA-request. Even if there are discrepancies between the two offers, the difference is big enough that the Israeli offer must have been objectively cheaper by all standards.
In Israeli Service
As noted the last time around, the Israeli decision not to upgrade their RGM-84D Harpoons to even -84L standard is rather revealing. In an article from 2014, a ‘senior naval source’ discusses the improvements to the anti-air and land-strike capabilities of the Navy, and reveals that “planned upgrades are also scheduled for sea-to-sea missiles.” These are all part of the “overall strategic vision in which the navy plays a growing role in the IDF’s integrated warfare capabilities.”
In 2017 INS Hanit, an Israeli Sa’ar 5-class vessel, took part in the international exercise ‘Novel Dina 17‘ with a single quadrupel-launcher of a new design (note that at least one of the pictures described as showing the INS Hanit in fact shows a Sa’ar 4.5-class vessel). This was captured on picture by AP press photographer Jack Guez, and labelled as the ‘Missile boxes Gabriel’. The box-shaped launchers have to the best of my knowledge not been seen either before or since. This is not surprising, as their unstealthy and generally crude look does give the impression of them being a test-installation rather than the final mount.
The Sa’ar 5 employs their Harpoons in two stealthy launchers, each holding four missiles. As discussed above, it is possible that the Gabriel can be fired from the same launcher, with only the missile control unit inside the vessel being switched out. As such, identifying which missile is carried based on the launcher is hard to impossible. However, in a YouTube-video posted by the Israeli Navy on their channel in the spring of 2017 a launcher with two longitudinal ‘stripes’ is visible. These might be vents, but in any case they differ compared to the standard version. If they are related to the Gabriel or not is impossible to tell, but there seems to be an upgraded version of the launcher introduced into service within the last year(s).
When Svenska Yle asked the Armed Forces about which other countries use the system, they could only confirm that other countries also use the system. Individual countries could not be mentioned because the information is classified.
An interesting question is where the Gabriel is in operational use. There is a small caveat that since this isn’t a direct quote and the interview might have been conducted in the secondary language of either the journalist or the Defence Forces’ representative, it is possible that this was a misunderstanding. However, the quote above, from an article by the Finnish public broadcasting company YLE, gives the impression that more than one country uses the missile. This obviously raises the question which country that might be?
Books can, and indeed have been, written on Israeli arms trade. In oversimplified terms, Israel is ready to export their weaponry to most anyone who can guarantee that it doesn’t end up in the hands of any of the countries actively promoting the destruction of the Israeli state. In effect, this has lead Israel to exporting arms to numerous countries in Africa, Asia, and South/Central Americas. Deals to western countries usually go through local partners (see today’s announcement about Lockheed Martin cooperating on the SPICE guidance kit). Export of earlier versions of the Gabriel have usually been tied to the export of Israeli surplus naval vessels, something which isn’t the case with the Gabriel 5 as it is so new.
In recent years, three countries stand out when it comes to Israeli exports: India, Vietnam, and Azerbaijan.
The missing link between the jewish democracy of Israel and the muslim dictatorship of Azerbaijan is Iran. Azerbaijan is in fact somewhat western-aligned, in part as neighbours Armenia and Iran are aligned towards Russia, and operate an impressive array of Israeli equipment. This includes Israeli Shaldag-class fast patrol craft and Sa’ar 62-class offshore patrol vessels. The latter are based on the Israeli Sa’ar 4.5-class fast attack crafts, and can likely lay claim to the title of the world’s most heavily armed coast guard vessels. Interestingly, Azerbaijan’s Turan news agency reported in 2011 that the country was buying an unspecified version of the Gabriel (secondary source, primary link broken). As the Sa’ar 4.5 in Israeli service is armed with the Harpoon, it is plausible that the missile system was destined for the Sa’ar 62. However, there are no indication of the system ever having been delivered to Azerbaijan, and the Sa’ar 62 currently operate with the SPIKE-NLOS (as seen in the infamous music video which confirmed the presence of Harop in Azerbaijani service). As such, it seems likely that the Gabriel was axed and replaced by the SPIKE-NLOS in the arms package.
India has bought Barak surface-to-air missiles for their newer vessels, and Vietnam is in the midst of a naval expansion program. While there are reports that some Vietnamese vessels are set to get improved firepower, nothing tangible indicate that the Gabriel would have been exported to either country.
Enter the Singaporean Formidable-class frigates. These are based on the French La Fayette-class, and is certainly one of the most formidable classes in operation in Asia. However, one odd feature is the fact that most sources list their main armament as being the outdated RGM-84C Harpoon, first introduced in 1982 and only marginally better than the original 70’s design of the -84A. While the Singaporean Navy isn’t exactly open with their armament choices, it seems that the assumption is that they share the RGM-84C version with the older Victory- and Sea Wolf-classes (the latter now retired, and curiously enough originally fitted with the Gabriel 2). The continued use of the RGM-84C would place the vessels at something of a drawback in a neighborhood featuring Exocet MM40 Block 2 and NSM, and would seem a strange decision considering the considerable cost sunk into the frigates.
There has been some rumours* that IAI participated in and lost the tender to arm the Formidable-class. Looking back, it might just be that they did participate, but in fact won. And no-one even noticed.
*The post reporting the rumours also discusses an Israeli missile shot showing a slender and fast missile, and speculates this could be a scramjet powered Gabriel 5. If that is the case, it is something completely else than the ANAM. My personal opinion is still that the ANAM is the likely Gabriel sold to the Finnish Navy.
The decision on one of the most important weapon systems for the Finnish Navy has become public today with the surprise announcement that Israeli Aircraft Industries’ Gabriel has been chosen for the PTO 2020-contract. The PTO 2020 will be the main ship-killing weapon of the Navy, being used on the Hamina-class FAC and the Pohjanmaa-class corvettes (Squadron 2020) as well as from truck-mounted batteries ashore. As such, it will replace the current MTO 85M (the RBS15 SFIII, a customised RBS15 MkII). This also effectively kills alls speculation that there would be a joint anti-shipping weapon operated by the Navy and by the Air Force, as there seems to be no air-launched version available for fast jets.
First a short discussion regarding the designations: IAI never mention Gabriel on their homepage, but they do market the Advanced Naval Attack Missile, and most sources agree that this is the Gabriel V. The odd one out is CSIS, which lists two versions of the Gabriel V, of which the ANAM is a shorter-legged and newer version of the original Gabriel V, which instead is designated Advanced Land Attack Missile. Also, the version of Gabriel bought is not publicly confirmed by the Finnish MoD, but there’s few possibilities. My working hypothesis is that while there might be slightly different versions the missile most commonly described by the Gabriel 5 / Advanced Naval Attack Missile designations is in fact the one bought by the Finnish Defence Forces.
Looking at the field, it was clear from the get-go that the big dividing line was between the IIR-seeker of the NSM compared to the traditional radar seekers of the rest of the field. Coupled with the stealthy body of the missile, this allows the NSM a completely passive approach. The phrase “they never knew what hit them” has never been truer. However, the world of physics also dictate that IIR-seekers perform worse in adverse weather conditions (snow, rain, fog, …) compared to radar ones, a serious drawback for any weapon designed to operate in the northern parts of the Baltic Sea. While Kongsberg always claimed that the NSM offers true all-weather capability, it has remained impossible to judge the true differences based on open sources. Also, the Finnish Defence Forces is known as being somewhat conservative when adopting new technology, preferring evolution over revolution. This became evident once again with the decision to opt for the tried and tested radar seeker, and notably stealth isn’t as important for a sea-skimming missile were detection ranges are extremely short.
The Gabriel has an interesting history. A month after the end of the Six Day War in 1967 the Israeli (ex-Royal Navy) Z-class destroyer was attacked without warning by three P-15 Termit anti-ship missiles from an Egyptian Project 183R Komar-class vessel sitting inside the harbour of Port Said. While tactical lessons of a WWII-vessel being hit by three missiles fired from inside a port basin might be discussed, it was clear for the IDF that a modern anti-ship missile was needed, and the Navy took over the failed Luz-program of surface-to-surface missile to produce what became the first version of the Gabriel. This proved to be an excellent weapon in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, where the Israeli Navy was the sole service branch to completely sweep the floor with the enemy.
Development of the Gabriel continued, but by the mid-80’s the Harpoon was being introduced in Israeli service, and it looked like it spelled the end of the indigenous weapon. However, in a country famous for resurrections, death should never be taken for granted, and by the early years of the new millennium analysts where starting to question why Israel wasn’t upgrading their stocks to the new RGM-84L standard. Rumours started spreading about a new weapon being development.
The exact specifications of the Gabriel V are shrouded in secrecy, but it seems to be built according to generally the same form factors as the Harpoon. The first relatively confirmed sighting of the new weapon came two years ago, when a SINXEX involved the Israeli Navy firing a Harpoon followed by a new weapon. The stills are blurry to say the least, which seems to indicate a faster launch speed and/or worse camera than used to shoot the corresponding Harpoon launch. Another one of the few publicly available pictures/renders is found in this video, where an unspecified anti-ship missile is available as part of the IAI Skimmer-package for maritime helicopters. An air intake below the missile fuselage is found on the helicopter video but not visible upon launch in the SINKEX, but might be retractable or specific to the air-launched version.
On their homepage, IAI offers a few choice insights into the weapon. It does sport and active radar seeker, and while Israel has no archipelago whatsoever, they are situated close to one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes with the number of civilian and neutral vessels vastly outnumbering those of potential targets at any given time. This means that the missile should feel right at home in the Baltic Sea. The weapon also reportedly “copes with rapidly evolving tactical situation”, which can only mean that it sports a datalink.
It also “penetrates hard-kill defenses”, which likely is a cover phrase for end-phase maneuvering. From the video of the SINKEX the impact point low on the hull is visible, though it is impossible to tell whether the missile shown impacting the tanker is in fact the Harpoon or the Gabriel. On the cutaway it is evident that the weapon has a jet engine.
The size of the warhead is unclear. RBS15 sports an impressive 200 kg warhead, while Exocet sports a 165 kg one, the Harpoon ER has shifted down from a 220 kg to a 140 kg warhead, with NSM also having a 120 kg one. The question of what kind of destructive firepower is needed for the Navy to effectively stop the Baltic Fleet short in their tracks is an interesting one. In short, 200 kg of explosives going off won’t send a frigate or destroyer-sized target to the bottom of the Baltic Sea. A good example here is the attack on the Iranian 1,100 ton frigate Sahand. which was hit by five 220 kg warheads (including three Harpoons) and cluster bombs, and still floated for hours before fires reached the magazines of the ship. A common theme is that fires might however prove troublesome, as was seen with both the Swift, hit by an Iranian C-802 near Yemen, and the HMS Sheffield hit by a single Exocet in the Falklands war. In both cases the ensuing fires caused significantly more damage than the warheads themselves. In the case of the Sheffield, the warhead seems to have failed to detonate, but the impact put the main firefighting systems out of action, severely hampering the fire-fighting effort.
If I had to take a guess, the warhead size of the Gabriel is likely closer to 120 than 200 kg. However, it can be argued that A) vessels need not be sunk to be effectively put out of action, and B) the majority of the vessels of the Baltic Fleet are relatively small compared to blue water ships such as destroyers. Also, modern warheads do pack a larger punch compared to similarly sized ones dating back to the 80’s. All in all, the choice to downsize from the current warhead size probably wasn’t a major factor in deciding the lethality of the Finnish Navy
One thing that has potentially been seen as an issue for the Gabriel has been the lack of shore-based systems. While the technical difficulties of creating a new launching system by mounting the tubes on a truck aren’t overwhelming, the certification process still will require some additional funding. Apparently this still fit within the given cost/capability brackets, especially as the MoD states that the deciding factors have been “performance vis-à-vis acquisition costs and schedule, lifecycle costs and security of supply, and compatibility with existing infrastructure and defence system”. Notably the maintenance will be done in Finland.
The Gabriel was decidedly something of an underdog, but it is clear that the Navy went into the project with an open mind and looking for the best option instead of just continuing in the tried and tested tracks of the next RBS15. Following the Polish and German export orders for the RBS15, diversifying the anti-ship missiles of the western countries around the Baltic Sea is also a good thing, as this makes it harder for the Baltic Fleet to optimise countermeasures.
The weapon also has a secondary land-attack capability, although the damage of the comparatively light warhead deals to any kind of hard target isn’t too impressive and the missile comes with a relatively hefty price tag. It could potentially have a role in taking out soft high-value targets, such as the kind of long-range radar systems. This demonstrates another case of a Finnish defence program moving into what the US likes to call ‘cross-domain’. In other words, joint capabilities where the ground, naval, and air domains interact over the boundaries to support each other either through kinetic effect or by providing targeting data for each other. As such, it does provide another part of the Finnish deterrence picture, further strengthening the ability of the Finnish Defence Forces to hit targets at long-ranges (most sources seem to agree upon at least 150 km range).
Imagine the following scenario: an HX-fighter identifies an enemy brigade headquarter being temporarily set up in the terrain close to highway E18, outside of the range of the Army’s long-range multiple rocket launchers. The maritime threat level is however low, and the Navy dispatches two Hamina-class FAC’s which in a few hours travel from their hiding locations near Örö, to take up positions west of Suomenlinna within the air defence umbrella created by the Army’s ground-based SAM systems covering the capital. From there they fire a salvo of PTO 2020’s, which strike the target 150 km east, not necessarily putting it out of action but dealing severe damage to it. While the missiles are still in the air, the Haminas retreat back to the safety of the cluttered archipelago, stopping for a refill of missiles at one of the several smaller ports found along the Finnish coastline. The whole operation is over well within 24 hours from that the fighter first spotted the target. That is cross-domains fires and joint capabilities.
1.2 billion Euros. That’s the quoted cost for Finland’s four new Pohjanmaa-class corvettes being built under the Squadron 2020-project. An estimate thrown around is that roughly half of that sum is the ship itself, and the other half is the naval specific items. While Rauma Marine Construction, RMC, has more or less secured the shipbuilding contract, the fight is still on for the “battle system”. This consists of the weapons, sensors, combat management system, and their integration into the vessel, and with a contract likely coming in at over half a billion Euros, it has certainly grabbed the attention of the shortlisted companies.
One of these is Saab (the other two being Atlas Elektronik GmbH and Lockheed Martin Canada Inc), and this means that I find myself together with a small group of Finnish journalists and their photographers in a nondescript conference room at Saab’s facilities in Järfälla just outside of Stockholm. The large site include a number of different production as well as R&D facilities, and everything is designated a protected site by the Swedish authorities, meaning that we have to pay close attention to what we are allowed to take pictures of. The reason is simple.
Things happen quite often, more than you know.
What exactly happens is left open to imagination, but it is clear that it includes both cyber security as well as people physically moving around in the vicinity of the site.
But if Saab isn’t too keen on discussing the details of attempts at intelligence gathering directed against them, they are very keen on discussing Finland. “It’s almost a home market for us”, senior director for Naval Combat Systems Mickael Hansson explains. “We are very proud of that as well” he says and points to the currently installed product base in the Finnish Navy. This covers everything from the Trackfire remote weapon system which the Navy has developed something of a love affair with (it has been bought for all three classes being built or undergoing MLU’s during the last years), via radars, remotely operated vehicles, communication systems, missiles, and on to the 9LV combat management system.
The 9LV is found in the Rauma-class, and soon in the Hamina as well as the system was chosen for the MLU. When asked what he believes were the deciding factors, Jonas Widerström, Saab’s Naval Sales Director Finland, mentions price, harmonisation with the Rauma-class, and above all the robustness of the system. Widerström should know, being a retired naval anti-aircraft officer having served aboard Swedish corvettes he has ample experience of the 9LV. Interestingly enough, the Hamina-class currently sports Atlas Elektronik’s ANCS 2000 but instead of upgrading this the Finnish Defence Forces chose to tear it out and replace it with Saab’s offering. While the Hamina MLU technically isn’t related to the Squadron 2020 CMS contract, it is clear that the MLU-contract means that Saab is the favourite for the larger deal as well. And Saab doesn’t beat around the bush when it comes to this.
We want to win this.
How is Saab then planning on doing this? The talking points comes as no surprise. They include a “comprehensive industrial participation package” and the value of having a harmonised C3I system with not only the Hamina-class but with the Swedish ships of the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG) as well. The 9LV is also sporting “pretty advanced” capabilities when it comes to converting between national and international data links and “very good sensor fusion software” with a rapid response time. Saab also points out that they have worked with the ESSM before on the Halifax-class (ironically as part of a team led by Lockheed Martin Canada), a system which “can be, maybe be on the SQ2020”.
To top off the offer Saab is bringing their own sensor suite. This is centered around the Saab Lightweight Integrated Mast (completely unironically abbreviated SLIM) which will be manufactured by Saab and delivered as a complete subassembly to the yard for installation aboard the ship. As a parenthesis, Saab explained that the renders showed this particular SLIM-setup “on another ship” and not on the Pohjanmaa-class. Hmm, I wonder what ship that could be…?
The mast sports a number of sensors and communication antennas, the most important of which are the vessels main active sensors: the Sea Giraffe 4A FF (Fixed Face) and a single rotating Sea Giraffe 1X found inside. Keen readers of the blog will remember that Saab originally planned for a setup with a single rotating 4A accompanying the rotating 1X, and while the head of marketing and sales for Surface Radar Solutions Pontus Djerf (another retired commander) maintain that it is an solution that’s “often good enough”, the fixed face version is more future proof and provides additional benefits. As the project has proceeded, this has led Saab to swap out the rotating 4A to the FF. The fixed 1 x 2 meter AESA-arrays cut response times, but it does not replace the need for the 1X. Instead the two complementing radars operate in S- and X-band respectively (in addition any CEROS FCS-systems would bring a Ku-band radar to the ship) which brings a certain amount of redundancy and jamming resistance while also providing radars optimised for slightly different roles. In short, the 4A looks at the larger picture, while the 1X has shorter range but better resolution. Notably both radars sport features borrowed from Saab’s work with artillery location radars and small targets (such as UAV’s), or C-RAM and ELSS respectively.
These are all interesting features for the Finnish Defence Forces, because as opposed to blue water fleets, the Finnish Navy is very much a force present on the right flank of the battlefield in any potential conflict. As such, the corvettes will play an important role in the grander picture (‘joint’ is a keyword for both the Squadron 2020 and the HX-programs) when it comes to establishing situational awareness and providing medium-ranged anti-aircraft support around the most populous areas of Finland. To be able to fill the needs of higher command, a serious sensor array of both active and passive systems coupled with an effective combat management system and the datalinks to share this information. Saab seems confident that they have the solution, and that they do so at a balanced cost/performance-ratio. We will have to wait for a few months and see if the Finnish Navy agrees.
On the evening of 18 November 1942, three Finnish motor torpedo boats entered the Soviet port at Moschny Island (Fi. Lavansaari) and fired four torpedoes which sank the Soviet 1,700 ton gun boat Krasnoye Znamya at its moorings, after which they sped away unscathed. The daring raid is the high point in the history of Finnish torpedoes, and five years later torpedoes were effectively banned from Finnish use with the Paris Peace Treaty.
Like the case with guided missiles, the ban would in the end give way to Soviet weapon exports. In this case torpedoes reappeared on the (official) Finnish TOE with the acquisition of two Project 50 ‘Gornostay’ (NATO-designation ‘Riga’-class) frigates in the mid-1960’s, both of which sported heavy torpedoes (533 mm). The local renaissance of the torpedo was however cut short by the fact that the ships themselves weren’t overly successful, and importantly they were too manpower intensive for the small Finnish Navy. In the end, they were retired in 1979 and 1985 respectively.
Now, while the heavy torpedo slowly gave way to the anti-ship missile as the premier weapon in ship-to-ship combat, the lightweight torpedo became the anti-submarine weapon of choice for most navies in the world. In Finland things were a bit different, mainly because of the shallow and constrained waters which dominate the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland. However, things slowly started to change with the introduction of ever more capable diesel-electric submarines and different kinds of midget submarines in the Russian Baltic Fleet. While running towards the enemy at speed and throwing depth charges might have worked against a Project 641 ‘Foxtrot’-class, it was very doubtful whether it would against more modern designs such as the current Project 877/636 ‘Kilo’ or the upcoming Project 677 ‘Lada’.
With these developments under the surface in combination with the Finnish Navy shifting more and more priority from defence against enemy amphibious landings/naval movements to protection of merchant shipping, it was clear that the ASW-capability needed a boost. There simply needed to be more ships capable of performing ASW, and they needed a longer reach to avoid being sunk outside of the range of their own ASW-weapons. Enter the second reintroduction of torpedoes into Finnish service, with the decision that the Hamina-class and the upcoming Pohjanmaa-class (Squadron 2020) would both get light torpedoes.
The choice of torpedoes was revealed early January this year, with the announcement that Saab’s new lightweight torpedo (NLWT) had been chosen. As a matter of fact, the torpedo is so new that it hasn’t got a company name yet. “There is a name in the works”, Saab’s sales director for underwater systems Håkan Ekström discloses. In the meantime, the Swedish Defence Forces has already named the new weapon Torped 47 (sans-o, as that’s how the word is written in Swedish).
That Finland would opt for the NLWT was rather unsurprising, considering that it is highly optimised for the kind of littoral environment that any Finnish submarine hunt would take place in. Compared to ‘blue waters’ (open seas), looking for submarines is vastly different in the Baltic Sea. Detection ranges, and combat ranges for that matter, can easily be much greater than the depth, leaving the combat taking place in what the product manager for torpedoes, Thomas Petersson, described as a “Thin slice of water”. This causes issues for active sonars, as in the oceans anything spotted by them is usually either a submarine or some kind of sealife. In the Baltic Sea, most echoes are simply coming from the seabed, leading to a more difficult discrimination problem. The water also has some interesting behaviors, part of which comes from the many rivers flowing into the sea. These bring fresh water of various temperatures and significant amounts of sediments into the sea, leading to sound waves in some cases experiencing refraction in two directions (see this short and nice primer on how different temperatures messes up submarine hunting). In short together with the cluttered seabed detection becomes difficult, leading to relatively short engagement ranges.
Saab’s answer is the NLWT, which sports a number of niche features which combine to address the problems of subhunting in littoral waters. To begin with the torpedo is wire-guided, meaning that the operator aboard the ship can easily control the torpedo throughout its course. This also allows it to be used like a forward-deployed sensor, in that the operator can use its active sonar to look for targets, at different depths, as the torpedo is happily moving towards the suspected submarine location. The torpedo also has a very low slowest possible speed, allowing it to run very silently, further increasing the effectiveness of its sonars (the torpedo can be fired in both active and passive modes). One crucial difference is that the active sonar is operating at a somewhat higher frequency than usual for light torpedoes, giving it better resolution on the sonar picture as a tradeoff for somewhat shorter viewing range. The torpedo also has a quick launch sequence and rapidly goes into stable running, to ensure that it doesn’t touch the bottom and can handle the earlier mentioned short engagement ranges efficiently.
For the technical specifications, NLWT is made out of aluminium, and sports a pump jet with a single rotating impeller and a stator in place of the earlier Torped 45’s two unshrouded coaxial counter-rotating screws. The battery has also been upgraded, with lithium iron phosphate (LiFePO4) batteries replacing the earlier silver-oxide. This allows the torpedo to stay launch-ready for longer times in the launch tube, which also functions as the plug-and-play storage tube. The launch tube also include pressurised air to eject the torpedo and a spool of the same wire as is found inside the torpedo. If the torpedo moves, the torpedo spools out wire, and if the vessel moves the launch tube spools out wire. This ensures that the wire stays stationary in the water after the first few meters of the torpedo run, making sure that it doesn’t tangle or break. In the case of a wire break the torpedo will either abort or continue in fire-and-forget mode, depending on the mode chosen before launch. After a torpedo has been launched, the whole empty launch tube is switched out to a new tube with a launch ready torpedo inside it. This switch takes around 15-30 minutes for a trained crew and doesn’t require any specific equipment other than a suitable crane to handle the load. As such, it could conceivably be handled at sea (sea state allowing). The used launch tube is then sent back to a naval base to be reloaded. The direct drive DC-motor together with the new batteries provide a range measured in “tens of kilometers”, the exact number being both classified and highly dependent upon the speed of the torpedo.
The active sensor provides a detailed enough picture that it can measure the length of the target, and any major features such as the conning tower can be made out. During the run the torpedo maps all return echoes, run validity checks, and reports on valid targets. If allowed it will then intercept the closest valid target inside the search box, and in case of a miss it will re-acquire for another attack. The seeker has been used successfully during live-fire exercises against targets the size of midget submarines, and Saab is confident that it can handle these kinds of targets as well as regular submarines. An interesting feature is the anti-ship capability, and though the small warhead (Saab declines to give the size, but notes that most light torpedoes carry a warhead weighing “about 50 kilograms”) won’t sink any major surface units, it does punch above its weight in that it has a dedicated ASuW-attack mode going beneath the vessel and using an upwards-looking proximity fuse to detonate under the keel. The combined effect of the gas-bubble which removes the water that carries that part of the vessel combined with the impact of water rushing back to fill the hole is enough to literally break ships in two when employed by larger torpedoes, and while the NLWT won’t repeat that, it will most likely send any corvette limping back to base with the hull distorted and propulsion shafts out of alignment.
Part of this performance comes from the Swedish requirement to be able to use the torpedo from both surface ships, submarines, coastal launchers, and aircrafts/helicopters. For the submarines, the light torpedo plays an important role as a self-defence weapon, as well as for hunting other submarines. For the Hamina-class, they will sport a single fixed twin launcher on the rear deck, allowing enough space for the RIB-launch to remain in its current position. Looking at the future, the contract with Saab also include an option for the four Pohjanmaa-class corvettes, and everything points towards this option being exercised within the next year or so when the acquisition of weapons for the corvette program starts to take place.
The current Finnish contract for the torpedoes include the systems for the Hamina-class and an undisclosed number of torpedoes, as well as training at the torpedo research and development center in Motala. This is also where we are shown the first prototype of the weapon, which is just about to finish its part of the development program. The production of the units themselves, and prototype number two which is currently in production, takes place in Linköping. Deliveries to both Finland and Sweden will start in 2023, and FNS Tornio, the first of the Hamina-class to undergo MLU, will be ready to go to sea with the launchers fitted already next year. Notable is that the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, FMV, is closely involved in the project and is the launch customer that has contracted Saab to develop a new torpedo. However, the Finnish contract with Saab does not include any research and developments, but is purely for production and supply (including torpedoes, hardware needed for their operation, documentation, and training). However, at the same time the Finnish Defence Forces Logistics Command, PVLOGL, has signed an agreement with the FMV regarding cooperation and loans of Torped 45 to cover the period 2019 to 2023 when the Finnish Navy will have torpedo capable ships but no torpedoes.
‘Borrowing’ something that is literally worth millions of Euros sounded a bit suspicious to me, so I decided to contact FMV to confirm that it wasn’t just a case of Saab spelling ‘leasing’ wrong. However, FMV confirmed that it is indeed the case that the Finnish Defence Forces gets to borrow a non-disclosed number of torpedoes for free, as long as they are used and maintained according to official documentation. The aim of this agreement is that Finland will be able to operate with the Torped 45 aboard FNS Tornio already next autumn. Part of why this generosity is bestowed upon the Finnish Navy is no doubt that torpedoes occupy a rather unique role amongst modern munitions in that after launch they can be retrieved (the training warhead sports a flotation device in the form a inflatable ‘balloon’), and after the wire has been respooled and the battery recharged they are good to go again. As such, this is quite different compared to e.g. borrowing artillery rounds.
However, another angle is without doubt the value for Sweden of having Finland as an operator of the same system. Not only will this offer benefits when jointly performing ASW missions as part of the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group (the SFNTG), but a second cooperation deal signed at the same time between FMV and PVLOGL concern the future of the NLWT. Under this the two nations will cooperate around the acquisition and continued development of the torpedo system. By creating these kinds of synergies the costs for operating and keeping the system up to date will hopefully be lower for both users, and the agreement also open up the doors for increased cooperation around the ASW-mission as a whole.
The first draft of the text and pictures, with the exception of those parts based on information given by FMV, has been provided to Saab for screening to ensure that no classified, export controlled, or company confidential information is included.
“Psychedelic” is the word I hear someone standing next to me use to describe the room. I agree. We are standing inside what is roughly a 13 m long cube, with all the surfaces being covered with soft blue spikes of different sizes. The room is completely void of echoes, and they say that if you stand here alone, you will eventually hear your heart beating. Loudly. The only objects standing out is a large frame mounted halfway up one wall, and a pattern of blank discs mounted opposite the frame, these being the flight motion simulator and the antenna wall respectively. We are in the anechoic chamber at ELSI, and I almost expect GLaDOS to start talking to us.
ELSI, or the Electrical Warfare Simulator, is at the hearth of Saab’s anti-ship missile program. The seeker-head of the RBS15 missile is mounted on the flight motion simulator, which moves the seeker in 3-axises as it ‘flies’. On the other end of the room the antennas sends out signals corresponding to what the seeker would see at any given moment during its course. This includes not only target signatures, environmental effects, and countermeasures in the form of false targets and active jammers. All this, coupled with the seekers simulated position and real-world direction, are then used to create the model, which is fed to the antenna wall’s signal generator which creates artificial radar returns for the seeker head. As noted, it is very much a case of the actual hardware being in the loop during testing.
The story of ELSI goes back to the early 90’s, when the board decided upon the investment, partly to ensure that Saab would be able to expand their share of the export market in an age of shrinking defence budgets. 1994 the site was running its first tests, and four years later it was operating at the desired level, a host of teething problems having been fixed.
Finland is no stranger to the RBS15, having operated the first generation of the missile from ship and shorebased batteries under the local designation MTO-85 since the late eighties. As such, a Finnish delegation visited ELSI early on in 1999, with the latest Finnish threat pictures. The purpose was to run a comprehensive round of tests with the MTO-85 seeker, which then provided the basis for an upgrade program launched at Saab. The upgraded seeker was then run through the same set of tests the following year. The tests can’t have gone too bad, as two years later the upgraded RBS15 SFIII, a customised RBS15 MkII, was introduced in Finnish service as the MTO 85M.
Now the RBS15 is a hot topic again for Finland. The anti-ship missile is one of the candidates for the PTO2020-program, the current acquisition to replace the MTO 85M on the Hamina-class following their ongoing MLU and in the truckmounted batteries, as well as becoming the main surface-to-surface weapon for the new Pohjanmaa-class corvettes (Squadron 2020). And Saab is confident that the RBS15 will be a prime candidate this time as well.
Saab has two distinct versions on the table. Noting that the baseline version was nearing the end of its life, Saab embarked on an ambitious upgrade program. While the step from MkI to MkII was an upgrade, the Mk3 was a radical redesign resulting in what was basically a completely new missile. Following a four-year test program it was adopted by the German Navy, and shortly after that by the Poles. The Swedish Navy is still soldiering on with the MkII, and would have been happy to adopt the Mk3. However, the Swedish Air Force had other thoughts, and had a requirement for the weapon to be lighter to allow four missiles to be carried simultaneously by the upcoming 39E Gripen. The result was the RBS15 ‘Next Generation’ (still lacking an official designation, though Mk4 wouldn’t come as a surprise), which is an upgraded Mk3 with a lighter launch weight, longer range, and generally improved performance. The weapon is contracted for introduction into Swedish service for both the Navy and the Air Force during the next decade, and Saab doesn’t mince words: “It is the most capable and advanced anti-ship missile on the market”, as was explained to us during a briefing.
The new launchers are a chapter for themselves, with the original box-like launcher having been replaced by octagonal tubes. The reason behind this is cost-savings, as the original box held the missile tilted 45° to one side, meaning that the railings holding the missile inside the box have very demanding tolerances. The newer launch tube instead holds the missile level, which is somewhat more forgiving on the structures. But it in turn leads to new questions. “The Visby-class will fit the NG, but we have already cut square holes in the side for the MkII, so in that case we will use the old launcher,” a technical sales support engineer explained. “The missile itself doesn’t really care, it can handle both positions.”
What then is so special about the RBS15? From a Finnish standpoint, the Baltic Sea as the design environment of choice is interesting. The often poor weather combined with a cluttered archipelago and lots of civilian traffic makes for a challenging battlefield, and Saab is one of very few companies designing their anti-ship missiles from the outset for littoral waters as opposed to the open sea. This is also where ELSI comes into play. allowing for advanced simulations of the performance of the seeker, something which plays a key role in evaluating parameters such as ECCM and target discrimination. The weapon is also capable of performing the land-attack role against ‘soft’ targets, though it is not optimised for the role in the same way as ‘true’ land-attack cruise missiles.
The ships we are firing against are not that keen on being hit.
The flight path of the missile is guided through a number of pre-set 3D waypoints, and the missile then navigates using both GPS and inertial navigation to make sure it hits all waypoints on time. Timing is key for features such as simultaneous time-on-target, a default feature for the RBS15, and as such the missile will throttle up and down in flight as needed to hit all waypoints on the exact time given. The exact height of the sea-skimming part of the trajectory also varies according to sea state, with larger waves naturally forcing the missile to fly at higher altitude. And in case the missile misses its target, it will swing around and do a reattack. If no target is found at all, it will eventually head off to a pre-set destruction point, which can be altered by the operator to make sure the missile doesn’t fly off and self-destruct over the nearest town.
For PTO2020, Saab hasn’t offered a specific variant, but instead opened the shop and described the Mk3 available today and the NG available tomorrow. The systems will also be interoperable, with NG launchers able to fire Mk3 and Mk3 launchers able (after a software update) to launch NG missiles. Customisation, as has been the case with the earlier Finnish versions, is also an option, but Saab notes that less and less countries are willing to pay the premium of having a customised missile. From a Finnish perspective, the supply chain is interesting. Diehl in Germany handles final assembly, with Saab building many major subassemblies and handling much of the development work and testing in Linköping. However, a new location on the map is Saab’s brand new technology centre, the STC, in Tampere, which is heavily involved in the electronic warfare side of the technology for the RBS15 NG.
The first draft of the text and pictures has been provided to Saab for screening to ensure that no classified, export controlled, or company confidential information is included.